A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


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Intellectual Property

No Trespassing
Bruno Figueiredo, Unsplash

Here's something you don't see every day. Judge Noreika today remanded a case with a DJ claim seeking a “determination that Nokia’s patent rights are exhausted” back to the Delaware Court of Chancery where it was initially filed.

Continental Automotive Systems requested that determination in its breach of contract complaint, which it filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Continental claims that Nokia's patents are subject to FRAND obligations, and that it breached a contract by failing to offer licenses to patents on FRAND terms.

Judge Noreika held that because patent exhaustion is a defense, not an affirmative claim, it does not raise a question of federal law, and there is no subject matter jurisdiction ...

What's the worst they could say?
What's the worst they could say? Andrew E. Russell

It's easy to forget that, before the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, attorney communications with testifying experts and drafts of expert reports were often discoverable by the other side.

The amended Federal Rules offer more protection to those kinds of materials. But since the change, some attorneys have become much more open in their communication with testifying experts, and some experts have become much less sensitive to avoiding written records.

But post-2010 Rule 26 does not protect everything relating to a testifying expert's work. In fact, it has gaping holes, and protects only two things: "drafts of any report or disclosure" and "communications between the party's attorney …

Back in August, Judge Hall shot down a plaintiff's attempt to recover its fees from counsel under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides for the award of "reasonable attorneys fees" in "exceptional cases." Today, Judge Andrews rejected several objections to Judge Hall's decision.

As set forth by Judge Andrews, the defendants' basic argument was that while earlier cases held that § 285 does not permit fee awards against attorneys, certain dicta in the Supreme Courts more recent Octane Fitness opinion changed that:

Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge "overlooked" the Supreme Court's Octane Fitness opinion, in which the Court found that § 285 imposed "one and only one constraint on district courts' discretion to award attorney's fees in patent …

With this case, the hits just keep coming...
With this case, the hits just keep coming... Mitya Ivanov, Unsplash

What do you do when your expert's damages opinion gets excluded, the Court rules you cannot proceed based solely on the factual evidence, and you bear the burden of proof?

According to an opinion from Judge Andrews yesterday, one option is to call the other side’s expert—even if the other side otherwise refuses to put her on the stand.

This Case Again?

We've actually talked about this case, Shure Inc. v. ClearOne, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1343-RGA-CJB (D. Del.), quite a bit at this point, including defendant's efforts to use DJ jurisdiction to keep part of the case out of Delaware, and plaintiff's effort …

Coffee Equals
Charles "Duck" Unitas, Unsplash

Most patent litigators know that the reverse doctrine of equivalents exists, and provides a way to argue non-infringement even if an accused product meets the literal terms of a claim. But it tends to be one of those issues that floats around in the ether, waiting for the right case, and it is rarely applied in practice.

Judge Connolly had an occasion last week to address the issue, resolving a motion for summary judgment of no reverse DOE, and took the opportunity to dig into some of the history of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. He first quoted the Federal Circuit's description of what the doctrine is:

the reverse doctrine of equivalents . . …

What I imagine claim construction arguments looked like
Immo Wegmann, Unsplash

Last week, Judge Noreika issued an interesting oral order regarding a claim construction dispute that was briefed—haphazardly, apparently—in the parties' summary judgment papers.

She criticized the briefing, ordered the parties to meet-and-confer and file ordinary claim construction briefing, and threatened sanctions if the parties don't try hard enough to reach agreement:

ORAL ORDER − In their summary judgment papers, the parties include arguments that either three or four additional claim terms must be construed by the Court. The parties' arguments are disjointed, do not focus on the intrinsic evidence and do not demonstrate any real understanding of what that other side's construction is. Thus, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before 5:00 PM on …

Divide
Crack on white concrete surface, Brina Blum, Unsplash

We've been following the district court cases holding that a complaint itself cannot establish knowledge of patent infringement sufficient to support a claim of indirect infringement or willfulness.

On Friday, Judge Hall jumped in, noting that judges in this district have taken views on this issue:

As many have acknowledged, courts—including courts within this district—disagree as to whether a pleading alleging post-suit inducement must allege that the defendant had the requisite knowledge prior to the filing of that particular pleading (or the lawsuit itself). I am also aware that there are courts—including in this district—that appear to hold that in the absence of pre-suit knowledge, a post-suit indirect infringement claim …

You know what they say about eggs in baskets...
You know what they say about eggs in baskets... Natalie Rhea, Unsplash

In a making a motion to dismiss for ineligibility under § 101, the moving party often seeks an ineligibility finding for all claims by attacking a single independent claim and arguing that it is "representative" of the others.

This can be a powerful briefing technique, as it avoids a repetitive slog through multiple asserted claims. Beyond that, it has the practical effect of shifting the burden to the patentee—to some extent—to show that the other asserted claims are different.

A short opinion yesterday by Judge Andrews, however, shows one downside of the representative-claim approach on a § 101 motion to dismiss. If you lose the argument …

We dug up a transcript.
We dug up a transcript. Jon Butterworth, Unsplash

Last week, in deciding a renewed motion to stay pending a § 101 motion to dismiss, Judge Burke commented on the likelihood of success of such motions:

The Court, having reviewed the parties' letters relating to Defendant's request to renew its motion to stay, . . . hereby ORDERS that the request is DENIED. . . . [I]n light of the circumstances here (including the statistical unlikelihood of prevailing on a Section 101 motion to dismiss as to each of the four separate patents−in−suit), the Court concludes a stay is not warranted.

Defendant had renewed the motion to stay after Judge Burke denied it in late April. That transcript was …

Yesteday, Judge Stark issued an opinion on various discovery disputes and objections in Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc., C.A. No. 20-125-LPS (D. Del. Sept. 21, 2021). Here are a few helpful nuggets from the opinion:

He declined to order defendants to respond to 30(b)(6) topics like the following, except for identifying "all persons substantively involved" because that language is "vague and overbroad":

The research, development, design, testing and validation of each of Your Accused Products, including when they were developed and identity of all persons substantively involved in their design and development.

He ordered defendants to produce a corporate witness on the following topic, including an order to describe contemplated and future filings with the …