"The white one in the middle is representative..."Andrew E. Russell, CC BY 2.0
This week, Judge Noreika denied a § 101 motion because it challenged more than 60 claims, and because the parties disagreed as to whether any claims were representative:
WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s [§ 101] motion does not precisely specify which claims’ eligibility it is challenging . . . , but in any event details challenges to more than sixty claims’ eligibility . . . without any agreement about representativeness . . . ;
WHEREAS, should this case proceed to trial, the asserted claims will be narrowed through the parties’ disclosures and discovery and, as such, most of the claims subject to the Plaintiff’s § 101 motion will not …
In IOEngine v. Paypal Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 18-452-WCB (D. Del.), the inventor kept a box of 33 prototypes for his invention in his basement "laboratory."
One of the prototypes—the "MediKey device"—had been the subject of intense dispute in a previous case on his patent. It had been analyzed by experts for both sides, who disputed its functionality and whether he had accurately described it to the PTO (as part of an inequitable conduct claim).
After a series of electrical incidents and fires in his laboratory, involving visits from various electricians and fire control personnel, the inventor discovered that the prototypes were in a new box and that the MediKey device was missing. …
As we've recognized before, motions for reconsideration can be tough.
First, the deadline to move for reargument or reconsideration is fairly easy to miss. It's just 14 days after the order or opinion, and there are no CMECF reminders to flag it for counsel.
Second, the standard for reconsideration is fairly narrow. As we've discussed, you can't rehash arguments you already made—but you also can't make new arguments you could have raised earlier.
What does that leave? New arguments that youcouldn't have raised earlier. And those typically result from something unanticipated in the Court's ruling or order.
This week we had a good example of a worthwhile motion for reconsideration. In …
As we’ve said before, sufficiency of each parties’ contentions can vary a bit by judge, and holdings are difficult to research because they usually appear in discovery dispute teleconference transcripts that are not posted to the dockets.
However, we saw a written decision issued by Judge Burke last week that illuminated one of the Court’s potential approaches to a dispute over invalidity contentions. The Court proposed that, if Plaintiff would agree to narrow its claims, the Court would require defendants to reduce the number of combinations. When Plaintiffs refused, they still received relief, but it wasn’t as strong or as specific as the relief they might have gotten had they adopted the Court’s proposal.
Plaintiffs complained that Defendants’ response to a contention interrogatory was unduly vague and insufficiently fulsome. The interrogatory sought invalidity contentions under § 103 obviousness, and the response incorporated Defendants’ Joint Initial Invalidity Contentions, so the Court focused on the Initial Invalidity Contention document itself for its analysis.
The Court found that the Initial Invalidity Contentions were sufficient in most respects:
In general, they provide real detail, including significant specificity as to ...
In rejecting a motion to amend a complaint almost two weeks ago (while we were indisposed), Judge Andrews held that a defendant's own importation under 35 USC 271(g) cannot serve as a basis for induced infringement:
Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment to assert induced infringement is futile, because Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege any of the three elements required for a claim of induced infringement – direct infringement, knowledge, and specific intent. . . . I find that because Plaintiffs have not alleged any acts of direct infringement by a third party in the United States, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim of induced infringement under § 271(b). . . . Plaintiffs’ argument that their …
"Pick a card, any card . . . that's our secondary obviousness reference."Aditya Chinchure, Unsplash
Judge Andrews issued a short memorandum order today denying two Daubert motions based on an obviousness analysis where an expert identified a main reference and 24 additional references, without listing specific combinations.
The analysis apparently sorted the prior art into categories:
The main point of both motions is the assertion that Dr. Lepore has not identified specific combinations of prior art for his obviousness analysis. Defendants have referred to a portion of Dr. Lepore’s report where he lists categories of references. . . . [T]he expert has one reference as the “lead compound.” The expert has three additional categories of references: (1) four that show “c-Met’s role in various Cancers,” (2) six references “related to selecting a lead compound,” and (3) fourteen references “related to modifying the lead compound.”
As the Court explained, a usual case may involve a multiple-reference "state of the art" or motivation to combine analysis, so this is not a Daubert issue:
My view is that, in the usual case, an obviousness combination requires the identification of two or sometimes three references that disclose the requisite claim elements, and (usually) additional references, which can be ...
A requirement to disclose third-party litigation funding arrangements on the docket;
A requirement in diversity cases to disclose the name and citizenship of every individual and corporation with a direct or indirect interest in every party;
An order expanding disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 for non-governmental joint ventures, LLCs, partnerships, and LLPs;
A requirement for the defendant in ANDA cases where there was a Paragraph IV certification to produce the ANDA when responding to the complaint;
The above are numbered only for reference below.
Each of these orders explicitly applies only in Chief Judge Connolly cases.
Yesterday, Magistrate Judge Burke released a new form scheduling order. There are redlines embedded below.
Here is a quick rundown of some of the changes in the patent scheduling order:
Added from Judge Andrews' scheduling order:
A requirement for plaintiffs to provide licenses and settlement agreements as part of their disclosures
A prompt in the scheduling order for the parties to consider a staged reduction of asserted claims and prior art, before and after claim construction (this comes up a lot)
Added from Judges Connolly, Noreika, and/or Hall's scheduling orders:
A requirement to include chart at the end listing the deadlines all together (convenient!)
Having a legitimate claim construction dispute that would lead to subject matter eligibility is a great way to survive a § 101 motion. Ideally, obviously, that argument should be set forth in an answering brief. But an opinion yesterday describes how a patentee was able to avoid a negative result on its § 101 motion through claim construction arguments offered at oral argument:
[Plaintiff] Trident suggested for the first time at oral argument that the “optimization engine” and “adaptive scoring” limitations required construction before the Court decides eligibility. . . . That claim construction wasn’t expressly raised until the oral argument suggests that [Trident] may not have actually thought there was a claim construction issue …
A reader helpfully flagged a stipulation denial by Judge Noreika last week (thank you!). The parties had a pretrial conference scheduled for July 18, 2022, and stipulated to move a number of deadlines, including for Daubert briefing. They moved the Daubert motion reply deadline from May 20, 2022 (52 days before the PTC) to June 10, 2022 (38 days before the PTC).
Judge Noreika denied the stipulation without comment. They smartly refiled, but without the Daubert deadline adjustment. This time it went through just fine, albeit with a comment stating that the Daubert deadlines were not moving:
SO ORDERED re 192 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME . . . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Daubert motion/briefing schedule set by D.I. 134 shall NOT be extended ...
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