A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

I guarantee that's the cleanest this car seat will ever look.
I guarantee that's the cleanest this car seat will ever look. Erik Mclean, Unsplash

Judge Andrews issued an opinion earlier this month regarding a permanent injunction in Wonderland Switzerland AG v. Evenflo Company, Inc., C.A. No. 18-1990-RGA (D. Del. July 5, 2022). Plaintiff in that case prevailed at a four-day bench trial in 2021, with a damages award of $343,680 (they sought $845,528, according to the draft PTO).

Plaintiff now moved for a preliminary injunction. The Court had held after trial, as part of its Georgia Pacific reasonable royalty analysis, that the parties were "direct competitors":

First, I previously held that "the parties are direct competitors in the industry of the patented invention." . . . Specifically, the parties do not dispute that Graco and Defendant directly compete in the car seat market. (See D.I. 195 at 2 (Defendant agreeing, " There is no dispute that Evenflo directly competes with Graco, Wonderland's customer in a large market for all-in-one car seats.")). Additionally, Plaintiff is the exclusive manufacturer of car seats sold by Graco in the United States. . . . Thus, if Graco loses a sale of a car seat, Plaintiff also loses a sale.

Judge Andrews rejected an apparent attempt to backtrack and argue that the parties were not competitors, in part because ...

Truth
Michael Carruth, Unsplash

Judge Andrews issued an interesting opinion today denying a requested $9 million attorneys' fee award in Acceleration Bay LLC v. Take-Two Interactive Software, C.A. No. 16-455-RGA (D. Del.).

There were a number of facts in defendant's favor, but not quite enough to get over the bar for fees under § 285. The one that most caught my eye was that the Court had previously expressed concerns about counsel's candor—a rare thing for the Court in the District of Delaware to do:

Defendants argue that the impropriety of Plaintiff's litigation conduct-including the lack of candor, forcing relitigation of lost issues, and the pattern of inappropriate conduct in previous cases-further proves that this case …

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Burn for something, that enlight and warm others. Passion., Andy Kogl, Unsplash

The 101 day has been the highlight of the Delaware patent law hearing calendar for many years now. It's an all-day no-holds-barred marathon where questions can come to any party at any time. And the best part is, you can look forward to a decision at the end of the day. It is our Super Bowl and our debutante ball all in one, where Delaware's brightest stars go to see, and be seen.

Naturally, I always attend.

I had been a bit worried that the practice would not survive Judge Stark's departure. Although other Judges have adopted the practice to some extent, Judge Stark (the progenitor of the practice) had always been the most reliable host for the event.

Judge Burke Revives the Practice with his own Flair

But my fears were laid to rest last week when ...

Checklist
Glenn Carstens-Peters, Unsplash

Today was the Federal Bar Association's annual luncheon, an annual event where the Chief Judges give updates on the status of Delaware's District and Bankruptcy courts.

This year's event was the first in-person meeting since the start of the COVID lockdowns. It was great to see everyone again in person!

Attendance was relatively low. Some speculated that this may be due to expiring FBA memberships. My theory is that there may have been an issue with the invitation e-mail (I never received it myself, and I'm a current FBA member).

In any case, I wanted to post some highlights and interesting facts from the speakers today, as we did for the virtual event last year:

  • The …

Split
Bannon Morrissy, Unsplash

IPR estoppel can be kind of terrifying as an accused infringer in a patent action. The statute says that an accused infringer may not assert invalidity on a ground that it could have raised in the IPR; but you can't raise product prior art, so product prior art should be safe, right?

Nope. Courts have sometimes held that product prior art may still be estopped, if there is patent or written prior art that is sufficiently similar. See, e.g., Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, 432 F. Supp. 3d 448, 453 (D. Del. 2020) (holding defendant estopped from asserting product art where “all the relevant features” of the art were in a printed publication that could have been raised in an IPR).

As Judge Stark notes in Wasica, courts have gone both ways on this, with some estopping arguments based on product art where similar written or patent art could have been raised in an IPR, and others permitting those arguments.

On Friday, Judge Noreika chose a side in this split: no estoppel for prior art products ...

Cell Phone
Tyler Lastovich, Unsplash

In patent infringement cases, plaintiffs' claim construction strategy sometimes seems to boil down to "Plain meaning! Construe it later! Everything is in!", while defendants often go for "No plain meaning! Construe it now! Our thing is out!".

Note that, for defendants, it's not necessarily that everything is out of the claim. It's often that there is one specific thing from the specification that is required, and that just happens to be the one thing the defendant's product doesn't have or do.

This strategy doesn't have a great success rate for defendants, but often I feel like the attitude is that "well it's worth a shot." I'm not sure that's always true, because a really bad argument …

Is there corporate culture in there? Let's hear from our expert...
Slejven Djurakovic, Unsplash

When expert reports go back and forth in a patent case, it's not uncommon to see complaints from the patentee's expert along the lines of "I understand that the opposing party did not produce information regarding x, so I will instead base my opinions y."

In other words, the expert wants to keep the door open to explain to the jury that he or she would have done a particular analysis if only the other side had given them the information they needed. But, obviously, the other side may object to that testimony.

Judge Connolly addressed a situation like yesterday, and held that the expert cannot just testify to the jury about the other sides alleged …

An embodiment of the claimed
An embodiment of the claimed "weight-shift controlled personal hydrofoil watercraft" U.S. Patent No. 9,359,044

We don't usually write about claim construction opinions, because they tend to be fact-specific and tough to generalize to other cases.

But there were a few interesting points in a claim construction opinion issued by Judge Andrews on Friday, and I thought it was worth outlining them here:

  • While the judges are typically somewhat adverse to extrinsic evidence, Judge Andrews asked the parties to submit letters outlining "textbook[]" style definitions of the a term, "stability," and said that he found the letters helpful. He adopted the construction that "capture[d] the concept of static stability" as set forth in the textbook definitions.
  • The Court relied on plaintiff's …

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Mario La Pergola, Unsplash

It's easy to fall into the trap of separating rules into "technical" and "substantive" and on that basis to choose which must be followed and which can be safely ignored. Judge Noreika neatly illustrated how foolhardy this practice can be last week, when she issued a brief, two-sentence order denying a summary judgment motion:

WHEREAS, pursuant to the 47 Scheduling Order, a separate concise statement of facts shall be filed with any summary judgment motion; and WHEREAS, Plaintiff did not file such statement with its 194 Motion for Summary Judgment. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED for failure to comply with this Court's procedures set forth in the Scheduling Order

Board …

RIP, dear stipulated extension
Mr Xerty, Unsplash

Just a heads up, since this has to be one of the more common things that counsel do in cases—this week, Judge Connolly denied a stipulation extending the answer deadline as untimely and lacking a reason:

ORAL ORDER: The parties' stipulation (D.I. 16) being untimely and offering no justification for an extension, it is HEREBY DENIED. Defendant has until June 23, 2022 to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the complaint. ORDERED by Judge Colm F. Connolly on 6/21/22. (ntl) (Entered: 06/21/2022)

Wikeshire IP LLC v. TransCore, LP, C.A. No. 22-445-VAC (D. Del.).

It's not clear from the docket why it was untimely. It looks like the answer deadline was originally 4/28/2022, then it was extended by stip to 5/28, then 6/14. Then, on 6/14 (the due date), the parties filed another stipulation extending the answer deadline to 6/28.

So it looks like the Court rejected a stipulation filed on 6/14 to extend a 6/14 due date. It may be that the parties filed after the 6pm filing deadline. Or, it may be that the Court is taking the view that the stipulation must be filed early enough for the Court to "so order" it prior to the deadline—but I haven't seen that in other cases.

Either way, it's probably safest to list a justification for your stip extending the answer deadline, and to file early going forward! Of course, this can be tricky in high-volume NPE cases, where plaintiff's counsel may be unresponsive until the parties are right up against a deadline.