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Intellectual Property

We've Found the Bottom: A Claim Construction So Unsupportable that It Fails the Rule 12 Plausibility Standard

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 30, 2020
MTD § 101

The most famous use of the phrase
The most famous use of the phrase "self-evident"? Engraving by William J. Stone

In ruling on § 101 motions to dismiss, the Court typically adopts plaintiff's constructions outright, if plaintiff offers any. Those constructions may or may not be enough to avoid dismissal, but I can't recall any instance where the District of Delaware actually had to reject a construction as implausible under the FRCP 12(b)(6) standard.

Until now. In Synkloud Tech. v. HP, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1360-RGA (D. Del. Sep. 28, 2020), plaintiff tried to bake the § 101 "non-conventional" standard into the proposed claim construction. Clever! But Judge Andrews described the problems with that approach as "self-evident":

Plaintiff states that a person of ordinary skill …
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Fed. Cir. Improves Cost / Benefit Calculus for Defendants Joining IPRs

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 24, 2020
Estoppel IPR

Previous equations for deciding whether to join an existing IPR
Previous equations for deciding whether to join an existing IPR Roman Mager, Unsplash

Today the Federal Circuit held that a party joining an existing IPR is not subject to estoppel on any grounds other than those that were actually raised. See the opinion below.

Before this, a plaintiff could argue that a defendant who joined an in-progress IPR was estopped on any anticipation or obviousness arguments that "reasonably could have [been] raised" in the IPR.

The Court here held, in short, that because a defendant joining an existing IPR is not allowed to add new grounds at all, it cannot be estopped except on those grounds actually raised.

It relied on the Facebook decision we talked about …

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Judge Bryson Issues 22-Page Opinion in Two Days, Stays Case Pending Re-Exam Just 11 Weeks Before Trial

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 18, 2020
Re-exam Stay

Judge Bryon issued an interesting stay opinion last Friday.

The plaintiff had initially asserted six patents. Of those, four were dismissed under § 101, and the claims as to one of the remaining patents were severed and stayed pending IPR.

The case was set to go to trial on the last remaining patent on November 30, just over 11 weeks from the date of the order. But, last month, the PTO granted a request for ex parte reexamination of the sole asserted claim of that patent.

Shortly after that, Judge Bryson issued his opinion granting a motion to stay pending re-exam. A couple of interesting points:

  • What a turnaround! Defendant first indicated it intended to request a stay …
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Judge Andrews Confirms Holding that Barred Full Prosecution History from Jury

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 16, 2020
FRE 403 FRE

Judge Andrews yesterday issued his opinion denying all post-trial motions in TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., C.A. No. 13-1835-RGA (D. Del.). The jury had returned a verdict of infringement and no invalidity after a trial in January 2020.

One part of the opinion stands out—Judge Andrews discusses his decision to preclude the defendant from discussing the full prosecution history of the patent before the jury as prejudicial under FRE 403:

I ruled that 2Wire could elicit testimony about what prior art was in front of the patent examiner, but that testimony about a “lengthy history of cancelling claims, adding claims, rejecting claims, [and] rejecting new claims” was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because …
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No expert? No problem. Maybe.

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 7, 2020
Litigation Pennypack

Empty Chair
Giorgio Trovato, Unsplash

Sometimes people think that they have to offer expert testimony to rebut the other side's expert on every single issue. That's not true, at least when the other side has the burden of proof.

I've represented a defendant in a jury trial representing where we offered no damages expert at all, and it worked out well (under the circumstances—I'm definitely not saying it's a good general strategy). We poked holes in the opposing expert's theories, and the other side had no way to return fire and no reply report in which the fix the issues.

Judge Andrews addressed something like that last week in an opinion on a motion in limine. Defendant had offered expert …

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Federal Circuit Holds That A Party Cannot Join Its Own Previous IPR Proceeding

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 4, 2020
IPR

The Federal Circuit's decision is below.

It found that even though the defendant did not receive an identification of asserted claims from the plaintiff until after the statutory IPR deadline, and even though the patents included a total of 830 claims, the statute did not allow the defendant to file a new IPR petition and then join it to its previous IPR proceeding as a way to add claims after the statutory filing deadline.

The Court recognized that the decision would result in wasted efforts by defendants in challenging claims unnecessarily:

We . . . recognize that our analysis here may lead defendants, in some circumstances, to expend effort and expense in challenging claims that may ultimately never be asserted …
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Judge Burke Sets Forth Views on Impermissible Discovery in Trade Secret Actions

Andrew E. Russell, Aug. 28, 2020
Discovery

Restricted Data Notice
"Restricted Data" stamp, RestrictedData, CC BY 2.0

In another part of the opinion mentioned earlier today, Judge Burke set forth his views on the scope of discovery in a trade secret action—an issue that comes up a lot, along with the related issue of the disclosure of the alleged trade secrets:

As to what is not relevant trade secret discovery: what [Plaintiff] is not entitled to do is to set out a claim in Count IX for trade secret misappropriation—i.e., a claim involving a certain set of alleged facts, occurring in a certain alleged time frame, involving a certain referenced set of persons and a certain type of purported misconduct—and then say to [Defendant], “Now that we have …
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The Court: Broad, General Interrogatories Merit Only Broad, General Answers

Andrew E. Russell, Aug. 28, 2020
Interrogatories Discovery

Judge Burke yesterday unsealed a lengthy opinion addressing a range of discovery disputes in a pending trade secret litigation.

In one instance, plaintiff sought to force a further response to a broad interrogatory, and complained that Defendant's broad answer omitted important time periods. The interrogatory asked:

[D]escribe in detail the stage of R&D, design, documentation, clinical work, marketing and/or sales of the [relevant product] at the time [Defendant] or anyone on behalf of [Defendant] was in first contact with any Former [Plaintiff] Employee . . . .

Judge Burke denied the request, noting that the time periods Plaintiff complained about were from before the alleged trade secret theft, and therefore it was not clear why they were relevant. He also …

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Trade Secret Allegations in Sealed Complaint Fail, Judge Andrews Rules

Jeff Castellano, Aug. 18, 2020
DTSA 12(b)(6)

In trade secret litigation, parties often fight bitterly over the level of particularity with which the party asserting misappropriation has described its trade secrets. That dispute frequently plays out in connection with interrogatory responses or other trade secret contentions, served after the initial pleadings are closed.

However, it can arise earlier in the case. In a recent order, Judge Andrews dismissed a federal trade secret misappropriation claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint identified "large, general areas of information that Plaintiff alleges to have shared with Defendant" but failed to "identify what the trade secrets are within those general areas."

Notably, the order, issued in Lithero, LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP, C.A. No. 19-2320-RGA (D. Del.), states …

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Chief Judge Stark Explains His Thoughts on Indefiniteness Issues Going to the Jury

Andrew E. Russell, Aug. 17, 2020
Indefiniteness Jury

In his lengthy ruling on the post-trial motions in Pacific Biosciences, Chief Judge Stark also set forth his views on whether indefiniteness may be tried to a jury, an issue that seems to come up repeatedly:

[Defendant] insists that the Supreme Court's decision in Teva vs. Sandoz[, 574 U.S. 318 (2015),] made indefiniteness an issue exclusively for the court to decide. I disagree. I continue to believe that I have discretion to put . . . indefiniteness before the jury where[,] as here, there are subsidiary fact disputes that inform the indefiniteness decision as a matter of law. [Defendant] has cited no contrary Federal Circuit case.
In fact, instead, the Federal Circuit [has] made clear that indefiniteness is …
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