The Third Circuit Court of Appeals announced a proposed rule change recently that implements a 5 p.m. filing deadline:
26.1 Date of Filing and “Last Day”/ Deadline for Filing
Documents received by the Clerk by 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time will be filed as of the day of receipt and documents received after 5:00 p.m. will be filed as of the next day the clerk’s office is open, regardless of the means of transmission (electronic filing or otherwise). Documents received by 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on the last day for filing will be considered timely filed, unless a different time is set by a statute, local rule, or court order. Documents received after 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time …
This morning I woke up and everything hurt. It was cold, and my old house made a sound like a sad kazoo with every mournful gust of wind. I'm still working out the physics of that last bit. As I sat down to my porridge, I admitted to myself that I was old.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Anyway.
All this is to say that I felt like nothing was going my way. So I empathized with the filers of a seemingly simple stipulation in Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc. v. ResMed Inc., C.A. No. 22-794-GBW.
The scheduling order there differed from Judge Williams' form in that it added a specific provision for the reduction of prior art, limiting the number of claims asserted for each patent, as well as the number of prior art references for each patent:
The parties shall reduce the number of asserted claims and asserted prior art used for anticipation and obviousness combinations as follows: • On January 9, 2023 . . . Plaintiff shall serve an Initial Election of Asserted Claims, which shall identify no more than 64 total asserted claims, and no more than 10 asserted claims per patent. • On February 8,2023 . . ., Defendant shall serve an Initial Election of Prior Art, which shall identify no more than 64 total references and no more than 10 references per patent that can be used for anticipation or as combinations for obviousness . . .
Id. at D.I. 41 Paragraph 3(g).
Later, the parties had a dispute over the per-patent cap ...
Judge Fallon made an opinion public today that deals with whether a plaintiff can get discovery on unlaunched, abandoned, and future products in the lead up to a preliminary injunction hearing. The Court held that discovery on those products was not proportional to the needs of the case:
Zwift has shown that the document discovery requested by Wahoo is not proportional to the needs of the case at this stage of the proceedings. (D.I. 72) The complaint establishes that Wahoo was aware of Zwift’s unlaunched and abandoned hardware products, yet it did not raise these products in its motion for a preliminary injunction, indicating that the relevance of the requested discovery to the preliminary injunction inquiry …
Photograph of all of plaintiff's likelihood of success arguments securely located in one basket.Court, Unsplash
Judge Williams ruled on a preliminary judgment motion yesterday in Cirba Inc. v. VMWare, Inc., C.A. No. 19-742-GBW (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2023). In that case, the plaintiff had originally gone to trial back in 2020, and won a $237 million jury verdict, plus a jury finding of willful infringement. Id., D.I. 550 at 6.
The Court previously vacated that win, however, because it turns out that one of the plaintiffs, Cirba Inc., had assigned all rights in the patent at issue to another entity, Cirba IP. The Court held that the re-assignment meant that Cirba Inc. lacked standing such that it should not have been part of the trial, and that including Cirba Inc. in the trial impacted the arguments enough to warrant a new trial. Id. at D.I. 752, 946.
Yesterday, the Court addressed plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction pending the new trial. It looks like it was an easy decision for the Court, because plaintiff relied entirely on the previous trial win to show a likelihood of success—despite the fact that the Court had granted a new trial:
Rather than brief why it will likely prove infringement, Cirba summarily states that it "is likely to succeed on the merits of its patent infringement claim because it already has," referring to the vacated verdict from the first trial. . . . This Court, however, granted VMware's motion for a new trial. . . . "[I]t is quite clear, that the order granting the new trial has the effect of vacating the former judgment, and to render it null and void, and the parties are left in the same situation as if no trial had ever taken place in the cause." United States v. Ayres, 76 U.S. 608, 610 (1869). Thus, Cirba has made no "clear showing" that it will likely prove infringement.
It's not hard to see what plaintiff was thinking here. On the surface, the Court ...
We try to keep it light here at IP/DE, but sometimes I actually learn something and I feel sort of obliged to pass it on. You know, some real dark arts stuff that I wouldn't have known if I didn't have to read absolutely everything written in the district for this blog.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Today's bit of lore today is about damages, and a split amongst district courts that visiting Judge Bryson has taken a stand on. Can a corporate parent can claim lost profits that would have initially accrued to its subsidiary?
The trite answer to this is "no." The Federal Circuit has squarely held that "a patentee may not claim, as its own damages, the lost profits of a related company." Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 778 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, as Judge Bryson pointed out in his opinion in Kaneka Corp v. Designs For Health, Inc., C.A. No. 21-209 (D. Del. Mar. 3, 2023) (Mem. Op. & Order), several courts have held that lost profits of a subsidiary can still be claimed if they flow "inexorably" from the subsidiary to the parent.
Judge Bryson agreed, stating
To be sure, the Federal Circuit has not expressly recognized that lost profits can be awarded when those profits flow inexorably from a subsidiary to the patentee . . . I find the weight of district court authority on that point to be ...
Just last week, we wrote about Judge Noreika ordering an in-person meet-and-confer to occur between lead trial counsel regarding claim terms, in the courtroom in Delaware, and "continuing until excused by the Court." In ordering the in-person meet-and-confer, Judge Noreika noted that the parties had "spoke[n] for just 20 minutes about 10 disputed terms" during their meet-and-confer.
Yesterday, Chief Judge Connolly issued an order along similar lines—but outright canceling the Markman hearing. Like Judge Noreika did, the Court noted that the parties had failed to adequately meet-and-confer about a disputed term:
Plaintiffs first made their new proposal [to construe "tangent"] during the "meet and confer" discussion required by paragraph 13 of the Revised Scheduling Order. . . …
Aaaand we're back. You'll note one of the stipulations listed as "iffy" (legal term) was stipulations to extend page limits. We got a good example of just how iffy those can be last week from Judge Noreika:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation is DENIED. The request to extend page limits was filed seven minutes before the over-the-page limit brief was filed. The effect of this was that Plaintiff granted itself an extension without leave of Court and without respect for the Court and its rules. THEREFORE, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for failure to comply with the page limits. Counsel may re-file the motion with a brief that complies with the Court's rules.
Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., C.A. No. 22-1549-MN (D. Del. Mar. 2, 2023) (Oral Order)
Obviously, it didn't help that the parties filed their stip just minutes before the relevant brief, giving the Court no opportunity to act on it. But it led me to wonder just how often these stipulations are denied in ...
Is the reign of Pennypack coming to an end?AI-Generated
We talked earlier this year about a decision by Judge Burke that struck a parties' final infringement contentions under a good cause standard, and declined to apply the much looser Pennypack standard.
Today, citing Judge Burke's opinion, Judge Williams likewise declined to rely on Pennypackin striking late-served "Amended Final Invalidity Contentions":
According to the Court's Scheduling Order, Defendants must serve their Final Invalidity Contentions to Chervon by December 17, 2020, which they did so. D.I. 37 if 7(f). On July 27, 2022, Defendants served their Amended Final Invalidity Contentions. D.I. 316 at 1; D.I. 319 at 1. Defendants did not request leave from the Court to amend their Final …
Judge Noreika is well known at this point for requiring real, substantive meet-and-confers on claim construction. In multiple cases, she has directed parties to further meet-and-confer after finding their initial efforts insufficient.
She issued another such order this week, this time directing the parties to have what appears to be a supervised meet-and-confer, in person in the courtroom:
ORDER . . . The parties did not comply with the Court's February 13, 2023 Oral Order requiring a good-faith meet and confer. Instead, the parties spoke for just 20 minutes about 10 disputed terms, as well as "hearing logistics" and a proposal by MarkForged to request deferral of certain claim constructions until dispositive motions. There is no breakdown indicating …
Parties in D. Del. patent actions frequently stipulate to adjustments of the case schedule, and these typically go through without any issue. So it always catches my eye when a stipulated stay is denied.
In Zogenix, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., C.A. No. 21-1252-RGA (D. Del.), and two related actions, one of the defendants had moved to dismiss one of the asserted patents in a related action, and the plaintiff had moved to amend its complaint to assert additional patents and join additional parties. The motions were filed in September and November, 2022, and remain pending.
The parties in the three actions stipulated to consolidate the actions for the purposes of discovery, and to stay the consolidated action until resolution of the motions to dismiss and amend.
Judge Andrews denied the motion, ordering that the parties instead move forward as if the motions were resolved in the broadest way:
ORAL ORDER: The Stipulation to Consolidate and Stay Case . . . is DENIED. The Court is not willing to stay the cases. The discovery deadlines in the two earlier cases . . . will not be extended. The parties should proceed as though the motion for leave to amend . . . will be granted and the motion to dismiss . . . will be denied. Ordered by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 3/1/2023.
We've noted before that stipulations to stay the entire case can be iffy, and Judge Andrews has previously rejected an attempt ...
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