A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Blackjack
Markus Spiske, Unsplash

How many amended complaints does it take before your infringement claims are dismissed with prejudice? As it turns out, it might only be two.

Last July, Magistrate Judge Fallon issued an R&R recommending partial dismissal of a patentee's amended complaint under Twombly and Iqbal (the complaint was amended in response to an earlier motion to dismiss). The plaintiff sought leave to amend its complaint a second time, which the court granted.

But instead of correcting the problems with the first amended complaint, Judge Fallon found that the plaintiff simply repeated them—bringing allegations that were "conclusory" and "lack[ed] any plausible facts supporting such a conclusion."

Perhaps an even bigger issue, though, was the fact that the plaintiff …

Somewhere between the filing of the pretrial order and the pretrial conference, Judge Stark typically issues an order resolving pretrial disputes and allocating trial time. These orders - while usually short - provide a wealth of insight into his trial practices and preferences, and (often) his views on substantive evidentiary issues. They also serve to remind litigants of longstanding trial management practices (including those codified in his form pretrial order).

On Friday, Judge Stark issued a 3-page pretrial memorandum order in a set of consolidated Hatch-Waxman ("ANDA") actions, Silvergate Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bionpharma, Inc. et al., C.A. Nos. 18-1962, 19-1067, 19-678. The order contained decisions on sealing the courtroom during the bench trial, obviousness proofs, disclosure of exhibits to be used on cross examination, and others.

Calendar
Adam Tinworth, Unsplash

At this point, every trial listed in our last jury trial update has been continued or delayed, almost all due to coronavirus concerns. Here is the breakdown:

  • January 25, 2021: Novel Drug Solutions, LLC et al v. Harrow Health, Inc., C.A. No. 18-539-MN (D. Del.) (Noreika, J.): After a joint request to delay trial due in part to coronavirus issues, this trial was "continued to dates TBD."
  • February 17, 2021: U.S. v. Joanna L. Crane, C.A. No. 20-51-CFC (D. Del.) (Connolly, J.): This trial was continued for reasons unrelated to COVID-19.
  • February 22, 2021: U.S. v. Davine Boyce, C.A. No. 20-43-CFC (D. Del.) (Connolly, J.): Delayed …

Le Duel a l'Épée et au Poignard (The Duel with the Sword and Dagger)
Le Duel a l'Épée et au Poignard (The Duel with the Sword and Dagger), Jacques Callot

After we talked last week about an unsuccessful effort to bypass the Court's discovery dispute procedures, I thought it might be interesting to talk about what those procedures are, for people who don't practice here day in and day out.

A discovery dispute is a special procedure that allows the parties to receive a (relatively) quick hearing to resolve issues that arise during discovery. Bringing a discovery dispute is the only way the Court allows the parties to address these kinds of discovery issues in a typical District of Delaware case (including both patent and non-patent cases).

Is This in the Rules or What?

Discovery disputes are not mentioned in the local rules, but all of the judges have discovery dispute procedures in their form scheduling orders. ...

When one prior art reference incorporates another, parties often prefer to argue that they form a single reference under an anticipation analysis, rather than asserting them as an obviousness combination. After all, who wants to deal with motivation to combine and secondary considerations of non-obviousness if they don't have to?

But there is a risk. The primary reference truly has to incorporate—not just cite—the secondary reference, which not the most common situation. If the first reference merely cites the second, the court will likely find that they cannot be treated as a single reference.

Judge Andrews addressed that situation this week, when faced with a Daubert motion to strike an expert opinion that treated two references as one in its …

Hang in there baby
Hang in there baby The Fall of Icarus, John Doyle

We discussed last month how it has, in Judge Andrews' words, become fairly routine for the Court to grant stays following IPR institution. With the recent increase in granted stays, one can see how a litigant might be tempted to fly even closer to the sun, and extend a stay through an appeal to the Federal Circuit.

Judge Connolly gave those gallant dreamers a bit of hope on Tuesday when he granted just such a motion in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC, et al., C.A. No. 17-498-CFC, D.I. 101 (D. Del. Jan 19, 2021). In that case, the parties had stipulated to a stay pending resolution of an IPR. When the IPR concluded, some of the asserted claims had been upheld and others had been invalidated, and the plaintiff was appealing the invalidated claims to the Federal Circuit. Plaintiff wanted to move forward with the remaining claims against some of the defendants, while the defendants argued that the stay should continue.

Judge Connolly ...

Casino
Heather Gill, Unsplash

It's a common dilemma in expert discovery: the other side's expert says something new in an opening report, you move to strike it, and you get a hearing date after the deadline for your rebuttal report. Do you have your expert respond (and weaken your prejudice arguments)? Or do you double down on your motion to strike (and risk losing the ability to respond altogether)?

In D. Del., the second option is a huge gamble. Yes, it's possible to persuade our judges to strike late-disclosed expert opinions (even under the Third Circuit's lenient Pennypack factors). But if you won't get a ruling before your responsive report is due, ignoring the new material can …

Yesterday, Judge Andrews excluded testimony by an expert that improperly advanced a "practicing the prior art" defense. It has been firmly established that "practicing the prior art" is not a defense to literal infringement, and thus is not a proper subject for expert testimony. It is acceptable, however, for litigants to argue that if a patentee interprets a claim broadly for infringement purposes, the claim will read on the prior art ("that which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier," the corollary of the proverbial "nose of wax" principle that prohibits parties from taking one view of claim scope for infringement purposes and another for invalidity).

The Boy Who Cried Wolf
The Boy Who Cried Wolf Francis Barlow

Most Delaware attorneys tend to hesitate before filing an "emergency" motion, because they know how busy the Court is. The Court takes emergency motions seriously. It may defer work on other pressing issues to assist the parties with a true emergency.

I don't think anyone would want be standing before the judge (or on a conference call, or a video conference) explaining why they unnecessarily disturbed the Court's management of its docket.

Last week, Judge Connolly issued an opinion showing what may happen when a party files an unwarranted "emergency" motion.

In FinancialApps, LLC v. Envestnet, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1337-CFC-CJB (D. Del.), a trade secret and contract action, the Court …

Robin Hood, taking on some rogue non-practicing entities
Robin Hood, taking on some rogue non-practicing entities Reginald Heade

Here is some colorful writing from Magistrate Judge Burke of the District of Delaware, recommending dismissal of a claim for willfulness that failed to plead knowledge, and which relied on—at most—possible knowledge for a 15-hour period between when the complaint was served on an unknown person and when the patent expired:

From the docket, it appears that someone who is in some way affiliated with [defendant] Robinhood was served with the FAC at 9:08 a.m. on July 30, 2019. . . . But, as it turns out, the '633 patent expired on July 30, 2019—that same day. The Court guesses that, in light of all of this, it might be theoretically possible for Plaintiff to pursue what would have to go down as the most de minimis claim of willful infringement in this Court’s history. But whether such a claim—revolving around whether Robinhood knew of the patent and its infringement thereof, during a roughly 15-hour time period on July 30, 2019—would even be plausible would depend on exactly who got served with the Complaint on July 30, 2019 and what their relationship with Robinhood is. Yet the record provides little information on that front. Thus, in the Court’s view, the best course is to grant Robinhood’s Motion as to willful infringement, and if Plaintiff believes it can (and should) pursue such a claim here, then in a further amended pleading, it can attempt to set out the factual basis for such a claim.

But that's not all ...