Are these ancient and inviolable rules from times of old? Nope—at least, not all of them.Unknown
When I first started practicing in the District of Delaware, in the decade before last, I was told there are certain rules of citation that should always be followed in filings here. I've heard these repeated by others as well.
Most of these fall into the bucket of "we do it this way because the Court prefers it," which is—obviously—a great rule of thumb. But does the Court really prefer that the bar do these things?
Out of curiosity (and for the sake of a blog post), I took a look at some of the D. Del.-specific citation rules that I've heard …
Growing up, my grandparents lived on a lake in far northern Minnesota. Naturally, one of my favorite pastimes (during the 6 hours a year when the lake was not frozen) was throwing objects into the lake to see the splash. Stones, screws, turtles, siblings, turtles and siblings together in a move I called turtle-terror-soup, all were grist for the splash mill.
Andrew E. Russell, displayed with permission
Famously, once the splash settled and the turtles have returned to doing whatever they do, the waters turned calm once again. A passerby moments later would have no knowledge of the true chaos that had just passed. This is the way of true ripples.
Metaphorical ripples, however, are a bit trickier, as evidenced …
"You should grant our stay because it will increase the chances of institution which will increase the chances of you granting our stay"Ihcoyc
This week in MYW Semitech, LLC v. Apple Inc., C.A. No. 25-504-RGA-EGT (D. Del.), the Court rejected a pre-institution IPR stay argument that I haven't seen before.
The accused infringer pointed out that the PTAB now considers whether any pending District Court action is stayed. It argued that, because institution would simplify the case (one of the traditional stay factors), the Court should stay pre-institution to maximize the chances of institution and, thus, simplification:
Under the new bifurcated process, granting a stay increases the likelihood of simplification of the issues. The factors considered by the Director as part of the discretionary denial process include “whether the court granted a stay” in this case. . . . This “evolving circumstance[]” means that granting a stay at this point directly increases the likelihood that [the accused infringer]’s IPRs will be considered on the merits and instituted—which in turns increases the likelihood that these IPRs will simplify the issues for the Court. . . . Thus, a stay promotes the simplification of the issues by encouraging the Director to allow consideration of the IPR on the merits for purposes of institution. The new discretionary denial procedure thus presents a new reality that uniquely warrants a stay while IPRs are at the discretionary considerations stage.
D.I. 65 at 2-3. Judge Andrews denied the pre-institution stay in a three-sentence oral order, and dedicated one of those three sentences to specifically rejecting this new argument:
ORAL ORDER: The motion for a stay pending IPR (D.I. 59) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal should an IPR actually be instituted. There is no reason to interrupt the schedule based on speculation about what might happen in April or June 2026. (D.I. 60 at 2). I note that I do not think that I should grant a stay in order to increase [the defendant]'s chances of getting an IPR instituted.
MYW Semitech, LLC v. Apple Inc., C.A. No. 25-504-RGA-EGT, D.I. 68 (D. Del. Jan. 21, 2026). Good to know!
It's usually easy to spot a dependent claim. They will immediately go to the first person they know at a party and follow them around for the whole evening. They text too much. They may boil your pet rabbit.
They also usually begin with something like "the compound of claim one, wherein the R1 group is cocktail sauce or raspberry jam"
Would you believe we already had this image saved for some reason?AI-Generated, displayed with permission
But what do you make of a claim like this?
A method of performing an assay that monitors cell-substrate impedance, comprising: providing the system of claim 1;
introducing cells into at least one well of said system;
monitoring cell-substrate impedance of said at least one well.
It references a specific system claimed in an an earlier claim (here a fancy sensing wellplate). But it doesn't look at all like the usual form. Instead it pretty much says, "use that well plate we told you about and then look at what happens you big dummy."
(Eds. Note: I should move into prosecution)
The issue came up in the context of a dispute over marking. As shown above, the patent in Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Axion BioSystems, Inc., C.A. No. 23-198-CJB (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2026) had an independent system claim and these "mixed" method claims that required using the system. It was undisputed that the plaintiff had sold a wellplate that practiced the system claim without marking it.
Years ago, the Federal Circuit held that a party could get around 287 in these circumstances by only asserting the method claims, even if there were other unasserted system claims in the same patent. Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009). But that leaves the question of what to do with a claim like this that actually requires the use of the infringing apparatus?
In granting summary judgement of no pre-suit damages, Judge Burke held that ...
There is no more cliched legal advice than "say nothing." It is such a staple of the greater Law and Order cinematic universe that the average 8-year-old, upon being arrested for rampant tomfoolery (still a crime in Delaware!) knows to ask for their phone call and then remain silent.
I know its a dog, but the image generator is down and its all I had. Just pretent its an unfortunately hairy child.AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Wow Tech USA, Ltd. v. EIS, Inc., C.A. No. 24-115-GBW (D. Del. Jan. 9, 2026) dealt with the fallout of an earlier patent dispute between the parties.
Both parties are competitors in the field of obscure and presumably advanced sex toys with "air pulse technology." The case had gone to trial in 2023, with the jury returning a verdict of willful infringement and awarding a $12.8 Million lump sum royalty (a running royalty was also an option on the jury form, so this lump sum choice was explicit).
However, the defendant's equitable defenses were not decided at the trial and remain outstanding, and thus no final judgment has been entered.
This new case arose when the defendant allegedly told potential customers that:
the jury verdict in the Patent Action "gave Defendant a fully paid-up license for the lifetime of Novoluto's patents-in-suit," and that the license includes Defendant's Air Pulse products, "including new-yet-materially-identical products Defendant has released and continues to introduce to the market since trial in the Patent [Action]."
Id. at 2 (quoting complaint).
Plaintiff thus brought Lanham Act false advertising claims (along with a host of related state law claims) based on these statements and defendant moved to dismiss arguing that these statements were literally true because "[a] lump sum patent damages award has the same effect as a lifetime paid-up license to the patents."
The Court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of particularity in the allegations (taking a side in the Third Circuit split on ...
Just an update: the parties and the Court made it part way through the Rein Techhearing today, but it ultimately had to be adjourned, to be rescheduled at a later time. We'll likely post another update on the substantive protective order violation issues—which are fascinating—after the rescheduled hearing.
We've been following a series of hearings in Rein Tech, Inc. v. Mueller Systems, LLC, C.A. No. 18-1683-MN (D. Del.), a now-dismissed case where the inventor attempted to serve the expert witness but was excluded due to protective order violations.
The defendant later alleged that the same inventor again violated the protective order by continuing to prosecute another patent application in the same field, despite a prosecution bar.
In response, counsel for the inventor argued that the inventor did sign the prosecution document, but did not "prosecute" the patent:
Although signed by [the inventor], he did not prosecute the ‘454 patent application [Request for Continued Examination] and response that was submitted . . …
It's not just you. Multiple firms in town have been experiencing issues with the Court's PACER system since yesterday. Most parts of the website work fine, and you can still make filings. But one of the most critical part of the site, pulling a list of docket items in a case, appears to be down. Others report that it's still working.
This feature is something I use multiple times per day. When I'm making a request of the Court, I like to check the docket to make sure I have the most up-to-date info about what's going on in the case. I also like to use exactly the same documents thatthe Court sees. Plus, it's helpful …
Typically, final judgment is the end of the road for a patent case. It's right there in the name. Sometimes, however, it is just a further maneuver in a forever war which the parties have little hope of resolving in their lifetimes.
There are, of course, only limited legal avenues for keeping the fires burning after final judgment. Today's case (oddly, the same as yesterday's case) deals with contempt.
The prompt was "the very embodiment of contempt." I think the bot has some personal issues to resolve.AI-Generated, displayed with permission
As we discussed yesterday, BioDelivery Sciences International, Inc. v. Alvogen Pb Research & Development LLC, C.A. No. 18-1395-CFC-CJB (D. Del.) had proceeded to judgment years ago, with the plaintiff generally prevailing.
Like most ANDA cases, the judgment contained a clause enjoining the defendant from making/selling/using the "ANDA Products" until after the expiration of the infringed patents. D.I. 308.
Years later, the defendant filed a new ANDA based on the same listed drug, apparently reformulated to design around the relevant patents. The Plaintiff, in addition to filing a new ANDA case against this ANDA, brought a motion to enforce the judgment.
Judge Connolly denied the motion, finding that it was procedureally improper:
I need not decide whether the products covered by ANDA No. 220582 are an "ANDA Product" covered by paragraph 7's injunction because I agree that the motion is procedurally improper, and I will deny it for that reason . . .
I agree that to the extent BDSI seeks to enforce the injunction in paragraph 7, it must do so by way of a contempt motion. An injunction is "an equitable decree compelling obedience under the threat of contempt[.]" And thus "injunctions are enforced through the district court's civil contempt power." Accordingly, "[i]f a party contends that another party is violating an injunction, the aggrieved party should move the court for an order to show cause why the other party should not be held in civil contempt."
D.I. 423 at 9-10 (internal citations omitted).
It's not clear from the opinion whether the door is technically open for a further motion for contempt. However, given that the Court took the parties to task for the "waste of judicial resources" and "obstreperous behavior by both sides to a degree I have rarely experienced as a judge" I would not be at all surprised if the plaintiff just let it lie and continued with the new case. Only time shall tell.
Just a heads up for D. Del. practitioners: The Court announced today that it will be closed on Friday of this week, 12/26/2025, in addition to being closed on Wednesday and Thursday as previously scheduled. This is due to an executive order issued last week. Be sure to consider whether this impacts any of your deadlines!
This blog is for general informational purposes. It is not an offer to perform legal services, and should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Nothing in this blog should be construed as forming an attorney-client relationship. If you have legal questions, please consult counsel in your jurisdiction.
