I am pleased to announce that, starting with Andrew's next post, we will be pivoting to a new format. No longer will we be analyzing the developments in IP law with mere written words. Instead, we will be creating Schoolhouse Rock style musical videos. Andrew's surprisingly moving singing voice will be accompanied by my own interpretive dance—leading you through the intricacies of the days' cases like a bee describing the way to honey.
This is perhaps my favorite picture I've used on the blogAI-Generated, displayed with permission
The subject of today's post, CosmoKey Solutions GmbH & Co. KG v. Duo Security, Inc., C.A. No. 18-1477-CFC-CJB, D.I. 413 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2025) will also be the subject of our first song, "Sanction Sanctuary."
The title comes from the plaintiff's motion for sanctions -- unusual in the district outside of the Pennypack context. The issue there was that the defendant had produced almost all of its documents after the substantial completion deadline, resulting in extra work for the plaintiff, who sought fees as compensation. The defendant argued that the late production was not sanctionable because it was caused in large part by an error in their document collection that had initially missed all documents before 2018.
As an old dog, I'm always excited to learn a new trick. For instance here is me being taught to fetch:
Contact me for the full series of videos wherein, after many weeks of simply throwing the ball on the ground for me to pick up, she throws it right back to me.Bellini, displayed with permission
As a lawyer, this often takes the form of some new novel argument that I might want to try out myself. Sometimes, however, a new trick turns out to be particularly ill-fated.
The defendant in Bausch & Lomb Incorporated et al v. SBH Holdings LLC, C.A. No 20-1463-GBW-CJB (D.I. 250 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2025) (Oral Order), moved for summary judgment under of no infringement under the DOE based on the disclosure-dedication doctrine. The problem was that plaintiff had served a rog asking for defendant's non-infringement contentions, and the defendant had not disclosed this theory. So, the plaintiff moved to strike the argument.
The defendant countered that, since disclosure-dedication is based upon the specification itself (which plaintiff obviously had), and is decided by the Court as a matter of law, there was no need to disclose the theory in response to a rog (this is the bit I hadn't seen before).
Judge Burke, however, disagreed, and granted the motion to strike:
Defendant’s arguments have no merit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) says that a party must respond to an interrogatory within 30 days, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) says that a party must supplement a response to an interrogatory in a timely fashion if, inter alia, it learns that a prior disclosure is incomplete or incorrect. There is no exception to these rules of the kind Defendant suggests. Just like every other party in a patent case, Defendant had to timely respond to contention interrogatories—a means of discovery that plays an important narrowing role in patent litigation. Defendant’s view to the contrary would, if permitted, wrongly allow a party—and not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—to determine whether it has to follow the discovery rules in a patent case, and to dictate what theories it does and doesn’t have to disclose. For all of these reasons, there can be no doubt that Defendant’s incredibly late disclosure of the DD theory in its summary judgment briefing (filed in September 2024) amounts to an untimely disclosure under Rule 26(e).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Court then went on to analyze the issue under Pennypack, finding that each of the factors were neutral or supported exclusion.
I'm a baker. I was born of flour and heat and fermented in this big jar we call life. My original starter, Yeasty Boy, has sired many children that live lives of plenty. His grandchild, breAD-Rock, sits upon my counter as I type, growing fat on apple peels.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
One of the first lessons of baking is that some ingredients can be modified or omitted without any real worry. You trade rosemary for thyme in your focaccia and everything's honky dory. On the other hand, if you switch the strong bread flour to whole wheat, you have crossed a moral line from which there may be no return. Some ingredients are simply more important, and some substitutions …
Yes, this is yet another Pennypack post. I can't resist. It's a tough-to-apply standard that impacts many cases (patent and otherwise). And it can sometimes seem to reward bad behavior by litigants, even—maybe especially—when applied as written.
But not this time! In Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir Technology, LLC, C.A. No. 20-984-WCB (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2024), the patentee produced documents about a pre-priority-date sale of prior art after fact discovery closed and just five days before opening reports.
Unsurprisingly, the other side's opening expert report five days later did not include invalidity allegations about this sale.
Parties stipulate to drop various claims and defenses all of the time. Sometimes, the parties simply bargain with each other to winnow down the scope of the case for trial. Other times, a defense or claim may be dropped to avoid some especially harsh discovery burden. Sometimes you just hate a patent claim sooo much.
Always there are dangers. For one rule is supreme in the realm of stipulations.
No takebacks.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Such was the lesson this week in Allergan, Inc. v. Mankind Pharma Ltd., C.A. No. 23-272-JFM, D.I. 126 (D. Del. July 24, 2024). The defendant, Mankind, had stipulated to drop all invalidity defenses as to one patent "because it would streamline the case and would allow them to avoid answering discovery requests" and because "the 504 patent had been unsuccessfully challenged in the past and the invalidity theories that remained were weak." Id. at 4.
A bit later Judge Andrews issued is opinion in Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs. Private Ltd., C.A. No. 19-1727-RGA (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2023), which we covered previously on the blog. TL;DR Judge Andrews held (for the first time in the district) that OTDP applied when the first-filed, and first-issued, patent was the one being invalidated.
All of a sudden, the defendant realized that they might have a real humdinger of a defense and so they moved to "vacate" the earlier stipulation in anticipation of the Federal Circuit affirming the decision in MSN.
Visiting Judge Murphy, however, held that this ...
A motion for attorneys' fees is a tough row to hoe. The shoddiest AI lawyer could pull together 8 paragraphs of quotes from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, Blackstone, and Hammurabi's code, warning that fees are an extreme sanction to be used only sparingly, lest their mysterious power be depleted.
And he works for peanuts!AI-Generated, displayed with permission
As Judge Williams' opinion in BearBox LLC v. Lancium LLC, C.A. No. 21-534-GBW (D. Del. Jan 9, 2024) shows, you can even lose a motion for fees if the Court previously held the other party acted in bad faith.
The opinion in Bearbox, contains a healthy recitation of losses by the plaintiff at various stages of the case, culminating in an unsuccessful trial on the merits. Its' not worth rehashing the whole thing for our purposes—
(Eds. note - what is our purpose? sound off in the comments, but know in advance that I will not read anything by a philosopher or anyone else with a fuller beard than I possess)
—but the big takeaway is that the defendant's failure to win the case at summary judgment effectively scuttled any argument that the plaintiffs' claims were objectively baseless and unreasonable:
Moreover, while the Court adopted Defendants' proposed claim constructions, the Court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgement because the Court found that there existed genuine issues of material fact regarding who conceived of the '433 patent's subject matter. Thus, Plaintiffs' decision to continue litigating the sole inventorship claim after receiving the Court's claim constructions was not sufficiently unreasonable to warrant a finding that this case is exceptional . . .
The Court, in denying Defendants' motion for summary judgement, rejected Defendants' argument that no reasonable juror could find that Mr. Storms was the sole inventor of the '433 patent. Thus, even considering the '632 patent application, Plaintiffs' position that Mr. Storms was the sole inventor of the '433 patent was not meritless.
Id. at 4, 6-7 (internal citations omitted).
The one issue where they seemed to get some traction was in a successful motion to strike filed earlier in the case. The plaintiff had apparently served a new expert report, without leave, in order to conform their expert's opinion to a the Court's claim construction. Defendants successfully moved to strike the report. In its decision, the Court applied the Pennypack factors and actually found that the plaintiffs' actions indicated bad faith.
Nevertheless, in ruling on the § 285 motion, Judge Williams found that this act of bad faith was not enough to make the case exceptional:
Accordingly, even though the Court found Plaintiffs' timing indicative of bad faith, the Court finds that, in this instance, Plaintiffs' desire to supplement Dr. McClellan's expert report to ensure consistency with the Court's claim construction order did not render this an exceptional case.
Id. at 5.
So take heart, those have shown bad faith. You may yet find yourselves sufficiently redeemed to avoid fees.
Motions to strike are tough in Delaware. Although the reign of Pennypack seems to be slowly entering its dotage, the door remains open for the late-disclosed.
With exclusion so rare, its a bit odd we don't see more of Rule 37's lesser sanction -- fees.
But visiting Judge McCalla gave us one on Monday in Invacare Corp. v. Sunrise Medical (US) LLC, C.A. No. 21-823-JPM (D. Del. May 22, 2023) (Oral Order). The facts there were pretty stark.
The defendant had an inequitable conduct claim based on the patentee's failure to inform the PTO that identical claims had previously been rejected. Plaintiff's prosecution counsel testified that the failure was due to an error in an internal spreadsheet they kept of related applications that omitted the relevant application. Plaintiff had previously withheld the spreadsheet as privileged but eventually waived privilege and produced it.
Unfortunately, it came out during expert discovery that the spreadsheet actually contained the relevant application. This was probably a bad day for a lawyer somewhere. Plaintiff then went back to see if there were other versions of the spreadsheet that did omit the application -- they eventually found and produced some, but by then it was 4 months after the close of fact discovery.
Defendant moved to exclude these new references. Judge McCalla denied the motion but ordered plaintiff to pay what will surely be a hefty sum to cover the ...
Today we highlight a decade-old opinion involving an inventor’s death, the reports of which were greatly exaggerated. The moral of the story: trust but verify. Do a Google search, even if you have it on good authority. Question your assumptions.
It's an oddball case that provides the perfect foil for Nate’s article yesterday involving the opposite fact-pattern—a dead expert. Here, an inventor thought expired was “not only alive, but also willing (‘indeed eager’)” to testify in the upcoming trial, scheduled only ten days away.
In an unusual mix-up, plaintiff relied on testimony from the plaintiff’s 30(b)(6) witness, a former high-ranking officer for plaintiff's company, who said that the inventor was deceased. Where'd he get that information? Several of plaintiff’s …
In the before time, when the green grass grew tall even in the wan Wilmington sun, all scheduling orders had two rounds of contentions, one early in the case and another near the close of fact discovery. A bit over two years ago, Judge Connolly shook things up by introducing a new form order in his cases that included only a single round of contentions early in the case and requiring "good cause" to amend.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
And so, on this slow news day, I decided to take a look back at how often parties manage to show the requisite good cause to amend their contentions in cases assigned to Judge Connolly (many of these are decided in the first instance by a magistrate judge).
The upshot is, that most of these motions seem to succeed. DocketNavigator shows 10 such motions in cases assigned to Judge Connolly (which strikes me as low, but I'm not a soulless trawling algorithm, so what do I know?). Of those 7 have been granted, and only 3 have been denied. Normally I would put in the percentages here, but I trust you all to do the math on this one.
This brings to mind another question, which I shall raise in a further blog post on another slow day, does Judge Connolly receive fewer motions like these than our judges who don't specifically require good cause? I.e., are parties who would otherwise just file late contentions and take their shot under Pennypack factors deciding not to do so because they know they can't show good cause?!
All this and more on next weeks episode of IPDE! (Batman theme plays)
It happens all of the time: You've got arguments A, B, and C that you want to fit in your brief, but you don't have the space to address them all.
What to do? Cut the weaker arguments?
For most attorneys, the answer is: of course not! They move the lesser argument to a footnote in a hail-mary attempt to win if the better arguments fail.
Does it work? Not usually. Here in D. Del., judges have suggested that parties waive arguments when they present them only in cursory footnotes, and Judge Noreika recently noted that "courts traditionally do not consider arguments presented entirely in footnotes." Nw. Univ. v. Universal Robots A/S, C.A. No. …
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