On Friday, Chief Judge Connolly issued an order in the lead-up to an ANDA bench trial compelling the plaintiff to reduce its number of asserted claims by 75% to 4 claims, or face consequences:
ORAL ORDER: WHEREAS, the parties filed the proposed pretrial order (D.I. 225) on May 10, 2022; WHEREAS, the bench trial in this case is 24 days away, and, according to the pretrial order, Plaintiffs are still asserting 15 claims across eight patents . . . ; and WHEREAS, Plaintiffs' assertion of 15 claims across eight patents at this juncture makes clear that Plaintiffs have yet to focus adequately on the relative strength of their various infringement claims, the limited resources of …
We don't see too many DTSA cases here (at least in comparison to patent cases), but this one is interesting.
In Peloton Interactive v. iFIT Inc., C.A. No. 20-1535-RGA (D. Del.), a mechanic at defendant iFIT had a childhood friend who was working as a freelance prop man helping shoot some commercials for iFIT competitor Peloton.
According to the Court, the iFIT mechanic found out about his friend's work and, despite allegedly knowing the scripts for the commercials were under an NDA, convinced his friend the prop man to forward him the scripts, which he did (along with a note "Dont [sic] forward or show my name.").
The iFIT mechanic then forwarded the scripts to the hero of this story, an iFIT Vice President of Product Development, referred to in the opinion as "Mr. Willardson." Mr. Willardson immediately shut down the idea of using the competitor's information and involved in-house counsel:
On October 26, 2020, after returning to the office, Mr. Chambers printed a copy of the Scripts from his email. . . . After reading a portion of the Scripts, Mr. Chambers brought the document to his immediate supervisor, Mr. Willardson, VP of Product Development. . . . Mr. Willardson quickly flipped through the Scripts and told Mr. Chambers not to share the document with anyone. . . . Mr. Willardson then put the Scripts in a sealed envelope and gave the envelope to iFIT's in-house counsel. . . . Mr. Chambers and Mr. Willardson have both testified that they never disseminated the Scripts.
"The white one in the middle is representative..."Andrew E. Russell, CC BY 2.0
This week, Judge Noreika denied a § 101 motion because it challenged more than 60 claims, and because the parties disagreed as to whether any claims were representative:
WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s [§ 101] motion does not precisely specify which claims’ eligibility it is challenging . . . , but in any event details challenges to more than sixty claims’ eligibility . . . without any agreement about representativeness . . . ;
WHEREAS, should this case proceed to trial, the asserted claims will be narrowed through the parties’ disclosures and discovery and, as such, most of the claims subject to the Plaintiff’s § 101 motion will not …
In IOEngine v. Paypal Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 18-452-WCB (D. Del.), the inventor kept a box of 33 prototypes for his invention in his basement "laboratory."
One of the prototypes—the "MediKey device"—had been the subject of intense dispute in a previous case on his patent. It had been analyzed by experts for both sides, who disputed its functionality and whether he had accurately described it to the PTO (as part of an inequitable conduct claim).
After a series of electrical incidents and fires in his laboratory, involving visits from various electricians and fire control personnel, the inventor discovered that the prototypes were in a new box and that the MediKey device was missing. …
As we've recognized before, motions for reconsideration can be tough.
First, the deadline to move for reargument or reconsideration is fairly easy to miss. It's just 14 days after the order or opinion, and there are no CMECF reminders to flag it for counsel.
Second, the standard for reconsideration is fairly narrow. As we've discussed, you can't rehash arguments you already made—but you also can't make new arguments you could have raised earlier.
What does that leave? New arguments that youcouldn't have raised earlier. And those typically result from something unanticipated in the Court's ruling or order.
This week we had a good example of a worthwhile motion for reconsideration. In …
As we’ve said before, sufficiency of each parties’ contentions can vary a bit by judge, and holdings are difficult to research because they usually appear in discovery dispute teleconference transcripts that are not posted to the dockets.
However, we saw a written decision issued by Judge Burke last week that illuminated one of the Court’s potential approaches to a dispute over invalidity contentions. The Court proposed that, if Plaintiff would agree to narrow its claims, the Court would require defendants to reduce the number of combinations. When Plaintiffs refused, they still received relief, but it wasn’t as strong or as specific as the relief they might have gotten had they adopted the Court’s proposal.
Plaintiffs complained that Defendants’ response to a contention interrogatory was unduly vague and insufficiently fulsome. The interrogatory sought invalidity contentions under § 103 obviousness, and the response incorporated Defendants’ Joint Initial Invalidity Contentions, so the Court focused on the Initial Invalidity Contention document itself for its analysis.
The Court found that the Initial Invalidity Contentions were sufficient in most respects:
In general, they provide real detail, including significant specificity as to ...
In rejecting a motion to amend a complaint almost two weeks ago (while we were indisposed), Judge Andrews held that a defendant's own importation under 35 USC 271(g) cannot serve as a basis for induced infringement:
Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment to assert induced infringement is futile, because Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege any of the three elements required for a claim of induced infringement – direct infringement, knowledge, and specific intent. . . . I find that because Plaintiffs have not alleged any acts of direct infringement by a third party in the United States, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim of induced infringement under § 271(b). . . . Plaintiffs’ argument that their …
"Pick a card, any card . . . that's our secondary obviousness reference."Aditya Chinchure, Unsplash
Judge Andrews issued a short memorandum order today denying two Daubert motions based on an obviousness analysis where an expert identified a main reference and 24 additional references, without listing specific combinations.
The analysis apparently sorted the prior art into categories:
The main point of both motions is the assertion that Dr. Lepore has not identified specific combinations of prior art for his obviousness analysis. Defendants have referred to a portion of Dr. Lepore’s report where he lists categories of references. . . . [T]he expert has one reference as the “lead compound.” The expert has three additional categories of references: (1) four that show “c-Met’s role in various Cancers,” (2) six references “related to selecting a lead compound,” and (3) fourteen references “related to modifying the lead compound.”
As the Court explained, a usual case may involve a multiple-reference "state of the art" or motivation to combine analysis, so this is not a Daubert issue:
My view is that, in the usual case, an obviousness combination requires the identification of two or sometimes three references that disclose the requisite claim elements, and (usually) additional references, which can be ...
A requirement to disclose third-party litigation funding arrangements on the docket;
A requirement in diversity cases to disclose the name and citizenship of every individual and corporation with a direct or indirect interest in every party;
An order expanding disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 for non-governmental joint ventures, LLCs, partnerships, and LLPs;
A requirement for the defendant in ANDA cases where there was a Paragraph IV certification to produce the ANDA when responding to the complaint;
The above are numbered only for reference below.
Each of these orders explicitly applies only in Chief Judge Connolly cases.
Yesterday, Magistrate Judge Burke released a new form scheduling order. There are redlines embedded below.
Here is a quick rundown of some of the changes in the patent scheduling order:
Added from Judge Andrews' scheduling order:
A requirement for plaintiffs to provide licenses and settlement agreements as part of their disclosures
A prompt in the scheduling order for the parties to consider a staged reduction of asserted claims and prior art, before and after claim construction (this comes up a lot)
Added from Judges Connolly, Noreika, and/or Hall's scheduling orders:
A requirement to include chart at the end listing the deadlines all together (convenient!)
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