Before you get too excited, defendants, this case involved a scheduling order using Judge Connolly's form, which provides only a single round of infringement and invalidity contentions, and explicitly requires good cause to amend.
Most District of Delaware scheduling orders include two rounds of contentions (initial and final), with the second round typically coming around the close of fact discovery. It is unlikely to be as difficult to amend in cases like those.
Regardless, I thought this was an interesting result worthy of a post. In Cognipower LLC v. Fantasia Trading, LLC, C.A. No. 19-2293-JLH-SRF (D. Del.), the Court stayed the case …
As we've noted in the past, it's fairly routine to stay cases once an IPR is instituted. But the Court has at least once denied a stipulated stay where the IPRs were not yet instituted.
Last week the visiting Judge Choe-Groves denied a stipulated stay where the PTAB had instituted an IPR for two out of three patents-in-suit—leaving one patent not subject to an IPR, as the parties explained in the stip:
WHEREAS, Teladoc filed three petitions for inter partes review (“IPR”) (Nos. IPR2024-00618, IPR2024-00616; and IPR2024-00617) of the Asserted Patents;
WHEREAS, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) instituted IPRs on the ’554 and ’142 Patents on September 16, 2024 and September 17, 2024; …
Motions to stay are common as dirt, and about as interesting.
The factors are exactly what you expect them to be, and the Court has broad discretion to apply them. Most of these motions could be reduced to a checklist:
Judge Burke addressed a situation yesterday in BT Americas, Inc. v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 22-01538-CJB (D. Del.) where a defendant moved to stay pending IPR, but the patent-in-suit wasn't actually part of the IPR.
You may be thinking—huh? How did that situation come up?
The plaintiff apparently brought suit on two patents, and the defendant moved for IPRs on both. The PTAB instituted on the first one, and declined to institute on the second. When the defendant notified plaintiff of their intent to request a stay, the plaintiff immediately dismissed the first patent with prejudice—leaving only the second patent, which was not the subject of any IPR.
The defendant nonetheless charged ahead with its motion to stay, arguing that it should get a stay anyway:
A stay of the suit pending resolution of PAN’s instituted IPR petition on the ’641 patent will streamline the issues in this case, even if the ’641 patent is dismissed. . . . Regarding the ’237 patent [which is not subject to an IPR], a stay is appropriate regardless of whether the ’641 patent is dismissed because there is substantial overlap between the two Asserted Patents. Both patents share an identical specification and the claims of the ’237 patent substantially overlap with the claims of the ’641 patent. . . . Indeed, during motion to dismiss briefing, the parties and the Court treated claims 14 and 18 of the ’237 patent as representative of all asserted claims of both patents. . . . Even BT’s infringement contentions are replete with internal cross-references, repeatedly relying on the “mapping” of representative ’237 patent claims to argue infringement of the ’641 patent. . . . The PTAB’s institution decision on the ’641 patent relies on the same evidence to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success as the PTAB’s decision on the ’237 patent for corresponding claim limitations.
. . .
Because of this significant overlap, the PTAB’s final written decision as to the ’641 patent could dramatically simplify the case or, at the very least, would be highly instructive as to the ’237 patent. The reasoning and written record from the PTAB on the instituted IPR will be relevant to at least claim construction and invalidity of both Asserted Patents. Accordingly, a stay will remove the possibility of onerous, redundant, and potentially inconsistent rulings, and narrow the issues in this case. . . . A stay will thus conserve judicial and party resources as to validity of the Asserted Patents.
Come on in, stay a whileAI-Generated, displayed with permission
This naturally suggests a strategy for avoiding stays that I have been surprised not to see more of—splitting your suit into multiple different cases, each asserting just a few claims. This seems to be what occurred in ImmerVision, Inc. v. Apple Inc., C.A. No 21-1484-CJB (D. Del. Oct 17, 2023) (Oral Order).
In that case, Immervision filed two separate suits at around the same time (but not actually on the same day) asserting different claims of the same patent. The PTAB issued an IPR that covered all of the claims asserted in one of the cases, but none of those asserted in the other. Apple moved to stay both cases (which had been consolidated for pretrial purposes), and Immervision opposed, just as to the case not covered by the IPR.
Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, Judge Burke found that it would make little sense to split these consolidated cases apart and granted to the motion to stay as to both cases:
Additionally, absent a stay in this scenario, two rounds of summary judgment and Daubert briefing/hearings would need to be held (one in this action and one in the 1733 action) -- as opposed to one combined summary judgment/Daubert process. Plus, since the PTAB's Final Written Decision in the 990 patent IPR is due in late summer 2024 (prior to the October 2024 trial scheduled in this case), if the PTAB upheld the claims at issue in that IPR, then no doubt ...
I'm not sure if "Ddrops" stands for "dew drops." But this is a nice picture regardless.Aaron Burden, Unsplash
We've talked about how pre-institution stays can be tough (but not impossible) to achieve, and about how Judge Burke has sometimes responded to a pre-institution motion to stay by asking for a status report and abbreviated briefing after the institution decision:
Therefore, no later than five business days after the PTAB rules on whether it will institute IPR as to the last of the petitions at issue, the parties shall provide the Court with a status report of no more than two single-spaced pages, indicating the outcome of the petitions and whether Defendant wishes to renew its Motion. If Defendant does wish to renew the Motion then, the Court will set a further (truncated) briefing schedule.
eBuddy Technologies B.V. v. LinkedIn Corporation, C.A. No. 20-1501-RGA-CJB, D.I. 108 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2022) (Burke, J.).
Last week, Judge Williams adopted a similar view, denying a pre-institution motion to stay but offering to revisit the issue after the institution decision—and to take the previous briefing into account:
ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed Defendant MOM Enterprises, LLC's ("MOM") Motion to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review ("IPR") . . . , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew the request if the IPR is instituted. A court has discretionary authority to grant a motion to stay. . . . Because no institution decision has yet been issued, the Court will decline to stay the case until it hears from the PTAB. . . . By no later than five (5) business days after the PTAB issues its institution decision as to the IPR petition relating to the asserted patent, the parties shall file a joint letter updating the Court on the results of the PTAB's decision. If the PTAB grants the IPR petition, and if MOM then wishes to renew its Motion, MOM should include in the joint letter a statement that it intends to renew its Motion. The Court will then set a letter briefing schedule on the renewed Motion. When reviewing the renewed Motion, the Court will take into account the briefs already filed as to the instant Motion. ORDERED by Judge Gregory B. Williams on 8/25/2023.
Ddrops Company v. MOM Enterprises, LLC, C.A. No. 22-332-GBW, D.I. 108 (D. Del. Aug. 25, 2023). This mirrors Judge Burke's previous order, although Judge Williams' order doesn't state whether the later briefing will be truncated—that may depend on the circumstances.
Judge Williams' practice is useful to know because, obviously, it affects the calculus of whether it is worthwhile to bring a pre-institution stay motion at all.
We wrote last week about how Judge Andrews—somewhat surprisingly—declined to lift a stay after the PTAB left just 4 of 83 patents standing, and invalidated the rest.
After that decision, the parties filed a series of letters that clarified that the plaintiff had intended to proceed only on the four valid patents, not the rest, but wanted to check with the Court regarding how they should proceed:
[Plaintiff] Cytiva understood that the litigation would proceed only with regard to the four claims that the PTAB upheld as valid, and until JSR’s submission, was not aware that JSR had a contrary view. Cytiva had no intention, and has no intention, …
On Friday, Judge Andrews addressed what happens when an IPR results in just 4 valid claims—and 79 invalid ones:
ORAL ORDER: I read the letters about lifting the stay. . . . The parties agreed to a stay through PTAB resolution of the IPRs. (D.I. 66 ). The PTAB resolution determined seventy-nine claims unpatentable and four patentable. Both sides have appealed. It does not make much sense to go forward with the overwhelming number of asserted claims likely invalid. I think it is probable that there will be a final decision from the Court of Appeals within a reasonable amount of time. That decision will, one way or another, greatly simplify this case. The …
You try and get him outsideAI-Generated, displayed with permission
Basic legal stuff.
As is often the case, these general principles can only be stretched so far. Such was the lesson of Monterey Res., LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., C.A. No. 19-2090-NIQ (D. Del. May 10, 2023) (Order), in which a motion to stay went just a bit too far.
Evident from the C.A. No., this case was pretty old, and had already been stayed once pending IPR's on 4 of the 6 patents-in-suit. A few of the IPRs succeeded but the case continued on the remaining patents this last January with some discovery taking place and Markman briefs being exchanged.
Pretty standard so far.
The twist is that the Defendant then requested EPRs for 2 of the 4 remaining patents and moved to stay the case again. This proved to be a bridge too far:
Here, this matter is in the middle stage of discovery, though the parties have also filed claim construction briefs. This matter, however, has been pending since November 4, 2019, and has already been stayed for more than 19 months to allow the IPR proceedings to play out. These circumstances do not favor a second stay.
Monterey Res., LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., C.A. No. 19-2090-NIQ (D. Del. May 10, 2023) (Order)
As a little aside, this order gave me a bit of nostalgia for my early days in Delaware. I used to see a great many orders where 80% of the text was in footnotes explaining the reasoning, but it seems to have fallen out of fashion in DE over the last couple years. I find that I miss it a bit.
We've had quite a few posts in recent months about the trend towards granting longer and longer stays in the district, so it was interesting to see a decision bucking that trend on Monday.
The Court stayed the proceedings in Speyside Medical, LLC v. Medtronic CoreValve LLC, C.A. No. 20-361 (D. Del. Oct. 14, 2022) (Oral Order) last year after the PTAB instituted an IPR on 3 of the 5 patents in suit. The final written decision issued last month, with about half of the asserted claims from those 3 patents invalidated, and the other half upheld. The parties joint status report hinted heavily that appeals could be expected from both sides
In the parties' status report, the plaintiff pressed to move forward with the case, agreeing not to pursue the currently invalidated claims. Defendant, unsurprisingly, wanted to continue the stay, and chastised the plaintiff for refusing to drop those claims with prejudice, and thus leaving the door open to their potential return at a less opportune time.
Judge Burke decided to get things moving, referring to the "typical practice of our Court"
The Court ORDERS that the stay is lifted and that the case will proceed forward pending any appeal of the IPR decisions, in light of the fact that: (1) the original decision to stay the case was itself a close call, (D.I. 155 ); (2) Plaintiff has (at least for now) agreed not to pursue in this Court any of the claims of the '897 and '708 patents that the PTAB has held unpatentable; (3) Defendants have had a fair shot in the PTAB to invalidate the remaining asserted claims of the '118 and '897 patents and have not prevailed; and (4) moving forward in these circumstances is in line with the typical practice of our Court, (D.I. 162 at 1-2 (citing cases)). ...
This blog is for general informational purposes. It is not an offer to perform legal services, and should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Nothing in this blog should be construed as forming an attorney-client relationship. If you have legal questions, please consult counsel in your jurisdiction.
