Yes, this is yet another Pennypack post. I can't resist. It's a tough-to-apply standard that impacts many cases (patent and otherwise). And it can sometimes seem to reward bad behavior by litigants, even—maybe especially—when applied as written.
But not this time! In Prolitec Inc. v. ScentAir Technology, LLC, C.A. No. 20-984-WCB (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2024), the patentee produced documents about a pre-priority-date sale of prior art after fact discovery closed and just five days before opening reports.
Unsurprisingly, the other side's opening expert report five days later did not include invalidity allegations about this sale.
A perennial question in disputes about late disclosures is whether the demandingFRCP 16 "good cause" standard applies, which hinges on diligence, or whether the more forgivingPennypack factors apply.
When it comes to case narrowing, there seems to be a building trend that the good cause standard applies, not the Pennypack factors. We've seen that multipletimes when it comes to a plaintiff's decision to drop claims, and on Wednesday, Judge Burke issued a detailed opinion finding that good cause is likewise required to revise a defendant's election of prior art references.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile v. Amazon.com, Inc., C.A. No. 22-1447-CJB (D. Del.), the Court ordered the defendant to cut …
I hope the Third Circuit one day revisits the Pennypack factors, which are what it directs the lower courts to apply to determine whether late disclosures are subject to sanctions such as preclusion.
The factors can be lenient on parties that are very late in disclosing critical facts. Pennypack sets up a system where, oddly, the more critical the late-disclosed fact is, the later the party can be, and the less likely it is to be excluded. Isn't that backwards?
In practice, the factors often seem to turn on whether there is incurable prejudice, and that can be hard to establish. But a rule that "you …
Here's a scenario that can happen in a patent case: The patentee serves an opening expert report alleging infringement. Your expert responds, detailing every reason why the design documents show non-infringment. The patentee then serves a reply expert report, citing new documents that it says show infringement.
What do you do now? There are at least four answers: (1) move for leave to serve a sur-reply report to address the new docs; (2) just serve a sur-reply report, without leave, and fight the inevitable motion to strike; (3) skip the report but have the expert be prepared to discuss the new papers at deposition, and hope plaintiff asks; or (4) just plan to address the new …
There are a few words I dread seeing in an order. Some are obvious—"egregious," "sanctions," "nonsensical," "balding," etc. Others I only learned to fear after seeing them used in an opinion—"valiant," "sporting," "leakage" (don't ask).
In an opinion issued over the blog's break, Judge Williams gave new fuel to the pyre of woe that is my subconscious, and added a new word to my list: IRONY
Sadly, there do not appear to be any public domain pictures of Alanis Morissette, I assume she is a reader though and will send us a replacement image with her blessing shortly.Filip Mroz, Unsplash
Even without the irony, Chervon (HK) Ltd. v. One World Techs., Inc., C.A. No 19-1293-GBW, D.I. 394 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2024) was an unusually interesting discovery dispute. In that case, the parties agreed to a case narrowing procedure wherein, after final contentions, the defendant was to elect no more than 3 grounds per asserted claim. When the defendant served that election, plaintiff complained that it included grounds that were not charted in the final contentions. In an apparent attempt to moot the issue, the defendant then served (without seeking leave) new contentions that did chart all of the elected grounds. The plaintiff then moved to strike the portions of the election not previously charted and the new contentions in their entirety.
Judge Williams granted that motion, striking most of the elected grounds and all of the new contentions, in particular noting that the defendant had not sought leave to serve them. Unfortunately this left the defendant without any elected grounds for several claims, and so they served a new election of asserted grounds including only grounds which were charted in the original, unstruck contentions (with a bit of a fudge factor). Shortly after service they moved for leave to submit the new contentions, and plaintiff cross-moved to strike them.
"Please, dear Court, don't strike our new argument that totally prejudices the other side."Lampos Aritonang, Unsplash
It can sometimes be tough to decide whether to ask the Court permission, or to just do something. The answer can vary depending on the thing you are doing and the judge.
But certain things clearly require permission. Say, for example, offering a "supplemental" expert report with a new damages calculation almost two years after the reply expert report, and only 19 days before trial:
There is no dispute that MED-EL failed to disclose Barry Sussman’s most recent damages calculations based on survey results (set forth in Paragraph 11 of his Supplemental Expert Rebuttal Report) during the expert disclosure period. Indeed, the …
We've talked about how, when deciding whether a late disclosure should result in waiver, the Court applies the Third Circuits rather forgivingPennypack factors.
We've also discussed how you really ought to have a reason for a late disclosure.
On Friday, we saw another example of that in Natera, Inc. v. CareDX, C.A. No. 20-038, D.I. 392 (D. Del. Oct. 6, 2023). Magistrate Judge Burke rejected the idea that a party can just not bother to provide an explanation for its late disclosure:
ORAL ORDER: The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's motion to strike certain [expert] opinions . . . hereby GRANTS the remaining …
Motions to strike are tough in Delaware. Although the reign of Pennypack seems to be slowly entering its dotage, the door remains open for the late-disclosed.
With exclusion so rare, its a bit odd we don't see more of Rule 37's lesser sanction -- fees.
But visiting Judge McCalla gave us one on Monday in Invacare Corp. v. Sunrise Medical (US) LLC, C.A. No. 21-823-JPM (D. Del. May 22, 2023) (Oral Order). The facts there were pretty stark.
The defendant had an inequitable conduct claim based on the patentee's failure to inform the PTO that identical claims had previously been rejected. Plaintiff's prosecution counsel testified that the failure was due to an error in an internal spreadsheet they kept of related applications that omitted the relevant application. Plaintiff had previously withheld the spreadsheet as privileged but eventually waived privilege and produced it.
Unfortunately, it came out during expert discovery that the spreadsheet actually contained the relevant application. This was probably a bad day for a lawyer somewhere. Plaintiff then went back to see if there were other versions of the spreadsheet that did omit the application -- they eventually found and produced some, but by then it was 4 months after the close of fact discovery.
Defendant moved to exclude these new references. Judge McCalla denied the motion but ordered plaintiff to pay what will surely be a hefty sum to cover the ...
Today we highlight a decade-old opinion involving an inventor’s death, the reports of which were greatly exaggerated. The moral of the story: trust but verify. Do a Google search, even if you have it on good authority. Question your assumptions.
It's an oddball case that provides the perfect foil for Nate’s article yesterday involving the opposite fact-pattern—a dead expert. Here, an inventor thought expired was “not only alive, but also willing (‘indeed eager’)” to testify in the upcoming trial, scheduled only ten days away.
In an unusual mix-up, plaintiff relied on testimony from the plaintiff’s 30(b)(6) witness, a former high-ranking officer for plaintiff's company, who said that the inventor was deceased. Where'd he get that information? Several of plaintiff’s …
When a party asks to do something outside of the time limits set by the scheduling order, the Court looks to whether there is "good cause" under FRCP 16(b)(4) to modify the scheduling order. Good cause requires diligence, generally meaning that the movant could not have reasonably met the deadline it's trying to move.
Last week we got two examples of diligence analyses from the Court, one that found that a party was diligent, and one that didn't. I thought it would be interesting to line them up and compare them.
"Immediately" = Good Cause
First, Judge Fallon found good cause where a plaintiff sought to depose a third-party witness after the close of fact discovery, after the …
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