A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Patent
Patent

When one prior art incorporates another, parties typically want to argue that they form a single reference under an anticipation analysis, rather than asserting them as an obviousness combination. After all, who wants to deal with motivation to combine and secondary considerations of non-obviousness if they don't have to?

But there is a risk. The primary reference truly has to incorporate—not just cite—the secondary reference, which not the most common situation. If the first reference merely cites the second, the court will likely find that they cannot be treated as a single reference.

Judge Andrews addressed that situation this week, when faced with a Daubert motion to strike an expert opinion that treated two references as one in its anticipation …

Robin Hood, taking on some rogue non-practicing entities
Robin Hood, taking on some rogue non-practicing entities Reginald Heade

Here is some colorful writing from Magistrate Judge Burke of the District of Delaware, recommending dismissal of a claim for willfulness that failed to plead knowledge, and which relied on—at most—possible knowledge for a 15-hour period between when the complaint was served on an unknown person and when the patent expired:

From the docket, it appears that someone who is in some way affiliated with [defendant] Robinhood was served with the FAC at 9:08 a.m. on July 30, 2019. . . . But, as it turns out, the '633 patent expired on July 30, 2019—that same day. The Court guesses that, in light of all of this, it might be theoretically possible for Plaintiff to pursue what would have to go down as the most de minimis claim of willful infringement in this Court’s history. But whether such a claim—revolving around whether Robinhood knew of the patent and its infringement thereof, during a roughly 15-hour time period on July 30, 2019—would even be plausible would depend on exactly who got served with the Complaint on July 30, 2019 and what their relationship with Robinhood is. Yet the record provides little information on that front. Thus, in the Court’s view, the best course is to grant Robinhood’s Motion as to willful infringement, and if Plaintiff believes it can (and should) pursue such a claim here, then in a further amended pleading, it can attempt to set out the factual basis for such a claim.

But that's not all ...

Trials in ANDA cases (also known as Hatch-Waxman cases) are usually very efficient matters. There is no jury, and the judges, lawyers, and witnesses that regularly try and participate in ANDA cases are well-practiced at maximizing the amount of evidence presented in each trial day (even where the issues are quite complicated and the parties numerous). So ANDA trials are often short, sometimes just a few days from start to finish.

Occasionally, however, even ANDA cases are too complicated to fit into a one-week-or-less trial. For example, Judge Stark recently stated that he may allocate up to 25 hours per side in an ANDA case set to go to trial later this week.

Sierra Nevada Mountains
Sierra Nevada Mountains Alistair Corden, Unsplash

The defendant in M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless America, Inc., C.A. No. 14-1102-RGA (D. Del.), argued that the PTAB's previous invalidation of several claims of the plaintiff's patents in an IPR meant that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from asserting the validity of the remaining claims—the claims that were not invalidated—at the district court.

Defendant argued that:

  • The Federal Circuit has held that collateral estoppel applies to IPR proceedings generally;
  • The Supreme Court has held that agency decisions may have preclusive effects during later court proceedings; and
  • The Federal Circuit has extended collateral estoppel effects to unajudicated claims when there were no material differences between those and …

Bridge
Jamie Street, Unsplash

Motions in limine can be kind of exciting. The motions and the rulings are typically short, and they are ordinarily filed with the pretrial order just before trial. Unlike most motions, the Court usually rules on them quickly (between the PTO and the trial), sometimes live at the pretrial conference, and the impact is felt almost immediately.

Plus, orders that result from MILs can sometimes have a huge effect on the practical course of the trial by precluding important arguments and evidence, or even by interfering with your trial themes—frequently at the last minute. So it's worth keeping in mind the kinds of things that may come up at the MIL stage.

Last week, Judge Andrews …

Stop Sign
Luke van Zyl, Unsplash

In an opinion last Thursday, Judge Andrews struck a defendants' prior art arguments as to two references, after it offered them for the first time in an opening expert report served nearly two years after final infringement contentions.

The Court found that the prior art arguments were intentionally withheld, because the defendant used the same expert as other parties in another case on the same patents, and those parties had asserted invalidity based on the relevant references (through the expert) nine months or more before the expert did so here:

[T]here is no explanation why Defendant did nothing to alert Plaintiff of its new theories in the nine months or more before the expert …

Illustration of plaintiff's willfulness allegations
Illustration of plaintiff's willfulness allegations Head Of A Skeleton With A Burning Cigarette, Vincent van Gogh

Judge Andrews, in granting a motion to dismiss a patentee's willfulness allegations:

The allegations could charitably be described as bare-bones. There is nothing to suggest any pre-suit knowledge of the two asserted patents. Thus, Plaintiff’s position is that failure of the Defendant to concede after a suit is filed automatically converts a non-willfulness case into a willfulness case. I disagree. Thus, I will grant the motion as to willfulness.

In the same short order, he set out his view on the difference in pleading standards between willfulness and indirect infringement:

As to indirect infringement, I think the allegations make out a case for post-December 2014 indirect infringement. (I do not think Plaintiff is arguing that there was any pre-December 2014 indirect infringement, and, in any event, there are no allegations that would provide any basis for such a theory.). I do not think the requirements in regard to state of mind for indirect infringement are as great as they are for willfulness. Thus, I will deny the motion as to indirect infringement.

I couldn't find a picture of
I couldn't find a picture of "teleorthodontics" H. Shaw, Unsplash

Today, Judge Connolly held ineligible a patent directed to "teleorthodontics," i.e., a business method for practicing orthodontics remotely through the use of 3D scans of a patients' mouth.

The outcome is not all that unusual—Judge Connolly characterized the patents as essentially "do it with a computer" patents for orthodontics, where the patent claims performing a traditionally offline activity remotely using conventional computers and commercially available 3D scanners.

And, as the Court noted, other courts have held telehealth business method patents ineligible under § 101. Here, according to the Court, the patents at issue simply applied available commercial technology to the abstract idea of connecting patients and orthodontists …

Dollar Bills
Sharon McCutcheon, Unsplash

Chief Judge Stark today released his opinion on post-trial motions in Roch Diagnostics Co. v. Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC, C.A. No. 17-189-LPS (D. Del.), following a jury trial last year that resulted in a $137m verdict and a finding of willfulness.

Damages Award on 65% Royalty Theory Confirmed

The Court denied a post-trial motion to undo the jury's damage finding, which equated to an approximately 65% royalty rate (or more, depending on the royalty base).

Interestingly, the jury awarded damages after a one-sided royalty rate presentation by Roche, the accused infringer. The Court had previously excluded the patentee's damages expert's opinion as to the royalty rate, because it used the wrong date …

IPR Timing Estimator Screenshot
Andrew E. Russell

It can be kind of a pain to estimate the schedule of an inter partes review proceeding beforehand, because the dates are relative (e.g., "30 days after x"), and because the deadlines are set in a number of different places (e.g., the U.S. Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, the PTAB's Trial Practice Guide).

A few years ago, I put together a spreadsheet that automatically estimates the timing and deadlines of an IPR based on the filing date. I've updated it a couple of times since then.

A spreadsheet like this can be a great help when you need to figure out the timing of an IPR so that you can do …