Some home-cooked stuffing. Apparently the photo in our Thanksgiving post was uncooked stuffing.Andrew E. Russell, displayed with permission
We're back! I hope you all had a great Thanksgiving. As we'd hoped, the Court issued some interesting decisions last week, including a denial of a motion to strike in Lindis Biotech, GmbH v. Amgen, Inc., C.A. No. 22-35-GBW (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2024).
In that case, the parties had agreed to a case narrowing schedule that required the accused infringer to cut back to 6 prior art references per patent by 14 days before the pretrial order, not including references used to show the state of the art, the knowledge of one skilled in the art, …
"A POSITA would be motivated to combine cocktail sauce and raspberry jam, as both are red-colored foodstuffs safe for human consumption that come in glass containers with metal, screw-on lids."AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Judge Andrews issued a lengthy summary judgment and Daubert opinion on Thurday in Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Amazon Web Services, Inc., C.A. No. 22-904-RGA (D. Del.). The opinion hits multiple interesting issues, and we may have a couple of posts on it this week.
But the one ruling that jumped out to me was the Court's rejection of the fairly typical, low-effort motivation-to-combine language that many experts rely on in their obviousness opinions.
Motivation to combine is often an afterthought. I've seen many initial contentions that address it only in a short paragraph that basically just lists characteristics of each reference (same field, same problem, etc.). Expert reports sometimes uncritically adopt paragraphs like that no elaboration.
If you've ever been involved in reading or writing invalidity contentions, you've probably seen motivation-to-combine paragraphs just like this one, from Thursday's opinion:
As those charts show, [the first reference] ATT Maxemchuk builds upon [the second reference] ’882 Maxemchuk and informs a POSITA of additional details related to ’882 Maxemchuk’s grid-based mesh network. A POSITA would be motivated to combine these references for several reasons. Both references are in the network architecture field and are directed to improving mesh networks. Both teach the simplification of routing of data that arises from the grid-based mesh network. And both disclose the same grid-based mesh network. In addition, ATT Maxemchuk includes additional implementation details for the grid-based mesh network that ’882 Maxemchuk describes.
The paragraph gives just four one-sentence reasons for its statement that a person of skill in the art would combine the references. Three of the reasons are about general similarities between the references.
The fourth sentence is a bit more helpful, and says that the first reference provides "additional implementation details" for part of the second reference.
The Court found that this paragraph—which the parties agreed was representative—simply could not provide support for a motivation to combine the references. The Court granted summary judgment of no obviousness:
Mr. Greene “fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does.” . . . His opinion does nothing more than explain why the prior art references are analogous to each other and to the claimed invention. . . . Plaintiff’s “assertions that the references were analogous art, . . . without more, is an insufficient articulation for motivation to combine.” . . .
As Defendant’s invalidity contentions rely on Mr. Greene’s testimony, Mr. Greene’s failure to opine on a POSA’s motivation to combine the asserted prior art references proves fatal to Defendant’s obviousness theory. I grant summary judgment of nonobviousness as to all asserted obviousness defenses.
Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Amazon Web Services, Inc., C.A. No. 22-904-RGA, at 37-38 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2024).
The District of Delaware's Default Standard for Discovery requires contentions in patent cases.
One common Delaware counsel question is: what level of detail is required for contentions?
The answer varies on what the concern is. There is a certain level of detail that will probably preclude the Court from ordering you to supplement your contentions—but providing just that bare level of detail may not be enough to preserve all arguments that you later want to make.
On Monday, Judge Burke denied a motion to strike invalidity contentions where a party had disclosed an obviousness theory as to a patent based on modification of a prior art reference, but had not disclosed their intent to cite and rely on their own product as evidence that the modification was obvious.
The plaintiff had moved to strike the discussion of the defendants' own product from their expert reports, on the theory that their contentions failed to to disclose their intent to use that product in their obviousness analysis. Judge Burke denied the motion, and explained that a party need not disclose all evidence in support of its contentions:
Although this is a difficult issue, the Court is not prepared to say that Defendants' actions amounted to an untimely disclosure. This is because Defendants have affirmatively represented that they are not relying on the direct aortic Engager system as prior art itself; instead, they rely on it only as a piece of evidence that will be used to "show that a direct aortic version would have been an obvious modification to Engager 3.0 at the relevant time." (D.I. 361 at 2) In other words, Defendants are relying on the system simply as evidence in support of a theory that was itself timely disclosed. And as Defendants note, courts generally hold that: (a) in validity-related or infringement-related contentions, a party is not required to cite to every piece of evidence that will be used to support a given theory; and (b) it is proper for an expert to expand upon such theories in his expert report. . . . The Court also notes that it is not as if Plaintiff had zero prior knowledge of the existence of the [Defendants'] system. As Defendants point out, they produced documents in discovery regarding this system, and their engineers testified at some length about the device during depositions. . . . (4) In light of the above, the Court cannot say that Defendants' conduct amounts to untimely disclosure that should be stricken.
Speyside Medical, LLC v. Medtronic CoreValve LLC, C.A. No. 20-361, D.I. 447 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2023).
In my view, the Court is not saying that no evidence at all needs to be disclosed in support of the contentions—just that this particular evidence went beyond what was necessary, under the facts of the case.
Yesterday, Judge Williams issued a claim construction opinion in Persawvere, Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, C.A. No. 21-400-GBW (D. Del. Feb. 21, 2023).
In the joint claim construction brief, plaintiff asserted that defendant had waived its indefiniteness arguments because it did not include them in its invalidity contentions:
Given that Defendant failed to raise an indefiniteness argument in its Invalidity Contentions concerning terms 3 and 4, see Ex. 8, Defendant has waived this defense.
D.I. 47 at 30. In the case, the scheduling order required both initial and final invalidity contentions; defendant did not mention indefiniteness in its initial contentions, and the deadline for final contentions had not yet passed.
Early case: "No, we're not amending, why are you bugging us?" Late case: "Oh no! There was a deadline to amend?"Eric Rothermel, Unsplash
Rule 16 says that a schedule "may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent." This rule comes up any time a party wants to do something after a deadline set in the scheduling order, which is one of the more common litigation issues.
Parties will often, for example, let the deadline to amend the pleadings pass by, only to later realize that they want to assert an inequitable conduct defense (defendants) or wrap in a related entity (plaintiffs).
Good cause requires diligence, and in practice parties often frame the diligence discussion …
We've talked before about how asserting invalidity based on system prior art (as opposed to written publications, for example) can be tricky, because accused infringers can face all kinds of sometimes-unexpected difficulties with proving up the prior art.
Parties often get into sticky evidentiary questions about exactly what kinds of evidence are sufficient to show that the relevant prior art was on sale before the priority date, and how the prior art functioned—and whether that all of that evidence has authenticity or hearsay issues.
On Friday, Magistrate Judge Burke issued a long oral report and recommendation to grant summary judgment of no invalidity based on a system prior art reference. In the case, the defendants relied …
As we've mentioned, Judge Connolly uses a different system of patent contentions than the other District of Delaware judges. The other judges generally use the system set forth in the Default Standard, while Judge Connolly's approach is modeled after the more restrictive method used in the Northern District of California.
Because he uses a unique system, parties often wonder just how much (or how little) is needed to offer sufficient contentions in Judge Connolly's view.
Judge Connolly offered some insight on that point today, when he overruled a patentee's objections to an accused infringer's invalidity contentions. Here is one of the contentions at issue:
Claims 1, 2, and 4 of the ’489 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § …
Case narrowing is an issue that comes up in most patent cases at some point, whether in the scheduling order, as a discovery dispute, or at the pretrial conference (or, possibly, all three).
When requested, judges in Delaware typically implement an initial two-stage reduction in asserted claims and prior art references, with the first stage occurring before claim construction, and the second afterward.
Of course, sometimes they will implement other schedules depending on the needs of the case and the requests of the parties. And, for cases that reach a pretrial conference, the Court often imposes an additional limit on the number of claims for …
In May 2020, West Publishing and Thomson Reuters filed a copyright action against ROSS Intelligence LLC, alleging that ROSS (through a third party) scraped content from WestLaw to start its own Artificial-Intelligence-based legal research platform. (ROSS has since ceased operations but persists solely to litigate this case.)
Down the line, I imagine the case may raise some interesting questions about AI and copyright. For example, what are the copyright implications of ROSS's use of Westlaw's copyrighted compilation of otherwise public domain materials to train an AI? Isn't that fair use (talk about transformative!)? If not, what are the damages? And so on.
For now, ROSS has moved to dismiss on the ground that West failed to …
Even when plaintiffs know of the potential weak spots in their infringement cases, they sometimes fail to address DOE until too late, or they offer a DOE analysis so weak that it gets excluded or wiped out by summary judgment.
That's what happened last week, when Chief Judge Stark struck a DOE opinion after a plaintiff tried to squeak by on the idea that its late DOE argument should be permitted because it never affirmatively disclaimedDOE:
Arendi's passing reference to DOE in its complaints followed by its lack of affirmative disclaimer of DOE theories (see, e.g., C.A. No. 12−1595 D.I. 238 at 5) ("Arendi has never asserted that its claims were limited to literal infringement") does …
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