Having a legitimate claim construction dispute that would lead to subject matter eligibility is a great way to survive a § 101 motion. Ideally, obviously, that argument should be set forth in an answering brief. But an opinion yesterday describes how a patentee was able to avoid a negative result on its § 101 motion through claim construction arguments offered at oral argument:
[Plaintiff] Trident suggested for the first time at oral argument that the “optimization engine” and “adaptive scoring” limitations required construction before the Court decides eligibility. . . . That claim construction wasn’t expressly raised until the oral argument suggests that [Trident] may not have actually thought there was a claim construction issue …
Last week, Judge Hall denied a motion to dismiss claims of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), finding that the plaintiff had "barely met the low threshold for alleging infringement of the asserted patents." The plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that the defendants imported and sold phone displays that were "remanufactured" overseas using patented methods of removing damaged glass covers from mobile phone displays so that replacement glass can be attached.
Judge Hall's R&R, issued in Viking Techs., LLC v. Squaretrade Inc., C.A. No. 20-1509-CFC-JLH, addressed four arguments made by the defendant, namely that the amended complaint: (1) did not adequately allege that the remanufacturing process performed all of the claimed steps; (2) failed to attribute specific misconduct to either defendant; (3) did not allege pre-suit notice; and (4) failed to allege infringement under 271(g) because the accused devices are not "made" by the accused process and are "materially changed" by subsequent processes.
On the first argument, the sufficiency of the allegations that the remanufacturing process met all claimed steps, Judge Hall found that "Viking has barely met the low threshold" for pleading infringement. Although the allegations of infringement in the complaint largely tracked the claim language, and did not include allegations of infringement for every claim mentioned in the complaint, Judge Hall found that the allegations were "sufficient to provide Defendants notice of the grounds on which Plaintiff’s claims rest," including "what portion of their business—mobile device repair—and what specific products—those that have had the display assemblies repaired/remanufactured—are accused of infringement." Citing the Federal Circuit's Nalco decision, she explained that there is simply "no requirement that a plaintiff plead facts establishing that each limitation of an asserted claim is met." ...
We've been following the district court cases holding that a complaint itself cannotestablishknowledge of patent infringement sufficient to support a claim of indirect infringement or willfulness.
On Friday, Judge Hall jumped in, noting that judges in this district have taken views on this issue:
As many have acknowledged, courts—including courts within this district—disagree as to whether a pleading alleging post-suit inducement must allege that the defendant had the requisite knowledge prior to the filing of that particular pleading (or the lawsuit itself). I am also aware that there are courts—including in this district—that appear to hold that in the absence of pre-suit knowledge, a post-suit indirect infringement claim …
An interesting fees issue was decided earlier this week in a Report and Recommendation by Judge Hall—can a prevailing defendant recover attorney's fees under § 285 for work done on a successful IPR petition?
The answer, apparently, is no.
Given the prevalence of IPR petitions, I was somewhat surprised to see that there was no authority on the issue from either the Federal Circuit or Delaware. Judge Hall found the text of § 285 decisive:
The text of 35 U.S.C. § 285 says nothing about giving the district court the ability to award fees incurred by a prevailing party in a separate administrative proceeding. The statute simply states that “[t]he …
Magistrate Judge Hall issued an R&R today recommending that the Court deny a motion to dismiss an inducement claim against a health insurer relating to a method-of-use claim for a generic drug.
The complaint alleges that, despite knowing that the plaintiff had a method-of-use claim for a specific treatment, the insurer nonetheless covered the patented treatment at a lower cost to patients than treatment with the name-brand drug:
The thrust of the allegations against [the insurer] Health Net are (1) that it provides coverage and payment for [co-defendant] Hikma’s generic product even in cases where Health Net actually knows that a particular beneficiary is using the generic version for an unapproved—and allegedly infringing . . …
Magistrate Judge Hall issued a § 101R&R today in Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., C.A. No. 20-1629-RGA-JLH (D. Del.), recommending denial of defendant Lyft's motion to dismiss based on § 101.
The Court found that the patent was not directed to an abstract idea—though it noted that it was a close call—and that, regardless, the invention contained an inventive concept under Step 2 of Alice.
We've all read about dozens (or more) of § 101 opinions over the last few years, but here are a few points of interest from Judge Hall's opinion:
Judge Hall closely examined the representativeness of the alleged representative claim, and rejected it as unrepresentative. Choose …
Judge Hall today issued an R&R on attorneys fees in In Re Kerydin (Tavaborole) Topical Solution 5% Patent Litigation, MDL No. 19-md-2884-RGA (D. Del. June 23, 2021), an ANDA case.
There, the plaintiff filed suit on four patents even though the PTAB had previously found an earlier patent in the family invalid in an IPR, and even though IPRs were pending on each of the four patents-in-suit.
Filing suit triggered the 30-month stay of FDA approval. Shortly after the suit was filed, one of the defendants moved to stay; plaintiff did not oppose, and actually filed a cross-motion to stay its own action against the other defendants (who opposed).
In a trade secret dispute over THC remediation processes, Judge Hall recently denied a hemp processing company's motion for a preliminary injunction. The redacted version of her opinion came out yesterday, and it gives some helpful guidance for parties litigating trade secret disputes. It also touches on an important tip for legal writers everywhere.
As usual, one of the key questions was whether the plaintiff adequately identified the trade secrets at issue. This requires a careful balancing act—the trade secret needs to be broad enough to cover what the defendant is doing, but narrow enough to qualify for trade secret protection in the first place.
In trying to walk this line, lawyers are often tempted to use terms like "and/or" to keep their options open. In this case, the plaintiff used "and/or" in defining the scope of two of its alleged trade secrets. This ended up playing an important role in Judge Hall's likelihood-of-success analysis:
Starting with (1), SCB’s definition is not only general, it uses the modifier “and/or,” which suggests to the Court that SCB is attempting to claim as a trade secret the idea of oxidizing THC into CBN. If so, the Court rejects it. As SCB acknowledged at oral argument, the process of oxidation, and more particularly the fact that THC oxidizes into CBN, was well known in 2019.
. . .
Although SCB’s position is not entirely clear, its use of the “and/or” modifier in its interrogatory response suggests that it might be seeking to claim as trade secrets each of the individual “parameters and conditions” set forth in its interrogatory response and every possible permutation. As Defendants’ expert points out, that's 57 potential combinations of trade secrets. (D.I. 47 ¶¶ 29, 30.) SCB does not provide separate argument as to any particular permutation, making it impossible for the Court to determine which combinations of “parameters and conditions” it intends to press.
In Delaware, Local Rule 7.1.2(b) sets deadlines for responding to motions, and states that
Except for the citation of subsequent authorities, no additional papers [other than the opening, answering, and reply briefs] shall be filed absent Court approval.
Based on this rule, parties file "notices of subsequent authorities" to present after-arising citations (and sometimes other content) to the Court.
But some attorneys disagree about just how much argument can accompany the "citation[s]" a notice of subsequent authority. The authority is mixed.
In some cases, the Court has declined to consider notices containing argument that are filed without leave. See, e.g., Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, C.A. No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23215, at *51 …
This week brought to light yet another unexpected side effect of COVID-19 -- it's now harder to win a motion to bifurcate.
This interesting tidbit came to light in Judge Hall's opinion in Evertz Microsystems Ltd. v. Lawo Inc., C.A. No. 19-302, D.I. 259 (D. Del. Feb. 23, 2021). The defendant there moved to bifurcate the infringement and damages cases into separate trials near the close of fact discovery. In denying the motion, Judge Hall noted that the prejudice to the plaintiff, and strain on the Court, of holding two separate trials was greater than it would normally be because it was unlikely the second trial could be scheduled for years:
As the parties both know, this Court currently has an extremely congested docket. It would be difficult to schedule an additional trial in this action; thus, Evertz would likely have to wait additional years to have full resolution of its claims.
Id. at 3.
Its also worth noting that Judge Hall called out the "fairly litigious" nature of the case, with the parties "raising numerous discovery disputes before the Court" leading to concerns that "bifurcating and staying the issue of damages will result in (1) duplicate discovery requests and disputes as those already resolved and (2) new disputes over what is appropriately part of the liability phase versus the damages phase" that would further tax the Court." ...
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