When it comes to summary judgment and Daubert motions, the local rules here in D. Del. set a limit for the number of pages, but don't set a limit for the number of motions. Our judges' form scheduling orders for patent actions address this, and set length limits for brifing dispositive motions (and sometimes for combined SJ/Daubert briefing).
Sometimes, however, parties end up with scheduling orders that place no limits on the number of motions. In that case, in theory, a party can file as many SJ motions as it wants under the rules, with 20 pages for each motion. In practice, that may not pan out so well.
I don't think I'm speaking out of turn when I say that snap removal is a patently ridiculous concept. Whatever lawyer first decided to float this argument deserves all of the praise I can heap upon them, both for the inventiveness and sheer audacity. In fact, lets take a moment to snap for them now:
Some say he's still writing that brief. . .AI-Generated, displayed with permission
In any case, snap removal has been the law in the Third Circuit since Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152-53 (3d Cir. 2018), where the Court held that the plain language of the removal statute required snap removal even though the "result may be peculiar." Id. at 153-54.
But real snappies will be aware of the next big thing—"super snap" removals, which the Third Circuit has yet to address. A super (duper) snap removal (expialadocious) is where the plaintiff electronically submits the complaint, the defendant becomes aware of it through their docket-monitoring service of choice, and then removes the case before the filing has even been accepted by the clerk.
Snappy.
The Ninth Circuit—the first to address this growing class of removals—held that they "had a foundational defect—the absence of an existing civil action in state court—that rendered them not just defective but legally null and void." Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2024).
Judge Noreika had a decision yesterday on a middle-ground between regular and snap removal, which I have chosen to call semi-super snap removal (expialadocious). The plaintiff in Higgins v. Novartis Pharms. Corp, C.A. No. 25-245-MN (D. Del. May 14, 2025) filed ...
This is not the level of disclosure at issue here.AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Most readers who are patent litigators will know this already, but a "claim chart" is a table with two columns. The column on the left lists claim elements, and and the column on the right lists the portions of something—typically a product, system, or disclosure—that meets the elements on the right.
The chart shows the reader how the thing (whatever it may be) meets the elements of a claim or claims.
Detailed claim charts sometimes include figures with arrows pointing to the relevant claim elements, quotes of relevant text (if applicable), and/or a narrative description of how the cited material meets the element.
Sham litigation is a doctrine that I believe lives on largely because it's fun to say. Lawyers like nothing better than to stand up in court and point out that the whole case is a sham, a phony, a baseless hullabaloo.
Classic hullabalooAI-Generated, displayed with permission
Of course, the other side would rather their claims not be constantly accompanied by the word sham, and thus motions to dismiss are fairly common. Visiting Judge Murphy gave us an interesting opinion on the sham litigation doctrine today in Corteva Agriscience LLC v. Inari Agriculture, Inc., C.A. No. 23-1059 (D. Del. May 13, 2025).
The defendant, Inari, had brought a host of counterclaims alleging the usual mess of equitable …
As most of our readers likely know, IPR estoppel means that an accused infringer who brought an IPR cannot claim invalidity at trial on a grounds it reasonably could have raised during the IPR. But what constitutes a "grounds" for invalidity has varied across different District Court judges.
Everyone agrees that, as the statute says, the PTAB cannot address system or product prior art under the on-sale bar, but can potentially address publications describing those products. There has long been a split of precedent on whether an accused infringer covered by IPR estoppel can argue invalidity based on a prior art product, where the documentation describing the production could have been asserted in the IPR …
We had some indications last fall that referrals to visiting judges may be slowing—but six months on, it's clear that they are still ongoing. This week, we saw 11 cases reassigned to visiting Judge Campbell Barker of the Eastern District of Texas. That prompted me to take a look at recent referrals in patent cases, and here is what I saw for this year:
May 6, 2025: 11 reassignments to visiting Judge Campbell Barker, E.D. Tx.
April 8, 2025: 11 reassignments to visiting Judge Choe-Groves, United States Court of International Trade
March 11, 2025: 9 reassignments to visiting Judge John F. Murphy, E.D. Pa.
February 12, 2025: 7 reassignments to visiting Judge Joshua D. Wolson, E.D. …
As we've covered exhaustively, Delaware favors the use of contention interrogatories. As discovery requests go, these are often some of the more burdensome ones to deal with, and so the responding party will frequently respond with all manner of possible objections.
One response that I see from time to time is that a contention topic seeks information that is really the subject of an expert report, and thus that no response is necessary until the reports are due.
This is where expert reports come fromAI-Generated, displayed with permission
This was exactly the approach that the defendant took last week in Astellas Pharma Inc. et al v. Sandoz Inc., C.A. No. 20-1589-JFB-EGT, D.I. 779 (D. Del. May 6, …
It's always a good idea to keep up to speed on the judges' form scheduling orders. In their form orders, the judges set forth their preferences, and when those orders are entered in a case, they can override some of the local rules.
In the past, when the judges have updated their form scheduling orders, they have occasionally ordered that the updates to apply to pending cases. Sometimes, even absent such an order, counsel have been eager to apply the new procedures on their own.
(The last such change I recall was when judges started switching over to Judge Andrews' method of claim construction briefing, where the parties serve back-and-forth …
Earlier this week, Judge Burke unsealed an opinion on what appears to be an issue of first impression for the district.
Biohaven Therapeutics LTD v. Avilar Therapeutics, Inc., C.A. No. 23-328-JLH-CJB (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2025) (R&R) is a trade secret case where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants ... stole ... their trade ... secrets. The issue was that one of the plaintiffs, Biohaven, only had a non-exclusive license to the alleged trade secrets and thus defendant argued that they lacked standing to assert them.
Unlike in patent law, where dense treatises have been written about which types of license confer standing, the question of whether a bare non-exclusive license …
We haven't written about pre-institution IPR stays in some time. Defendants generally know that they are tough to achieve. You can try it but, unless there is something special about your case, pre-institution stays are rare. Most of our judges view the chances of institution as too remote to support a stay, and want to evaluate the situation after institution.
Judge Andrews issued a short oral order last week consistent with that view, denying a pre-institution in a way that suggests, unsurprisingly, that getting a pre-instutition stay remains difficult:
I read the briefs in connection with the motion to stay. Each side's positions are clear. Oral argument would not change the outcome. Therefore, the oral argument …
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