A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: Expert Discovery

Is there corporate culture in there? Let's hear from our expert...
Slejven Djurakovic, Unsplash

When expert reports go back and forth in a patent case, it's not uncommon to see complaints from the patentee's expert along the lines of "I understand that the opposing party did not produce information regarding x, so I will instead base my opinions y."

In other words, the expert wants to keep the door open to explain to the jury that he or she would have done a particular analysis if only the other side had given them the information they needed. But, obviously, the other side may object to that testimony.

Judge Connolly addressed a situation like yesterday, and held that the expert cannot just testify to the jury about the other sides alleged …

Copyright Symbol
Andrew E. Russell

We've talked before about how asserting invalidity based on system prior art (as opposed to written publications, for example) can be tricky, because accused infringers can face all kinds of sometimes-unexpected difficulties with proving up the prior art.

Parties often get into sticky evidentiary questions about exactly what kinds of evidence are sufficient to show that the relevant prior art was on sale before the priority date, and how the prior art functioned—and whether that all of that evidence has authenticity or hearsay issues.

On Friday, Magistrate Judge Burke issued a long oral report and recommendation to grant summary judgment of no invalidity based on a system prior art reference. In the case, the defendants relied …

"Pick a card, any card . . . that's our secondary obviousness reference." Aditya Chinchure, Unsplash

Judge Andrews issued a short memorandum order today denying two Daubert motions based on an obviousness analysis where an expert identified a main reference and 24 additional references, without listing specific combinations.

The analysis apparently sorted the prior art into categories:

The main point of both motions is the assertion that Dr. Lepore has not identified specific combinations of prior art for his obviousness analysis. Defendants have referred to a portion of Dr. Lepore’s report where he lists categories of references. . . . [T]he expert has one reference as the “lead compound.” The expert has three additional categories of references: (1) four that show “c-Met’s role in various Cancers,” (2) six references “related to selecting a lead compound,” and (3) fourteen references “related to modifying the lead compound.”

As the Court explained, a usual case may involve a multiple-reference "state of the art" or motivation to combine analysis, so this is not a Daubert issue:

My view is that, in the usual case, an obviousness combination requires the identification of two or sometimes three references that disclose the requisite claim elements, and (usually) additional references, which can be ...

Even when plaintiffs know of the potential weak spots in their infringement cases, they sometimes fail to address DOE until too late, or they offer a DOE analysis so weak that it gets excluded or wiped out by summary judgment.

That's what happened last week, when Chief Judge Stark struck a DOE opinion after a plaintiff tried to squeak by on the idea that its late DOE argument should be permitted because it never affirmatively disclaimed DOE:

Arendi's passing reference to DOE in its complaints followed by its lack of affirmative disclaimer of DOE theories (see, e.g., C.A. No. 12−1595 D.I. 238 at 5) ("Arendi has never asserted that its claims were limited to literal infringement") does …

Caution Tape
Hiroshi Kimura, Unsplash

I came across this case today, and I thought it was a good example of why, in Delaware, it can be dangerous to be seen as acting unreasonably, particularly when it comes to things like discovery disputes and case management.

Plaintiffs filed a first case in 2018, asserting infringement of a single patent. Earlier this year, it filed a second case against the same defendant for a newly-issued patent relating to the same subject matter.

Plaintiffs sought to consolidate the two cases because they involved similar facts:

[The cases involve] identical parties, identical accused acts of infringement, the same accused process, and related patents with identical inventors, materially identical specifications, and overlapping claim terms.

Defendants opposed …

Dollar Bills
Sharon McCutcheon, Unsplash

Chief Judge Stark today released his opinion on post-trial motions in Roch Diagnostics Co. v. Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC, C.A. No. 17-189-LPS (D. Del.), following a jury trial last year that resulted in a $137m verdict and a finding of willfulness.

Damages Award on 65% Royalty Theory Confirmed

The Court denied a post-trial motion to undo the jury's damage finding, which equated to an approximately 65% royalty rate (or more, depending on the royalty base).

Interestingly, the jury awarded damages after a one-sided royalty rate presentation by Roche, the accused infringer. The Court had previously excluded the patentee's damages expert's opinion as to the royalty rate, because it used the wrong date …

Pennies.
Pennies. Mark Bosky, Unsplash

I always find it interesting to see what kinds of facts that can succeed in a motion to strike. As I've mentioned, motions to strike in the Third Circuit are governed by the Pennypack factors, which can be tricky to meet and often favor lesser remedies (although the Court does strike things).

Here is what it took to warrant striking portions of an opening infringement report Arendi S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, C.A. No. 12-1595-LPS (D. Del.):

  • Disclosing infringement contentions against five new products for the first time;
  • Relying on previously undisclosed evidence;
  • Doing so in the 8th year of a case (albeit one currently without a trial date); …

Although it requires some reading between the redacted lines, Judge Stark's recent ruling in H. Lundbeck A/S v. Apotex, Inc., C.A. No. 18-88-LPS is worth the effort. It shows that while sometimes exclusion orders leave the door open a crack to introduce the excluded evidence in some other fashion, that is not always the case.

Unusually Spry Expert Rushes to Supplement Report
Unusually Spry Expert Rushes to Supplement Report Man Holding Handbag, Andy Beales, Unsplash

Judge Andrews recently granted a motion in limine precluding a party from presenting expert opinions that were not disclosed until the expert's deposition -- without analyzing the Pennypack factors.

The correct procedure for challenging a late disclosure of theories or evidence has long been a matter of some debate in Delaware. There are cases suggesting that the party seeking to update its contentions should move for leave to do.

More commonly, a party will simply serve updated contentions or expert reports that the opposing party moves to strike. Regardless, the motions are generally analyzed under the demanding Pennypack factors, with the usual result that the …

Remember these?
Remember these? Tim Gouw, Unsplash

It can be tough to get late-produced theories or evidence excluded in Delaware, because the Court must apply the permissive Pennypack factors that typically favor admission.

The factors include prejudice, ability to cure any prejudice, disruption of trial, and bad faith/willfulness.

But lately, the Court seems to be granting more motions to strike such theories. Today, Judge Andrews granted a motion to strike a late DOE theory offered for the first time in a reply report.

Judge Andrews Isn't Messing Around

He shot down the Pennypack factors in four short and to-the point paragraphs.

As to the first factor, he found prejudice because admission of a late theory requires …