A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for search: Stark

Computer Screen
Arget, Unsplash

As we must have discussed in one of the prior 238,000,000 entries (estimated) on this blog, the Default Standard for Discovery requires an accused infringer to produce it's "core technical documents" early in the case (60 days after the scheduling conference), to allow the patentee to prepare its infringement contentions. This leads to the question of what exactly constitutes a "core technical document?" and, in particular, is source code a "core technical document"?

This question has gone largely unaddressed in the years since the Default Standard was adopted [editor's note: with at least one exception back in 2012]. This week, however, Judge Stark gave us a parting gift of a bit of clarity, holding that …

Visualization of the average D. Del. judge's <a href='#' class='abbreviation' data-bs-toggle='tooltip' data-placement='top' title='Summary Judgment'>SJ</a> motion pile (circa 2021, pre-Judge Stark departure)
Visualization of the average D. Del. judge's SJ motion pile (circa 2021, pre-Judge Stark departure) Christa Dodoo, Unsplash

Last month Judge Noreika issued an order praising Chief Judge Connolly's ranking-based summary judgment procedure, and imposing a similar procedure—at least for one case.

Under his SJ procedures, Chief Judge Connolly addresses each party's motions in their ranked order, and if a single motion is denied, he may decline to consider all remaining motions.

Judge Noreika issued her order after the parties in the case, Dali Wireless, Inc. v. Commscope Techs. LLC, C.A. No. 19-952-MN (D. Del.), sought …

jon-tyson-PXB7yEM5LVs-unsplash
Norman Tsui, Unsplash

One of the oddities of beginning a case is the somewhat tortured interaction between Rules 26 and 16. Under Rule 26(d), most discovery can't be served until after the parties have their initial scheduling meet and confer. That conference, discussed in Rule 26(f), should take place "as soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)." Rule 16(b), in turn, requires the court to issue the scheduling order:

as soon as practicable, but unless the judge finds good cause for delay, the judge must issue it within the earlier of 90 days after any defendant has been served …

Broken
CHUTTERSNAP, Unsplash

We wrote last week about an accused infringer's attempt to secure a TRO to force the patentee to undo their efforts to get the infringer's product de-listed from Amazon.

Judge Stark swiftly ruled on the TRO, ultimately denying it for failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits:

ORAL ORDER: Having considered all the briefing and other relevant materials . . . and having heard short oral argument yesterday, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that [accused infringer] EIS's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (D.I. 139) is DENIED. EIS has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. EIS's noninfringement argument (D.I. 140 at 7−9) turns on construction of the …

Chess
Hassan Pasha, Unsplash

In light of how busy the District of Delaware is right now, between COVID-19-related trial delays and just the ongoing burden of complex of patent filings (not to mention the likely impending departure of Judge Stark), I was curious just how often parties consent to jurisdiction over an action by a magistrate judge.

After all, we've all seen the "notice, consent and referral forms re: U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction" that are filed in new cases. Surely parties sometimes take the Court up on this, right?

The answer appears to be: yes, but not all that often. At least according to Docket Navigator, there have been only 12 cases in the District of Delaware since 2012 where …

"Moon flask with Aesthetic bird motif" The Met

Judge Stark today issued an opinion holding five claims across four patents indefinite, based on two terms: "aesthetic" and "similar to a light house." The Court held that both terms indefinite because they are subjective. As to "aesthetic," the Court rejected an argument that "aesthetic" merely differentiated between artistic and functional aspects of light:

The Court . . . agrees with [accused infringer] HeathCo that "aesthetic" is subjective and, accordingly, the claim term is indefinite. [Patentee] Vaxcel insists "aesthetic" is not subjective because it relates to the "philosophy" or "science" of "beauty and ugliness," not to whether something is pleasing or displeasing. . . . This is unpersuasive, in part …

CIrcuit Board
Umberto, Unsplash

Most patent litigators are familiar with means-plus-function claims, which are defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (previously § 112 ¶ 6). They allow a patentee to write a claim limitation as a "means" or "step" for performing a function, which is performed by the corresponding structure (or material, or acts) within the specification.

Section 112 ¶ 6 can be a gold mine for accused infringers. If they successfully argue that a claim element falls under § 112 ¶ 6, they can then argue invalidity based on a lack of corresponding structure, or they can argue non-infringement if there is structure but their products lack any equivalent. Patentees usually don't want to construe their claims as § 112 …

Cave
Cade Roberts, Unsplash

Over the past year, we've noticed that the D. Del. judges have shown an increasing willingness to exclude late-disclosed evidence and theories. Until recently, motions to strike were difficult to win under the Third Circuit's Pennypack standard. If the prejudice caused by the late disclosure could be cured, it was almost impossible to get anything excluded.

Today, harkening back to an earlier time, Judge Andrews denied cross-motions to strike allegedly late-disclosed theories from the parties' opening expert reports. Although he found that the defendant's motion presented a close call on late disclosure, he concluded that "[e]ven if these infringement theories were untimely, I find, under the Pennypack factors, that their exclusion is not warranted."

At …

Is the dam about to break on over-redaction of filings?
Is the dam about to break on over-redaction of filings? Thomas Dumortier, Unsplash

Most patent cases involve a protective order, and the parties tend mark documents other than prior art as confidential or attorney's eyes only. As a result, many of the more substantive filings—particularly discovery motions, summary judgment motions, and pretrial orders—are filed under seal.

Unlike some other jurisdictions, particularly the Northern District of California, the District of Delaware's procedure for filing under seal is not burdensome. Once a protective order is entered, no motion is required to file a document under seal, and the parties simply file redactions within seven days.

Over time, parties have become more and more liberal with their redactions, often heavily redacting sealed …

"Oh god. What did our expert just say?" Jamie Haughton, Unsplash

More and more NPE cases have moved to Delaware over the last few years, following TC Heartland. Defendants often try to deal with NPE cases by threatening fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, with varying degrees of success.

A § 285 fees opinion today by Judge Stark offers an interesting data point as to what kind of conduct is not sufficient to render a case as a whole exceptional under § 285, as well as a lesson on how to best to pursue a fees motion.

In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Trend Micro Inc., C.A. No. 12-1581-LPS (D. Del.), the patentee's …