A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


RGA
The Honorable Richard G. Andrews

Cave
Cade Roberts, Unsplash

Over the past year, we've noticed that the D. Del. judges have shown an increasing willingness to exclude late-disclosed evidence and theories. Until recently, motions to strike were difficult to win under the Third Circuit's Pennypack standard. If the prejudice caused by the late disclosure could be cured, it was almost impossible to get anything excluded.

Today, harkening back to an earlier time, Judge Andrews denied cross-motions to strike allegedly late-disclosed theories from the parties' opening expert reports. Although he found that the defendant's motion presented a close call on late disclosure, he concluded that "[e]ven if these infringement theories were untimely, I find, under the Pennypack factors, that their exclusion is not warranted."

At …

Is the dam about to break on over-redaction of filings?
Is the dam about to break on over-redaction of filings? Thomas Dumortier, Unsplash

Most patent cases involve a protective order, and the parties tend mark documents other than prior art as confidential or attorney's eyes only. As a result, many of the more substantive filings—particularly discovery motions, summary judgment motions, and pretrial orders—are filed under seal.

Unlike some other jurisdictions, particularly the Northern District of California, the District of Delaware's procedure for filing under seal is not burdensome. Once a protective order is entered, no motion is required to file a document under seal, and the parties simply file redactions within seven days.

Over time, parties have become more and more liberal with their redactions, often heavily redacting sealed …

Technical difficulties
Technical difficulties Glitch While Streaming, Michael Dziedzic, Unsplash

As we've previously discussed the district's local rules and longstanding practice prohibit speaking to a witness about the substance of his testimony during a deposition. Specifically, D. Del. local rule 30.6 states:

From the commencement until the conclusion of deposition questioning by an opposing party, including any recesses or continuances, counsel for the deponent shall not consult or confer with the deponent regarding the substance of the testimony already given or anticipated to be given, except for the purpose of conferring on whether to assert a privilege against testifying or on how to comply with a court order.

Normally, the application of this rule is pretty straightforward. But what …

Although a plaintiff may seek to dismiss its claims of infringement without prejudice after providing a covenant not to sue, the Court has discretion to impose a dismissal with prejudice, depending on the terms of the covenant and other factors.

In that vein, the plaintiff in a patent infringement suit pending before Judge Andrews argued "that the Court should dismiss its infringement claims without prejudice because the covenant it has provided to [defendant] CSL prevents their reassertion." Judge Andrews rejected this "paradoxical" argument ...

This remote definitely can't decode compressed video streams by itself.
This remote definitely can't decode compressed video streams by itself. Glenn Carstens-Peters, Unsplash

Prosecution disclaimer can be tough to prove. Practiced prosecution counsel seem to know how to phrase things in such a way that a patent examiner understands them to be different from the claimed invention, but a later court may still find the opposite.

In an opinion today, Judge Andrews reversed a prosecution disclaimer finding by Magistrate Judge Fallon. The patent claims involves a "tethered digital butler" that can perform smartphone-like functions in a lower-cost way by using cheaper hardware that may be "tethered" to a desktop computer, which takes care of the heavy lifting.

Specifically, the claims discuss a "palm held remote," and the parties disputed …

Science!
Hans Reniers, Unsplash

On Friday, Judge Andrews issued an opinion adopting a Special Master opinion, which held that certain pre-litigation testing documents were not covered by attorney privilege.

Pre-Litigation Testing Not Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege If Not Provided to Attorneys

The Court found that the pre-litigation scientific testing was not covered by attorney-client privilege, even though they may have been done "at the direction of" a law firm, because the core purpose was for the client's understanding rather than for facilitating legal advice:

I do not think [plaintiff] First Quality has shown that the attorney-client privilege applies to any of the [relevant] disputed . . . documents. Plaintiff's position is that everything [the expert] Dr. Malburg did falls "well …

As jury trials in Delaware continue to get back on track, the judges' trial calendars are jam packed for 2021 and 2022. What does this mean if you have an upcoming trial date and need to move it?

In some cases, you might be out of luck. Yesterday, Judge Andrews denied an unopposed motion to extend a case schedule that would have pushed trial from June 2022 to September 2022. The purpose for the request was to provide additional time to complete fact discovery.

In an oral order, Judge Andrews rejected the request outright:

The Parties say they need more time, but simply needing more time is not good cause. The Court's schedule is already completely full …

When parties seek to dismiss or stay a patent dispute in federal court in favor of arbitration pursuant to an agreement, someone needs to decide whether the parties' dispute falls within the scope of the agreement's arbitration provision (and is thus arbitrable). Whether that question is decided by the court or the arbitrator depends on the language of the agreement. So, in essence, the court must interpret the agreement for the limited purpose of divining the parties' intent (or lack thereof) to shunt arbitrability to the arbitrator.

In a recent order in Nidec Corp. v. Seagate Technology LLC, C.A. No. 21-52-RGA, Judge Andrews found...

Expert witnesses testifying in federal court are required to provide an expert report under Rule 26(a)(2). Although Rule 26 sets forth some requirements for the content of the report, it does not directly address how the report should be prepared, and in particular how much input the expert (as opposed to the party that has retained the expert, or the party's counsel) should have in preparing the report.

Some experts insist on writing their report in its entirety, while others rely heavily on counsel during the drafting and revising process. Too much reliance on others, however, can lead to a motion to exclude for violation of Rule 26's mandate that the report setting forth the expert's opinions be “prepared and signed by the witness." Judge Andrews recently resolved such a motion in TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., C.A. No. 13-1835-RGA, finding that while the plaintiff's expert had contradicted some of the reports from his report during deposition, that did not justify...

Whenever collateral estoppel comes up in a patent case, it usually generates some interesting discussion. Yesterday's decision from Judge Andrews in TQ Delta v. 2Wire is no different.

After the Federal Circuit reversed a PTAB determination of unpatentability on an unasserted claim, the plaintiff moved to estop the defendant from challenging the validity of two related claims in the district court litigation.

Judge Andrews concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because the defendant adequately "explained how the differences between the [asserted claims] and [the adjudicated claim] alter the invalidity analysis[,]" but he also addressed an interesting question: Is a petitioner "fully represented" in an IPR when another petitioner is taking the laboring oar before the PTAB?

The defendant …