Happy thanksgiving, all! We won't have posts for the rest of this week. If you're in the U.S., enjoy the holiday!
Don't forget to check your calendars for any deadlines set for this Friday. Even though the District of Delaware will be closed, deadlines may or may not automatically move to Monday (depending on whether, for example, they are set to a date certain in a scheduling order).
Years ago, I wrote a really terrible first draft of a summary judgment brief arguing invalidity of a patent for obviousness.
I wrote it immediately after expert reports, and my draft failed to actually say why the claims were obvious. Instead, the whole draft read like a sur-rebuttal to the patentee's expert: here is why their first argument doesn't work, here is why their second argument doesn't work, and so on. Never "here is why the claims are obvious."
To me, at the time, it looked great. I rebutted all of their arguments! How can we lose! To others, it …
The District of Delaware is looking for its next magistrate judge!
The formal requirements to become a magistrate judge, as set forth in the announcement, are actually fairly easy to meet:
To be qualified for appointment an applicant must
(1) Be, and have been for at least five years, a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Virgin Islands of the United States, and have been engaged in the active practice …
Even occasional Delaware practitioners will be aware of the meet and confer requirement for non-dispositive motions embodied in LR 7.1.1:
. . . every nondispositive motion shall be accompanied by an averment of counsel for the moving party that a reasonable effort has been made to reach agreement with the opposing party on the matters set forth in the motion. Unless otherwise ordered, failure to so aver may result in dismissal of the motion. For purposes of this Rule, “a reasonable effort” must include oral communication that involves Delaware counsel for any moving party and Delaware counsel for any opposing party.
This rule gets an additional piquante twist in the context of discovery disputes, wherein several judges' procedures require …
Sometimes it's nice to know what doesn't work.
In AlterWAN, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1544-MN (D. Del.), the parties stipulated to a judgment of non-infringement after the Court construed certain terms of the patent, and then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit vacated the stipulated judgment because it found it was not specific enough, and remanded the case. See AlterWAN, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 63 F.4th 18, 23 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[W]e cannot ‘ascertain the basis for the judgment’ of non-infringement, . . . because the parties did not adequately explain how the claim construction rulings related to the accused systems.”).
On remand, the …
I really feel for technical experts. You study and work for years on your niche area of expertise, pushing the bounds of human knowledge while training the next generation. In your daily life you converse with other experts in the complex jargon in which you are all fluent, in an atmosphere of almost intimate trust. Then the lawyers call.
(eds. note, I'd wanted to post a screenshot from the Simpsons where Lionel Hutz imagines a world without lawyers, but I couldn't figure out how to get the rights and this blog is enough work without dealing with a cease and desist from Disney. If the blog ever really flounders we might do it as a publicity stunt. For now, …
It's always good to know where the lines are. Today, Judge Williams awarded attorneys fees after the plaintiff in a Defend Trade Secrets Act action maintained an "objectively specious" argument after the close of fact discovery:
A claim is objectively specious where there is a complete lack of evidentiary proof from the party suing. . . . [T]he Court agrees with [defendant] Backer that [plaintiff] ZIM litigated this matter with knowledge that its claims were objectively specious. While Backer contends that ZIM knew that its claims were objectively baseless when it filed the Complaint, the Court finds that ZIM understood that its claims were objectively specious by the close of fact discovery on January 12, …
The judges' form scheduling orders in D. Del. have deadlines for "substantial completion" of document production. Generally, this deadline is set so that the parties can get most of their documents out and then proceed to depositions.
This tends to be one of the key deadlines in cases, and it often the subject of disputes. We've talked before about how a party cannot withhold a category of documents until after the deadline, and how waiting to produce things until after the deadline can result in exclusion.
Parties typically agree to make "rolling productions" up until that deadline. But, sometimes, the "rolling production" is a trickle, with the bulk of the documents coming just before the deadline—leaving the other side to scramble to review everything in time for depositions.
This week we got some useful precedent from Judge Burke about how that technique is inappropriate, and how parties need to spread their "rolling" production out proportionally:
ORAL ORDER: The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's discovery dispute motion ("Motion"), (D.I. 73), and the briefing related thereto, (D.I. 70; D.I. 72; D.I. 82), hereby ORDERS that the Motion is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART as follows: (1) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants should make an orderly and proportional production of their ESI discovery, such that they should not be dumping the bulk of those remaining documents on Plaintiff at or near the December 5 substantial completion deadline. But the Court sees that Defendants have begun to move forward with those productions (perhaps spurred by Plaintiff's Motion), and it also agrees with Defendants that it is not in a good position to set an arbitrary number of ESI documents that should be produced each X days on Y dates.; and (2) So the Court will simply order that between now and December 5, Defendants should produce their remaining ESI discovery on a consistent, roughly proportional, rolling basis, such that Plaintiff does not get the bulk of the remaining documents at or near the deadline. Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 11/6/2023. (mlc) (Entered: 11/06/2023)
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., C.A. No. 22-1447-CJB, D.I. 91 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2023).
The plaintiff had sought an order compelling the defendant to produce "50,000 documents per week" over the 7 weeks that were then remaining before the substantial completion deadline. The Court rejected that part of the request, possibly because the defendant argued it didn't have all that many documents.
But the order makes clear that the defendant has to roll out what it does have in a "roughly proportional, rolling basis" before the final deadline. Nice!
I've attached the order below so that we can all find it next time this issue comes up in a discovery dispute.
The doctrine of equivalents is often treated as the legal equivalent of going "c'mon....c'mon! its all the same."
It's not uncommon to see it included in infringement contentions in terms that just note that, to the extent the noodlewiggler (TM) does not literally infringe claim 38 of of the '123 patent, it's insubstantially different, and performs the same function in the same way to achieve the same result, and is lame."
Judge Andrews issued an opinion today that neatly illustrates the problem with that tactic. The defendant in Carrum Techs., LLC v. Ford Motor Comp. C.A. No. 18-1647-RGA (D. Del. Nov. 9, 2023) (Mem. Op.) moved for summary judgment on the basis of a …
The reverse doctrine of equivalents and ensnarement are great for accused infringers, but for whatever reason they often seem to get set by the wayside.
Reverse doctrine of equivalents has a terrible name. It's really just the argument that even if the accused product meets the literal elements of the claim, it does not infringe because it is performs the claimed function in a substantially different way than the claimed invention.
As Judge Connolly put it …
