A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: FRCP 12(b)(6)

Chief Judge Connolly Holds, Sua Sponte, That Willfulness Cannot Be Dismissed, and States That He Will No Longer Entertain Such Motions

Andrew E. Russell, Oct. 15, 2025
FRCP 12(b)(6) Willfulness

Lightning
Yoav Aziz, Unsplash

We've talked a lot about how hard it can be to plead indirect infringement and willfulness before Chief Judge Connolly. He set forth his views on the subject in ZapFraud, Inc. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1687-CFC-CJB (Mar. 24, 2021), where he held that a complaint cannot form the basis for an allegation of willful infringement in the same action:

[I]n the absence of binding authority to the contrary from the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, I will adopt the rule that the operative complaint in a lawsuit fails to state a claim for indirect patent infringement where the defendant's alleged knowledge of the asserted patents is based solely on the content of that …
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Something to Consider When Considering a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss a Patent Case

Andrew E. Russell, Jan. 8, 2025
MTD FRCP 12(b)(6)

Robot
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Back in 2021 the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am. that raised the standard for granting a motion to dismiss in a patent action. C.A. No. 2020-2218, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20624 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021). The Federal Circuit held that "[a] plaintiff is not required to plead infringement on an element-by-element basis"—which was news to the patent practitioners who had filed (and won) motions on that basis.

We haven't written much about that decision in the time since, but it's still out there, and it's something to keep in mind as you weigh your options in response to a patent infringement complaint.

Last month, during our …

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Court Denies Motion to Dismiss That Was Contingent on a Claim Construction Issue

Andrew E. Russell, May 17, 2024
MTD FRCP 12(b)(6)

Trash Can Basket
Gary Chan, Unsplash

If you file a motion to dismiss and it's contingent on resolution of a claim construction issue in your favor, you're at risk of being denied. We saw that yesterday in a case before Judge Hall, where she denied a motion to dismiss in advance of the Markman hearing:

ORAL ORDER: Having been reassigned this case, having reviewed the briefing filed in connection with Medacta's pending Motion to Dismiss Count III (regarding infringement of the '678 patent) for Failure to State a Claim (D.I. 12 ), and it appearing that the outcome of the Motion depends on the Courts claim construction of a particular term, and in light of the fact that claim construction disputes are …
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How Little Is Too Little? Court Dismisses Patent Complaint for Lack of Detail, Threatens Sanctions

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 20, 2023
MTD FRCP 12(b)(6)

Little
Paul Kramer, Unsplash

One of the early questions in many cases (particularly NPE cases) is whether the defendant can move to dismiss the complaint under 12(b)(6) for lacking sufficient detail under Twombly/Iqbal.

The answer is yes: You can, as long as there is insufficient detail. But what is the cutoff? How bad does it have to be?

We got an example of that on Monday, when Chief Judge Connolly dismissed a complaint for lacking detail. According to the Court, all the plaintiff did was say that the defendant's product infringes the claim:

"[A] plaintiff cannot assert a plausible claim for infringement under the Iqbal/Twombly standard by reciting the claim elements and merely concluding that the accused …
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Judge Kennelly Weighs In on Whether Complaint Can Establish Notice for Willfulness

Andrew E. Russell, Sept. 21, 2022
FRCP 12(b)(6) Post-Filing Willfulness

An AI-generated (!!) scene of a split courthouse
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

We've written a lot about how there is a split in the District of Delaware about whether a complaint itself can establish knowledge of infringement sufficient to support a claim of post-filing willfulness or induced infringement.

Early this week, visiting Judge Kennelly weighed in, siding with the judges who say that a complaint can establish knowledge, in a short opinion:

A claim for willful infringement of a patent requires the plaintiff to establish—or at this point in the case, to plausibly allege—that the accused infringer had knowledge of or was willfully blind to the patent and that its conduct constituted, induced, or contributed to infringement. . . . Similarly, a claim of induced or contributory infringement …
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Impossible-to-Reconcile Federal Circuit Precedent Results in Denial of § 101 Motion

Andrew E. Russell, Aug. 20, 2022
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings FRCP 12(b)(6)

Federal Circuit on the left vs. Federal Circuit on the right. Will we get to see round 2?
Federal Circuit on the left vs. Federal Circuit on the right. Will we get to see round 2? Charl Folscher, Unsplash

We talked a couple of days ago about how, in Longbeam Technologies LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1559-CFC (D. Del.), Chief Judge Connolly stayed the action after raising plaintiff's inadequate disclosures at a § 101 hearing.

But, at the same hearing, plaintiff actually prevailed on the § 101 motion—and Chief Judge Connolly made some notable comments about how the Federal Circuit has responded to his previous § 101 decisions, and what that means for cases going forward.

Case 1, Universal Secure: Affirmed

The first case, Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., …

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Is Receipt of a Letter Listing Only the Patent and Accused Product Enough to State a Claim for Willfulness?

Andrew E. Russell, Jan. 5, 2022
Willfulness MTD

Envelope with Letter
Brando Makes Branding, Unsplash

That is the question Judge Andrews addressed yesterday. He found that yes, a letter listing a patent and accused product is enough to state a claim in a complaint for pre-suit willfulness—the letter need not include things like claim charts or specific descriptions of product features:

I find that the notice letter sufficiently pleads knowledge for the eight patents-in-suit listed in the letter. The letter lists many LG products and states, " These products, and others made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported into the United States by LG, infringe many of the patents in [Bench Walk's] portfolio." (D.I. 25-1 at 1-2). The letter then enumerates eleven patents, including eight of the ten …
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When Filing a § 101 Motion to Dismiss, Don't Short-Change the Argument About Whether a Claim Is Representative

Andrew E. Russell, Oct. 1, 2021
MTD FRCP 12(b)(6)

You know what they say about eggs in baskets...
You know what they say about eggs in baskets... Natalie Rhea, Unsplash

In a making a motion to dismiss for ineligibility under § 101, the moving party often seeks an ineligibility finding for all claims by attacking a single independent claim and arguing that it is "representative" of the others.

This can be a powerful briefing technique, as it avoids a repetitive slog through multiple asserted claims. Beyond that, it has the practical effect of shifting the burden to the patentee—to some extent—to show that the other asserted claims are different.

A short opinion yesterday by Judge Andrews, however, shows one downside of the representative-claim approach on a § 101 motion to dismiss. If you lose the argument …

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Chief Judge Connolly Dismisses NPE Complaint for Inadequate Detail

Andrew E. Russell, July 28, 2021
MTD FRCP 12(b)(6)

March of the Trolls
Paulo O, CC BY 2.0

Continuing our theme, another subject that often comes up in defending NPE complaints is whether the NPE's often-lackluster complaint may be vulnerable to an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (and whether that motion can be brought economically).

Judge Connolly today dismissed a complaint by Swirlate IP, an (alleged) IP Edge entity, because the complaint mostly parroted the language of the claims and offered an unspecific website URL.

Here is an example of a typical paragraph from the complaint, which mirrors the claim language but also offers slightly more:

21. Upon information and belief, the Accused Instrumentality performs the step of performing the second transmission by transmitting the second data symbols over a …
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Some Notable Points from Magistrate Judge Hall's § 101 Denial in RSDI v. Lyft

Andrew E. Russell, July 12, 2021
§ 101 Days 12(b)(6)

Ridesharing
Brecht Denil, Unsplash

Magistrate Judge Hall issued a § 101 R&R today in Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., C.A. No. 20-1629-RGA-JLH (D. Del.), recommending denial of defendant Lyft's motion to dismiss based on § 101.

The Court found that the patent was not directed to an abstract idea—though it noted that it was a close call—and that, regardless, the invention contained an inventive concept under Step 2 of Alice.

We've all read about dozens (or more) of § 101 opinions over the last few years, but here are a few points of interest from Judge Hall's opinion:

  • Judge Hall closely examined the representativeness of the alleged representative claim, and rejected it as unrepresentative. Choose …
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