A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


RGA
The Honorable Richard G. Andrews

Judge Andrews appeared to break new ground in ODTP law yesterday with his post-trial opinion in Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs. Private Ltd., C.A. No. 19-1727-RGA (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2023).

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

(eds. note - I refuse to abbreviate it "Lab'ys." The legal profession has committed more than its fair share of dark linguistic sins, but if Shakespeare wasn't long dead this would have killed him. Actually, check on your favorite author to make sure they survived this edition of the bluebook).

Anyway.

The issue arose in the unusual case where a patent issued and received a term extension of a few hundred days. The patentee filed a continuation which issued a few years later. Because the continuation did not receive a term extension it actually expired before the first patent. Plaintiff (Allergan) submitted this helpful chart with the briefing:

Seriously, it's a nice chart!
Seriously, it's a nice chart! Allergan

Id., D.I. 428 at 4 (Joint Status Report, Plaintiffs' position)

The parties agreed the relevant claims of the two patents were not patentably distinct—the issue was, does ODTP apply in where the first-filed, and first-issued, patent is the one being invalidated?

The Federal circuit had recently answered part of that question in In re Cellect, LLC, 2023 WL 5519716, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2023), where it held that OTDP applied to patent term extensions generally. Cellect, however, did not involve ...

"Could we do it in a few days? Eh, let's stip it out by six weeks." AI-Generated

We've talked before about how, in the District of Delaware, the Court usually grants stipulated extensions of upcoming deadlines, as long as those deadlines don't impact the Court.

Today I noticed an order from last week that goes against that trend. In Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals Ireland Ltd. v. Airgas Therapeutics LLC, C.A. No. 22-1648-RGA-LDH (D. Del.), before Judge Andrews, the parties filed a straightforward stipulation extending the deadline to file redacted versions of a number of pleadings:

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the parties hereto, and subject to the approval of the Court that the time for …

Many years ago, before Andrew made me put a picture in EVERY TURTLE-CURSED POST, I wrote a post about the very easiest Daubert motion to win. As a brief refresher, it turned out to be a motion to exclude a damages experts reliance on a jury verdict point as the starting point for a hypothetical negotiation. Both Judge Andrews and Judge Burke were particularly firm on the issue, coming just short of setting a bright-line rule:

A jury verdict does not represent evidence from which a hypothetical negotiation can be reliably determined. A jury verdict represents the considered judgment of twelve (or maybe fewer) random non-experts as to what a hypothetical negotiation would have resulted in for the patent(s) …

Casual readers might not be aware, but we at IP/DE have a long-running feud with the Swedish publication, "boat news." They think they're so great just because they're all so tall and they write about cool boats. Well, someone finally had the nerve to tell those ruggedly handsome jerks what for.

Wahhhhhhh! No one reads my boat magazine!
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

That brave soul was Judge Andrews in yesterday's opinion in MHL Custom, Inc. v. Waydoo USA, Inc., C.A. No. 21-92 (D. Del. Sept. 6, 2023) (Mem. Op.).

The defendant, Waydoo, alleged that the asserted patent was anticipated by a paper written by a bunch of Swedish engineering students as part of a project. Unlike the famous thesis in In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 228 USPQ 453 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the students project wasn't indexed in a library, but was simply placed on the website for the college course. Apparently, it was downloaded by 17 people.

A dispute thus arose as to whether this paper was "publicly accessible" (and thus prior art). In support of the contention that the paper was accessible, Waydoo noted that Boat News had written an article about the project that included a link to the paper (riveting, I'm sure). Waydoo contended that this article would have led the magazines many readers to the paper.

Judge Andrews, however, noted the obvious flaw ...

Local Rule 7.1.5 governs motions for reargument, sometimes styled as motions for “reconsideration.” As we’ve noted, the deadline to move for reargument or reconsideration can be easy to miss. The deadline is just 14 days after the order or opinion, and there are no CMECF reminders to flag it for counsel.

What Is a motion for reargument?

A request for “clarification” of the Court’s prior order may be interpreted as a motion for reargument/reconsideration. But a motion for reargument is not a do-over. In fact, you cannot rehash arguments you already made—and you cannot make new arguments you could have raised earlier.

Erasers
Mick Haupt, Unsplash

The scope of a motion for reargument is very narrow, and must show at …

As we've covered exhaustively in the past, it's becoming increasingly rare for Delaware Judges to consider indefiniteness at Markman, and it's rarer still to see someone get over the hump and knock a patent out.

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Judge Andrews, however, is still willing to show a patent who's the boss at Markman (even for a non means-plus-function claim) as demonstrated this week in Genzyme Corp. v. Novartis Gene Therapies, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1736-RGA (D. Del. August 18, 2023).

The term at issue was, unsurprisingly, opaque:

Forms intrastrand base pairs such that expression of a coding region of [a] heterologous sequence is enhanced relative to a second rAAV vector that lacks sufficient intrastrand base pairing to …

Broken
CHUTTERSNAP, Unsplash

Ouch. That's something you never want to see.

We wrote last week about how Judge Andrews—somewhat surprisingly—declined to lift a stay after the PTAB left just 4 of 83 patents standing, and invalidated the rest.

After that decision, the parties filed a series of letters that clarified that the plaintiff had intended to proceed only on the four valid patents, not the rest, but wanted to check with the Court regarding how they should proceed:

[Plaintiff] Cytiva understood that the litigation would proceed only with regard to the four claims that the PTAB upheld as valid, and until JSR’s submission, was not aware that JSR had a contrary view. Cytiva had no intention, and has no intention, …

Michał Mancewicz, Unsplash

One of the more common issues to come up at trial is whether an to what degree an expert can exceed what is in their report. I've heard varying opinions on this from judges in Delaware and elsewhere. Some judges hold experts pretty tightly to their report; others apply something more akin to notice pleading, where the expert merely has to stay within the broad outline of what was addressed.

If you're going to have an expert on either side at trial, it's a good idea to know where your judge stands on this issue beforehand. We got a data point from Judge Andrews on this last week, when he issued a memorandum order on a …

Analog Clock
None, Ocean Ng, Unsplash

On Friday, Judge Andrews addressed what happens when an IPR results in just 4 valid claims—and 79 invalid ones:

ORAL ORDER: I read the letters about lifting the stay. . . . The parties agreed to a stay through PTAB resolution of the IPRs. (D.I. 66 ). The PTAB resolution determined seventy-nine claims unpatentable and four patentable. Both sides have appealed. It does not make much sense to go forward with the overwhelming number of asserted claims likely invalid. I think it is probable that there will be a final decision from the Court of Appeals within a reasonable amount of time. That decision will, one way or another, greatly simplify this case. The …

Reverse
愚木混株 cdd20, Unsplash

It's easy to think that, once an opposing party takes a position on the record as to a legal issue, it can never change that position. Not so.

Today Judge Andrews addressed an argument that defendants who lost at trial were nonetheless bound by their "judicial admissions," thus preventing them from taking a (purportedly) contradictory position after trial. Not surprisingly, the defendants disagreed:

Plaintiff argues that Defendants made representations before and at trial that directly contradict positions that Defendants must take in order to prove an interference-in-fact. . . . Plaintiff notes that Defendants' representations were "judicial admissions." . . . . Therefore, Plaintiff argues, Defendants cannot establish an interference-in-fact between the '537 patent and the '207 patent, and I must dismiss the counterclaim against the '537 patent as moot for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants respond that Plaintiff does not invoke estoppel—or any other legal theory—that would support dismissing their claims. . . . Defendants add that, in any case, they are not estopped from abandoning their trial positions, nor from invoking theories that Plaintiff presented at trial, because Plaintiff prevailed over them at trial.

The Court found the the defendants were ...