A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

As we discussed last week, people sometimes forget that parties can object to even non-dispositive rulings by a magistrate judge under FRCP 72—although I don't know whether that is what happened here.

In Boston Scientific Co. v. Micro-Tech Endoscopy USA, Inc., C.A. No. 18-1869-CFC-CJB (D. Del.), defendants moved to strike plaintiff's infringement contentions for failure to apply the Court's claim construction. The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Burke, who denied it:

(1) With regard to Defendant's request that Plaintiffs' FICs regarding the term "breakable link... adapted to be broken[,]" be stricken, (D.I. 169 at 2), it is DENIED. The Court did not construe this term, and Defendant has not convinced the Court that Plaintiffs are …

Illustration of plaintiff's willfulness allegations
Illustration of plaintiff's willfulness allegations Head Of A Skeleton With A Burning Cigarette, Vincent van Gogh

Judge Andrews, in granting a motion to dismiss a patentee's willfulness allegations:

The allegations could charitably be described as bare-bones. There is nothing to suggest any pre-suit knowledge of the two asserted patents. Thus, Plaintiff’s position is that failure of the Defendant to concede after a suit is filed automatically converts a non-willfulness case into a willfulness case. I disagree. Thus, I will grant the motion as to willfulness.

In the same short order, he set out his view on the difference in pleading standards between willfulness and indirect infringement:

As to indirect infringement, I think the allegations make out a case for post-December 2014 indirect infringement. (I do not think Plaintiff is arguing that there was any pre-December 2014 indirect infringement, and, in any event, there are no allegations that would provide any basis for such a theory.). I do not think the requirements in regard to state of mind for indirect infringement are as great as they are for willfulness. Thus, I will deny the motion as to indirect infringement.

Lightbulb
Person Catching Light Bulb, Júnior Ferreira, Unsplash

This week, Judge Andrews dismissed a summary judgment motion on inequitable conduct.

Plaintiff argued—apparently correctly—that the defendant had never pled inequitable conduct at all. And, when the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on inequitable conduct, the defendant did not file any answering brief opposing the motion (although a defendant in a related action filed brief a brief for "all Defendants").

So why was the seemingly unopposed motion dismissed rather than granted? As explained by Judge Andrews:

I do not think I can grant summary judgment against a party on an issue that is neither raised by the pleadings nor asserted by the party in the briefing. Inequitable conduct is not an …

Last week, Judge Andrews ruled on claims of privilege by Express Mobile ("EM") in Shopify, Inc. v. Express Mobile, Inc., C.A. No. 19-439-RGA, finding that several of the claims were "frivolous," and ordering a revised privilege log and supporting lawyer declarations "so that I know who to blame should Express Mobile continue to baselessly assert claims of privilege."

I couldn't find a picture of
I couldn't find a picture of "teleorthodontics" H. Shaw, Unsplash

Today, Judge Connolly held ineligible a patent directed to "teleorthodontics," i.e., a business method for practicing orthodontics remotely through the use of 3D scans of a patients' mouth.

The outcome is not all that unusual—Judge Connolly characterized the patents as essentially "do it with a computer" patents for orthodontics, where the patent claims performing a traditionally offline activity remotely using conventional computers and commercially available 3D scanners.

And, as the Court noted, other courts have held telehealth business method patents ineligible under § 101. Here, according to the Court, the patents at issue simply applied available commercial technology to the abstract idea of connecting patients and orthodontists …

Corporations, looking down at the tattered remains of their common interest privilege
Corporations, looking down at the tattered remains of their common interest privilege Foggy skyscrapers, Matthew Henry, Unsplash

When magistrate judges are referred a dispositive matter, they issue an R&R that goes to the district judge. In Delaware, an R&R typically notes the objection period at the end, and the losing party typically (but not always) files objections.

When magistrate judges are referred a non-dispositive matter, they issue an order (and possibly an opinion). The order typically does not mention any review period or process for review.

What parties often forget is that you can object to a magistrate judge's order just as easily as you can to an R&R under FRCP 72. And, in fact, the District Court …

In light of the ongoing delays in restarting patent jury trials, and the rising COVID-19 numbers nationwide, it's no surprise to see Judge Andrews recognize that parties may be better served by having a bench trial in the near future rather than waiting an indeterminate time for a jury to be available:

ORAL ORDER: The court doubts that a jury trial will be feasible on Feb. 1. On the other hand, a bench trial would be very feasible. The parties are requested to discuss with each other whether they would mutually agree to a bench trial on Feb. 1, and, if they both do agree, report that fact to the court by no later than Dec. 9. If one …

Excellent, now set it on fire . . . the hoop
Excellent, now set it on fire . . . the hoop Border Collie jumping through the hoop at NZDAC Gore New Zealand, Andrea Lightfoot, Unsplash

In Delaware, there are a few hoops to jump through if you want to bring a discovery dispute before the Court. Local Rule 7.1.1 is the most basic, and requires the parties to make "reasonable efforts" to resolve their disputes, including verbal communications between opposing Delaware Counsel.

Next, each Judge has their particular procedures for bringing the dispute, either requiring a joint phone call to chambers (Judges Connolly, Noreika, and Andrews) or a joint letter outlining the issues and confirming that the parties have met and conferred (Judge Stark). In either case, the parties …

Phone Booth
Phone booth in London city centre, Katarzyna Pracuch, Unsplash

Sometimes it's better to be heard than seen. Although most of the D. Del. judges have been holding hearings by video since March, Judge Connolly has consistently held his hearings and conferences by telephone.

Yesterday, the parties in one of his cases filed a joint request to hold a Markman hearing by video instead of by phone. They explained their rationale (to "allow for more effective and efficient presentations" and help direct the court's "attention to exhibits and demonstratives"), and offered to handle all of the logistics.

The court was not interested. Judge Connolly issued a one-sentence oral order the same day, saying only that "the Markman hearing will be held by telephone."

What's the takeaway? It's been almost nine months since the court issued its first COVID-related standing order, and the judges have had plenty of time to hone their procedures. It might not hurt to ask, but don't expect them to change what's been working.