During our long break, when Andrew and I languished upon a beach, trading daiquiri recipes across a bridge table whilst a jazz band played Auld Lang Syne on repeat (they seemed quite uncomfortable in their tuxedos), Judge Bryson brought us an opinion with a new twist on an old PO dispute.
The Plaintiff in Rheault v. Halma Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 23-700-WCB, was not a corporation. He was just a dude . . . named Rheault. The parties disputed whether Rheault could have access to all of the information produced by the defendants in the action, or if there should be some separate attorney's eyes only tier that he was not privy too.
As Judge Bruson noted, a dispute about whether a particular person should have access to the most confidential documents usually depends upon whether that person is a "competitive decisionmaker."
The question whether a particular individual should be allowed access to highly confidential materials has arisen in a number of cases. Such cases often involve the question whether certain employees of a party, such as in-house counsel, should be permitted access to materials with that designation. The answer to that question typically turns on whether the employees in question are involved in competitive decisionmaking on behalf of the party. If so, those employees are typically barred from having access to materials designated as highly confidential. If not, they are often allowed access to those materials.
Rheault v. Halma Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 23-700-WCB, at 2 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2023) (Mem. Op.)
Here, however, Rheault was a guy. Presumably he makes his own day to day decisions about whether to go to Arby's or Fudruckers (Arby's), but he wasn't involved in the operation of any particular company (the dispute actually centered upon the contract selling his company to the defendants).
Judge Bryson found this point dispositive, at least in the absence of any evidence that he would rejoin the market imminently and compete with the defendants:
Given that there is no evidence that Mr. Rheault intends to resume activity in his former field of business and that the defendants have not shown any other reason why Mr. Rheault should be denied access to the materials designated as “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” I conclude that the defendants have not satisfied their burden of showing entitlement to the restrictive protective order they have requested.
Id. at 7.
