The service rules are relics of a different time. A time when New York and Vermont would occasionally shoot half-heartedly at one another over the land between the Connecticut and Hudson rivers -- an area now mostly known for being the world's most boring drive.
In any event, the requirements remain and thus we are occasionally forced to make some poor courier drive to someplace terrible (see above) to drop off a paper packet. That's rule 4, for ya.
But the rules get a bit squishy if your defendant is foreign-based. 4(f)(1) initially suggests you might want to use the Hague convention, which is a great idea if you are a meticulous masochist. 4(f)(3) is where things get a bit more interesting, allowing service by "other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders."
Naturally, very few means of service are specifically prohibited by international agreement. Yodeling, smoke signals, a swarm of vicious bees -- all are typically fine under the relevant treaties.
This leads us to the case of the intrepid plaintiff in Williams Rowland Acquisition Corp. v. Global Food and Ingredients Ltd., C.A. No. 24-471-RGA-SRF (D. Del. May 20, 2025) (R&R). Two of the defendants there were individuals residing in Canada. Plaintiff attempted to serve them at their last known addresses unsuccessfully, ultimately employing skip tracers to track them down.
All the while, counsel for the two individuals were corresponding with plaintiff by email, noting the continued failure of service, but saying they were not authorized to accept. So, the plaintiffs filed a motion for alterative service asking if they could just serve the defendants by email to their counsel or their business emails.
Judge Fallon granted the motion, reasoning that Plaintiff had been sufficiently diligent in attempting service by traditional means:
service via e-mail to Hanna and Murray's U.S. counsel is reasonably calculated to inform Hanna and Murray about this action for purposes of comporting with due process requirements . . . . Finally, proceeding with email service on Hanna and Murray's U.S. counsel under Rule 4(f)(3) is warranted because the record confirms Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to effectuate service on Hanna and Murray. Specifically, Plaintiff retained skip-tracers to identify potential addresses for Hanna and Murray and served a summons and complaint via the Hague Convention to the address identified for Hanna. Courts have held that alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) is justified where, as here, Murray's address remains unknown.
Id. at 16.
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