A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Photograph of a damages expert report involving the Georgia-Pacific factors, the Panduit test, apportionment, convoyed sales, non-infringing alternatives, marking . . .
Photograph of a damages expert report involving the Georgia-Pacific factors, the Panduit test, apportionment, convoyed sales, non-infringing alternatives, marking . . . Luca J, Unsplash

It seems like people are always messing up with patent damages experts. There are just a lot of ways to get tripped up on damages, and—obviously—big incentives to take risks to drive damages numbers up or down.

We had another example of that on Monday, when visiting Judge McCalla granted a Daubert motion and excluded testimony from an expert who applied a later date for the start of infringing sales for the royalty calculation, and an earlier date for the hypothetical negotiation. The expert apparently used a December 2014 date for his royalty calculation:

Wonderland argues that neither Evenflo nor Mr. Peterson presented evidence of any manufacture or testing that occurred at the dates that Mr. Peterson suggested. . . . Wonderland supports its assertion by pointing to sections of Mr. Peterson’s report and deposition in which Mr. Peterson . . . uses December 2014 and not an earlier date as the starting point for calculating royalty damages based on his hypothetical rate. . . .

But the expert used an earlier date for the reasonably royalty calculation, arguing that the earlier date is when the infringement actually began:

When using a hypothetical negotiation to assess damages, “the date of the hypothetical negotiation is the date that the infringement began.” . . . Mr. Peterson asserts that a date falling between December 2013 and April 2, 2014 “more naturally aligns with the actual date of first infringement.” . . .

But the Court found that the party had failed to put forth evidence of the earlier date, and ...

OK Nate, you win. Mavexar is a crab now.
OK Nate, you win. Mavexar is a crab now. AI-Generated, displayed with permission

We posted last month about two more mandamus petitions regarding Chief Judge Connolly's recent efforts to enforce his standing orders regarding disclosure requirements in his cases.

The Mavexar saga is getting a bit complicated, so here is a quick recap of the mandamus petitions:

  • Chief Judge Connolly scheduled hearings in several cases regarding various plaintiffs' compliance with his standing orders
  • In two of the hearings, the plaintiffs explained that an entity called Mavexar recruited the plaintiffs and took up to 95% of their proceeds
  • The Court ordered some of the Mavexar entities to produce a broad range of communications among the plaintiffs, Mavexar, and their attorneys
  • One …

So, my new year's resolution was not to write any more about the Mavexar hearings until we got something really juicy. Unfortunately, due to the holidays there hasn't been much else to write about these last few weeks. I made it almost 3 days though, which is a personal best for resolutions of this sort.

Howdy Crab Monsters!
Howdy Crab Monsters! AI-Generated, displayed with permission

One of the more interesting aspects of the Mavexar hearings has been the general lack of participation from the opposing parties in the hearings, many of whom have already been dismissed. This unique state of affairs has left me to imagine what the papers might look like if a defendant really went to town on the issue.

Last …

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愚木混株 cdd20, Unsplash

We got a good "what not to do" example today, relayed in an opinion by Judge Williams.

In the opinion, the Court addressed objections to a magistrate judge ruling on a privilege issue (remember—you can object to non-dispositive magistrate judge rulings in addition to R&Rs. Good luck.).

As the Court explained, the defendants initially argued to the magistrate judge that Third Circuit law governed, and that Federal Circuit law was grounded in the same principles as Third Circuit law anyway. The magistrate judge agreed:

In briefing submitted to the Magistrate Judge, Defendants state that, "Federal Circuit [law] does not differ [from Third Circuit law] in that it 'is grounded in principles of fairness. '" D.I. 224 at 3. The Magistrate Judge credited Defendants' argument to conclude Third Circuit law applies. See D.I. 232 at 3 n.2 ("Because Defendants themselves initially relied on Third Circuit caselaw here (as did Plaintiff) and because Defendants assert that the Third Circuit's approach to this issue is no different from that of the Federal Circuit, the Court will herein apply Third Circuit law regarding the 'at issue' doctrine to this patent case." ).

Then, in objecting to the magistrate judge's ruling, the defendants apparently reversed position, arguing that Federal Circuit law differed, and that the magistrate judge had erred by relying on

This case, man, it's nothing but twists.

Happy New Year Crab Monsters!
Happy New Year Crab Monsters! AI-Generated, displayed with permission

As we noted last week, Following the Federal Circuit's denial of their mandamus petition, Nimitz failed to produce the documents ordered by the Court by the December 8th deadline. Judge Connolly responded by issuing an order for Nimitz to show cause why it should not be sanctioned for that failure.

Well, Nimitz Responded

On the deadline to respond to the show cause order, Nimitz filed a short (653 word) paper explaining why it had not produced the documents. The upshot is that it intends to seek rehearing of the denial of its mandamus petition:

Nimitz is filing a Combined Petition For Panel Rehearing …

Attorneys at Table
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

This is an interesting order from earlier this month that we never had a chance to post about.

In Ecobee, Inc. v. EcoFactor, Inc., C.A. No. 21-323-MN (D. Del.), the parties had a Markman hearing scheduled for December 8. As she often does, in the leadup to the hearing, Judge Noreika issued an order directing lead counsel for the parties to meet-and-confer to reduce the number of disputes:

ORAL ORDER . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before 12/1/2022, local and lead counsel (i.e., those attorneys that will be leading trial) for the parties shall meet and confer and file an amended joint claim construction chart that sets forth the …

As a lawyer, I am used to reaching into my stocking on Christmas eve to find yet another lump of sumptuous coal. Hard and black as my own cynical heart, it is but fuel for engine of my enemies' destruction.

Season's Greetings!
Season's Greetings! AI-Generated, displayed with permission

This year, however, I was presently surprised to return to the office after spending the entire holiday sick in bed to find a new opinion to discuss on the blog. Everyone wins today.

IBM Corp. v. Rakuten, Inc., C.A. No. 21-461 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2022) presents an interesting issue of personal Jurisdiction I hadn't seen before. The plaintiff, IBM, sued Rakuten a Japanese corporation (and seller of cool Japanese goods) along with its U.S. subsidiary Ebates. After suit was filed, Rakuten transferred several patents in its portfolio to Ebates, who then asserted them against IBM as permissive counterclaims. All the while, Rakuten maintained that the Court lacked personal Jurisdiction (Ebates conceded jurisdiction).

Judge Williams, however, found the maneuver of shuffling the patents off to Ebates sufficient to confer ...

Kiwi Split in Half
engin akyurt, Unsplash

In Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir Technologies, LLC, C.A. No. 20-984-RGA-MPT (D. Del.), the defendant brought counterclaims asserting their own four patents, in addition to the three originally asserted by the plaintiff.

During fact discovery, the plaintiff filed an FRCP 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under § 101. Defendant pushed back, arguing that the motion was untimely—both because it was filed two years into the case (i.e., it was too late), and because of "the Court’s general disfavor of multiple rounds of dispositive motions" (i.e., it was too early). D.I. 115 at 1.

The plaintiff argued that its motion was timely, as FRCP 12(c) just requires the motion to be filed …

DALL·E 2022-12-20 17.09.05 - digital art of state of delaware forlornly looking at shoes
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

One of the better known quirks of Delaware practice is the requirement of association with "Delaware Counsel." This requirement is more stringent than any other jurisdiction that I know of, requiring a Delaware lawyer to sign and file all papers in the action:

Association with Delaware counsel required. Unless otherwise ordered, an attorney not admitted to practice by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware may not be admitted pro hac vice in this Court unless associated with an attorney who is a member of the Bar of this Court and who maintains an office in the District of Delaware for the regular transaction of business (“Delaware counsel”). Consistent with CM/ECF Procedures, Delaware counsel shall be the registered users of CM/ECF and shall be required to file all papers. Unless otherwise ordered, Delaware counsel shall attend proceedings before the Court.

D. Del. LR 83.5(d)

Although the requirement itself is generally well known, the highlighted clause is fairly obscure, and ...

Google apparently indexed its allegedly confidential information on its own search engine.
Google apparently indexed its allegedly confidential information on its own search engine. Pawel Czerwinski, Unsplash

Whew, this is another one that falls in the "I'm glad I'm not involved in that" bucket (some previous entries here and here).

On Friday, Judge Andrews rejected a frivolous motion to seal, after he found some of the supposedly-sensitive information as a top result on Google:

This is about as frivolous a motion to seal as I have seen. Defendants submitted a declaration of Phil Harnish in support of their motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. The motion is based on the purported need to avoid disclosing “sensitive personal information about employees that, if revealed, would …