Where IPRs are concerned, post-institution stays are fairly routine. But there are also instances where cases are not stayed, and it can lead to surprising results. For example, we talked last year about a case where where a defendant won on invalidity in an IPR, but had to proceed to trial anyway—and faced estoppel on their prior art.
We saw an order in a somewhat similar category this week, when Judge Williams denied a post-trial motion to stay following the invalidation of the asserted claims by the PTO in an ex parte reexamination:
ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed the Joint Status Report, D.I. 1856, filed by the parties on October 23, 2023, the Court …
Generally Delaware counsel are downright accommodating when it comes to granting extension requests. One common refrain is that "if we don't grant it, they'll just move, and the Court will grant it."
Often that's true—I've seen multiple successful emergency motions to extend deadlines after opposing counsel unreasonably denied an extension. Typically these seek a short extension (a few days, or sometimes 30 days for a response to a complaint) and are backed by good reasons.
Uh Oh - An Emergency Extension Motion Fails
That's why I thought it was interesting to see an "emergency" attempt at extending a deadline fail, in Speyside Medical, LLC v. Medtronic Corevalve, LLC, C.A. No. 20-361-GBW-CJB (D. Del.). …
The scope of IPR estoppel is a tricky issue that courts have gone different ways on. Everyone agrees that a party cannot argue invalidity in an IPR based on a prior art product (as opposed to reference), and that IPR estoppel extends to art the petitioner "reasonably could have raised" during the IPR.
Courts have gone different ways, however, when it comes to whether a party can assert invalidity at trial based on a product that embodies a reference that was asserted or could have been asserted at an IPR. In D. Del., as we've discussed, Judge Stark held that a …
Today, I present a gift to the many patent law professors that read this blog every morning (presumably). I give you a truly odd fact pattern that can be inserted neatly into your next exam, and which is guaranteed to annoy your students. All I ask in return is that you require those students to subscribe to the blog in perpetuity, on penalty of failure.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Deal? Deal.
The issue here was the on-sale bar. As a quick refresher, that's this bit of 102:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or
The patents in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Elysium Health, Inc., C.A No. 20-1098-GBW (D. Del. Aug 30, 2023) covered distinct crystal forms of a compound called "NCRI." Shortly before the critical date of July 24, 2013, the patentee had agreed to sell some NCRI to a customer. There was a PO and ...
I'm not sure if "Ddrops" stands for "dew drops." But this is a nice picture regardless.Aaron Burden, Unsplash
We've talked about how pre-institution stays can be tough (but not impossible) to achieve, and about how Judge Burke has sometimes responded to a pre-institution motion to stay by asking for a status report and abbreviated briefing after the institution decision:
Therefore, no later than five business days after the PTAB rules on whether it will institute IPR as to the last of the petitions at issue, the parties shall provide the Court with a status report of no more than two single-spaced pages, indicating the outcome of the petitions and whether Defendant wishes to renew its Motion. If Defendant does wish to renew the Motion then, the Court will set a further (truncated) briefing schedule.
eBuddy Technologies B.V. v. LinkedIn Corporation, C.A. No. 20-1501-RGA-CJB, D.I. 108 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2022) (Burke, J.).
Last week, Judge Williams adopted a similar view, denying a pre-institution motion to stay but offering to revisit the issue after the institution decision—and to take the previous briefing into account:
ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed Defendant MOM Enterprises, LLC's ("MOM") Motion to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review ("IPR") . . . , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew the request if the IPR is instituted. A court has discretionary authority to grant a motion to stay. . . . Because no institution decision has yet been issued, the Court will decline to stay the case until it hears from the PTAB. . . . By no later than five (5) business days after the PTAB issues its institution decision as to the IPR petition relating to the asserted patent, the parties shall file a joint letter updating the Court on the results of the PTAB's decision. If the PTAB grants the IPR petition, and if MOM then wishes to renew its Motion, MOM should include in the joint letter a statement that it intends to renew its Motion. The Court will then set a letter briefing schedule on the renewed Motion. When reviewing the renewed Motion, the Court will take into account the briefs already filed as to the instant Motion. ORDERED by Judge Gregory B. Williams on 8/25/2023.
Ddrops Company v. MOM Enterprises, LLC, C.A. No. 22-332-GBW, D.I. 108 (D. Del. Aug. 25, 2023). This mirrors Judge Burke's previous order, although Judge Williams' order doesn't state whether the later briefing will be truncated—that may depend on the circumstances.
Judge Williams' practice is useful to know because, obviously, it affects the calculus of whether it is worthwhile to bring a pre-institution stay motion at all.
It's not uncommon to see discovery requests and 30(b)(6) topics asking about the location of documents. In fact, up until 2015, Rule 26 specifically provided for this kind of discovery:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense--including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things . . . .
In 2015, in a (highly commendable) effort to shorten Rule 26, that example was dropped. Now it just reads:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . …
We've noted before that parties routinely stipulate to extend the deadline to answer in D. Del. cases. You may have wondered—is there a limit to the number of times the parties can stipulate to extend the answer deadline?
Now we have the answer: Yes, at least for Judge Williams. Here is how he reacted when parties filed their ninth stipulation to extend the answer deadline:
ORAL ORDER: There have been nine (9) Stipulation and Proposed Orders entered in this case granting Defendant an extension of time for it to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. See D.I. 20; D.I. 21; D.I. 22; D.I. 23; D.I. 24; D.I. 25; D.I. 26; D.I. 27; D.I. …
We've written a lot about the common D. Del. practice of limiting parties to 10 claim terms per case (at least for the Markman hearing).
We talked about a similar order from Judge Andrews earlier this month, and previous orders by Judges Connolly, Noreika, and Burke. Now, Judge Williams has set the same limit, in at least one action:
ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed the parties' Joint Claim Construction Brief (D.I. 96), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will construe a maximum of ten (10) terms/term sets during the August 1, 2023 Claim Construction Hearing. The parties shall meet and confer and, no later than July 17, 2023, the parties shall file …
We're really starting to run out of good, free pictures of sand bags for these posts.Karen Barrett, Unsplash
At this point, all of the D. Del. judges have adopted a joint claim construction brief procedure invented by Judge Andrews, where the parties serve opening, answering, reply, and surreply briefs, and then file a single combined joint claim construction brief that presents the arguments term-by-term. This means that the parties and the Court can work from a final, combined joint brief where all of the arguments match up.
This is a great procedure and everyone seems to like it. Certain questions tend to come up about it, though.
Common Questions on the Joint Claim Construction Brief
When a party asks to do something outside of the time limits set by the scheduling order, the Court looks to whether there is "good cause" under FRCP 16(b)(4) to modify the scheduling order. Good cause requires diligence, generally meaning that the movant could not have reasonably met the deadline it's trying to move.
Last week we got two examples of diligence analyses from the Court, one that found that a party was diligent, and one that didn't. I thought it would be interesting to line them up and compare them.
"Immediately" = Good Cause
First, Judge Fallon found good cause where a plaintiff sought to depose a third-party witness after the close of fact discovery, after the …
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