I will speak a truth that many of you have suspected. Sometimes we (well, I) pick a case just because it has a fun name. My original post today was about HQ Specialty Pharma Corp. v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, C.A. No. 21-1714-MN. Honestly the case was too fact intensive to easily convert to a general interest blog post. On the other hand, it contained a great deal of discussion of the testimony of a New Jersey Pharmaceutical executive named Mr. Pizza.
"I'm cooked!"AI-Generated, displayed with permission
The whole thing ended up being just jokes and out of context slices ("Mr. Kelly . . . doubted whether Mr. Pizza 'had any knowledge of the [prior art] references'") …
Deadline extensions are perhaps the most common of all requests to the Court. I have seen requests granted for medical reasons, conflicts with deadlines in other cases, prescheduled vacations, and the need to enact a dark ritual which can only take place when the moon fears to rise (we'll have a post about that one on the future, assuming the ritual is unsuccessful and does not result in all things returning to dust beneath the sacred ash and the profane oak).
Today's post, however, is a tale of an extension denied. The defendant in Purdue Pharma LP v. Accord Healthcare Inc., C.A. No. 22-913-WCB, D.I. 111 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2024) had prevailed on its obviousness defense following a bench trial and filed a timely motion for fees 14 days after the Court entered final judgment.
The plaintiff, however, apparently intended to appeal the invalidity determination and thus requested that the defendant stipulated to defer briefing on fees until after the resolution of that appeal. When the defendant refused to stipulation, plaintiff moved to defer briefing until after the appeal and requesting expedited consideration of the motion (as the clock was already ticking on its 2-weeks to file a responsive fees brief).
Unlike in the true to life examples listed at the start of the blog, the plaintiffs motion was not based in any particular conflict with client or counsel. Instead, the deferment was based on the general proposition that "the appeal may impact or otherwise refute the bases for Accord’s motion." Id., D.I. 108 at 2. The defendant filed a short opposition to the motion, noting that this logic would apply to essentially any motion for fees.
Judge Bryson denied the motion to defer the briefing in a short order:
The motion to defer briefing on Accord's motion for attorneys fees 108 is denied. The court will determine when to rule on Accord's motion for attorneys fees after the briefing is complete.
We'll keep a watch out for that fees opinion and let you know if it comes before or after the appeal.
Yes, this is yet another Pennypack post. I can't resist. It's a tough-to-apply standard that impacts many cases (patent and otherwise). And it can sometimes seem to reward bad behavior by litigants, even—maybe especially—when applied as written.
But not this time! In Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir Technology, LLC, C.A. No. 20-984-WCB (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2024), the patentee produced documents about a pre-priority-date sale of prior art after fact discovery closed and just five days before opening reports.
Unsurprisingly, the other side's opening expert report five days later did not include invalidity allegations about this sale.
It seems fairly well known that while parties can freely stipulate to most kinds of schedule adjustments in the District of Delaware, changing the dispositive motion deadline is a danger zone that might result in the denial of your stipulation—or worse, such as the loss of your trial date.
But people often do it anyway. Yesterday, visiting Judge Bryson denied a stipulation that would move the case dispositive motions deadline to April 25, 2025 for a trial starting July 14, 2025.
Assuming the parties use the briefing schedule under the local rules, the Court will not have a full set of papers until May 16, less than 2 months before the first day of trial. No …
Judge Bryson unsealed a discovery dispute opinion last week in Impossible Foods Inc. v. Motif Foodworks, Inc., C.A. No. 22-311-WCB (D. Del.), addressing a motion to supplement infringement contentions after the deadline for final contentions. The patentee argued that it had good cause to supplement because it did so quickly after the accused infringer added a totally new prior art reference in their final invalidity contentions.
There are a couple of interesting things about the opinion, but I wanted to call out one in particular.
The case included a deadlines for final contentions, and then for case narrowing, with the defendant to drop to a list of 10 references. The defendant initially cut …
(Eds. Note - Andrew actually knows how the website works, so he could probably stop me)
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Today's case is RyanAir DAC v. Booking Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 20-1191-WCB, D.I. 399 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2024). For those unfamiliar, RyanAir is sort of the Irish version of Spirit airlines, although I believe they represent a significantly less wintry ring of hell (I understand they do not charge extra for a seat that did not previously contain an incontinent cat). Booking is a third-party website for booking airfare and accommodations -- similar to Expedia for our American readers.
Apparently, it was undisputed that Booking paid contractors to scrub RyanAir's website via screengrabs to get prices to post on their site. RyanAir sued, alleging that this amounted to a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") because, in collecting the screencaps, Booking and its contractors "intentionally accessed a computer without authorization or exceeded authorized access, and thereby obtained information from any protected computer."
So I mean, its pretty close to IP.
The issue was that RyanAir's website was, unsurprisingly, open to the flying public. They ran various anti-spyware measures to prevent bots from scrubbing their website for prices and blacklisted known bots, but any normal person was free to peruse at their leisure. The dispute thus centered on whether running bots to grab the prices, in contravention of terms of service and in an active attempt to circumvent the security measures, constituted access to the website "without authorization." Judge Bryson found that ...
Maybe it's just me, but pre-trial evidentiary opinions are always fun to read. They often involve rules that don't come up in other written opinions, and all of the rulings tend to be highly impactful for trial (otherwise the parties wouldn't be spending their extremely limited pre-trial time and MILs on the issues).
We got an opinion from Judge Bryson last week on pre-trial evidentiary issues in Acceleration Bay LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., C.A. No. 16-453-WCB (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2024). There are a number of interesting rulings in it, but one in particular that is worth calling out involved whether a party can offer evidence of past licenses to prove damages. …
This week, Judge Bryson issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law following trial in Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., v. Tolmar, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1784-WCB (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2024), and ANDA action. The opinion is long and thorough, and I thought the section on enablement was worth noting.
The patent at issue covers a "dosing regimen" for giving an anti-psychotic drug "to a psychiatric patient in need of treatment for psychotic disorder." According to the method, two loading doses of the drug are given, and then a maintenance dose is given between 21 and 38 days later (a "17-day window").
Defendant argued that the patent was not enabled, first because a person of …
Shh. They're not "invalid," they're "canceled" and "in the public domain"Kristina Flour, Unsplash
Yesterday Nate wrote about Judge Bryson's opinion that a plaintiff was not bound by its prior allegation that a product infringed two claims, because plaintiff's statement deals with an issue of law, not fact.
Today, I think it's worth discussing another aspect of the same decision, where Judge Bryson addressed a motion by plaintiff to preclude the defendant from discussing the same two invalid claims, claims 9 & 9 of the two asserted patents.
The the PTAB canceled claims 9 and 9 in an IPR, and plaintiff now asserts only claims that depend on those two canceled claims. It moved to prevent defendant from …
Lawyers are famously careful. We double-knot our shoes. We check the expiration date on milk, cheese, and even BACOS-brand non-bacon chunks. More than anything, we are famous for hemming and hawing and avoiding a direct response to seemingly simple questions in a transparent attempt to avoid saying something that might later be used against us.
This is a tale of one such admission that turned out alright.
So maybe don't worry so much.
DOOOOO - DO -DO -DO -DO - DA -DO -DO -DO -DO DOODLE-OOODLE DOOOOAI-Generated, displayed with permission
The initial complaint in Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir Technologies, LLC, C.A. No. 20-984-WCB (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2024) (Mem. Op.) stated pretty baldly that the defendant infringed claim 9 of the patents-in-suit.
(Eds. note, for no sensible reason it was claim 9 of both patents. I spent about 15 minutes trying to figure out how best to parse that grammatically, briefly toying with "claims 9," like "attorneys general" before realizing I don't get paid for this and giving up).
There were claim charts and everything.
This is normally what you want in a complaint, really. You kind of have to accuse them of infringement after all. The difficulty is that claims the ninth (?) were both invalidated at IPR and so the plaintiff was left to assert various dependent claims. They amended the complaint accordingly, removing any reference to the now-cancelled niners (?).
When it came to trial, defendant wanted to use the earlier complaint as evidence that their own products practiced all but the few extra limitations of the dependent claims, thus bolstering their invalidity and damages cases.
Plaintiff argued that the original complaint could not be used against it because it had been superseded (I sometimes see this called "rendered a nullity" which I quite like) by the amended complaint. Accordingly, they moved in limine to prevent those statements from being used against them at trial.
This blog is for general informational purposes. It is not an offer to perform legal services, and should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Nothing in this blog should be construed as forming an attorney-client relationship. If you have legal questions, please consult counsel in your jurisdiction.