A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


GBW
The Honorable Gregory B. Williams

Judge Williams issued an interesting opinion yesterday on a motion to strike.

This is becoming my standard pitcture when I don't have anything more clever.  Let me know if you would like me to replace it with a series of cartoons of Andrew and I shrugging
This is becoming my standard pitcture when I don't have anything more clever. Let me know if you would like me to replace it with a series of cartoons of Andrew and I shrugging Billy, Unsplash

The issue in Cisco Systems, Inc. et al v. Ramot at Tel Aviv University Ltd., C.A. No. 21-1365-GBW (D. Del. Jan. 15, 2025) was the form of the briefing. The case had previously been assigned to Judge Stark, before passing to the vacant judgeship, then Judge Burke. The parties' scheduling order thus followed judge Burke's form order which contained a specific letter briefing procedure for motions to strike with 3-page opening, a 5 page answering and 2-page reply briefs. When the case was reassigned to Judge Williams, the parties kept the old scheduling order.

The parties ultimately raised the motion to strike through Judge Williams' dispute procedures. He issued an oral order that allowed for only 3-page opening and answering briefs without reference to the procedures in the scheduling order:

Having reviewed the parties' joint letter requesting a discovery teleconference (D.I. 146), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 10, 2024, any party seeking relief shall file with the Court a letter, not to exceed three (3) pages, outlining the issues in dispute, its position on those issues, and supporting authority for its position(s). By no later than 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 12, 2024, any party opposing the request for relief may file a letter, not to exceed three (3) pages, outlining that party's reasons for its opposition and supporting authority.

The movant (Plaintiff) filed a 3 page letter (the correct procedure under either the scheduling order the later oral order). The defendant, however, filed a 5-page answering brief -- allowed under the scheduling order but exceeding the limit set in the oral order.

Judge Williams thus declined to consider any of the argument after page 3 of the brief:

While the Operative Scheduling Order sets default page limits for motions to strike, the parties were both instructed to submit letter briefs not exceeding three pages. Cisco complied with that instruction. Ramot did not. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion and give no weight to the text beyond page three of Ramot's brief.

Id. at 2 n.2 (internal citations omitted).

I'm a baker. I was born of flour and heat and fermented in this big jar we call life. My original starter, Yeasty Boy, has sired many children that live lives of plenty. His grandchild, breAD-Rock, sits upon my counter as I type, growing fat on apple peels.

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

One of the first lessons of baking is that some ingredients can be modified or omitted without any real worry. You trade rosemary for thyme in your focaccia and everything's honky dory. On the other hand, if you switch the strong bread flour to whole wheat, you have crossed a moral line from which there may be no return. Some ingredients are simply more important, and some substitutions …

Some home-cooked stuffing. Apparently the photo in our Thanksgiving post was uncooked stuffing.
Some home-cooked stuffing. Apparently the photo in our Thanksgiving post was uncooked stuffing. Andrew E. Russell, displayed with permission

We're back! I hope you all had a great Thanksgiving. As we'd hoped, the Court issued some interesting decisions last week, including a denial of a motion to strike in Lindis Biotech, GmbH v. Amgen, Inc., C.A. No. 22-35-GBW (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2024).

In that case, the parties had agreed to a case narrowing schedule that required the accused infringer to cut back to 6 prior art references per patent by 14 days before the pretrial order, not including references used to show the state of the art, the knowledge of one skilled in the art, …

Dominoes
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Both Chief Judge Connolly and Judge Williams require parties to rank their summary judgment motions. This is an effort to deter meritless summary judgment motions. Upon denying a higher-ranked motion, the Court will automatically deny lower-ranked motions as well.

In other words: You had better be careful when ranking your summary judgment motions. But it can be tricky! Do you put the one with the highest chance of success first, even if it's on an issue you don't care as much about? Or do you rank the tougher SJ motion first because it addresses a critical issue first, to ensure that the Court will at least address it?

And what if a motion is granted, but …

Today's post will be the final one for a bit on the subject of indefiniteness rulings at Markman. Long ago, we wrote this post cataloguing which Delaware judges allowed the parties to argue indefiniteness during Markman and which deferred the issue until summary judgment.

At the very bottom of that post, we had a note that Judge Williams had invited indefiniteness argument at a hearing, but we have not yet noted a case where he actually found a claim indefinite.

Until today.

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Last week, Judge Williams issued his claim construction ruling in Cisco Sys. Inc v. Ramot at Tel Aviv Univ. Ltd., C.A. No. 21-1365-GBW (D. Del. Nov. 12, 2024). In that decision, in addition to construing several terms, Judge Williams found several indefinite:

The Court holds that claims 45-47 and 49-54 of the '998 patent are "invalid for indefiniteness [as] [those] claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention." Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 901. Specifically, with respect to those preceding claims, "the problematic limitation" is the "wherein the N bits of the N bit digital input data word are mapped" clause, which "although not directed to a function performed by a user[,] . . . appear[s] in isolation and [is] not 'specifically tied to structure."' KOM Software, No. CV 18-160-WCB, D.I. 116 at 34 n.6.

Id. at 15-16.

The details are pretty straightforward and not worth recounting here, but there can no longer be any doubt that Judge Williams will kill a claim at Markman.

Artist's interpretation of the Sword of Algorithms piercing the Shield of § 230.
Artist's interpretation of the Sword of Algorithms piercing the Shield of § 230. AI-Generated, displayed with permission

There has been a lot of political talk lately about § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which provides immunity for certain kinds of claims related to user-generated content on social media. It's a hot-button, IP-adjacent topic.

Judge Williams today addressed the question of whether § 230 operates to shield Meta / Facebook from the effects of its algorithms. The case is between former Governer Mike Huckabee and Meta, and involves privacy, publicity, false light, and unjust enrichment claims related to ads Facebook hosted that suggested Governor Huckabee was associated with a CBD product:

[Plaintiff claims that t]o promote …

Its not often I got to throw out a reference to A Critique of Pure Reason, so this one goes out to whatever liberal arts majors find themselves reading the blog for some reason.

I spent a good deal of time trying to find an image for this, and I'm now convinced that no artist actually saw him alive, as the many depictions look nothing alike.  I have chosen the one with the best cheekbones as I assume he would have wanted.
I spent a good deal of time trying to find an image for this, and I'm now convinced that no artist actually saw him alive, as the many depictions look nothing alike. I have chosen the one with the best cheekbones as I assume he would have wanted. Friedrich Rosmäsler, 1822, from a painting by Todd Schorr

As the aforementioned liberal artists among you may have gathered, today's post deals with the question of representative claims in the 101 analysis. In particular, to what extent can the few exemplary claims listed in the complaint stand in for the larger, inchoate, collection of claims that may ultimately be asserted when deciding a motion to dismiss.

In Redwood Techs., LLC v. Netgear Inc., C.A. No. 22-1272-GBW, D.I. 27 (Oct. 28, 2024), Judge Williams drew the hardest (most Kantian?) line on the issue that I have seen in recent years.

The operative complaint followed the common tactic of accusing the defendant's products of accusing "one or more claims" of several patents and then describing the alleged infringement of one claim per patent "for example." Id., D.I. 14 (Amended complaint).

Defendant moved to dismiss, discussing only those representative claims. Plaintiff opposed, arguing that the defendant "did not meet its burden of demonstrating representativeness," and noting that it "will be asserting additional claims of infringement." Id., D.I. 21 at 1.

Judge Williams was unpersuaded by this potential assertion of as-yet-unidentified claims and treated each of the claims referenced in the patent as representative:

The Court rejects Redwood's attempt to insert new patent claims through its opposition brief, as Redwood put forward only a skeletal argument and "did not file a motion for leave to amend [its] [Operative] Complaint." Redwood "may not amend [its] claims via [its] opposition to the motion[] to dismiss." "[T]he Court will consider only the claim[s] asserted in [Redwood's] [Operative] Complaint."
Thus, as Redwood fails to specifically identify a single, disputed claim left unaddressed by Netgear's motion, there are no "disputes over representativeness" for this Court to resolve.

Id., D.I. 21 at 5 (internal citations omitted).

Given the "skeletal" (spooky!) nature of the Redwood's briefing on this issue, it's not clear if the representativeness argument was doomed by the failure to specifically seek leave to amend, or if it could have passed muster with some additional detail. As an example, I sometimes see briefs that actually say something like "claim 39, which we definitely will be asserting, is totally different for the purposes of this analysis because it also claims a novel perpetual motion machine."

A possible answer lies in ...

The patentee's <a href='#' class='abbreviation' data-bs-toggle='tooltip' data-placement='top' title='Temporary Restraining Order'>TRO</a> attempt worked out about as well as this (unmanned) rocket's attempt to reach orbit.
The patentee's TRO attempt worked out about as well as this (unmanned) rocket's attempt to reach orbit. Tim Mossholder, Unsplash

Ouch. In Nivagen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals Inc., C.A. No. 24-846-GBW (D. Del.), the patentee plaintiff filed suit to stop a competitor from launching a drug that it says would infringe its patents, after the competitor received FDA approval.

(Because this was not an ANDA, there was no automatic stay.)

The plaintiff filed a TRO motion on August 13, shortly after its complaint. For at least two of the …

One of these guys forgot to come armed.
One of these guys forgot to come armed. AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Attorneys spend a lot of time threatening fee awards when dealing with an NPE, even though they can be challenging to get. So I always think it's interesting to see what kinds of behavior will support a fee award.

Last week, Judge Williams issued a memorandum order granting fees in Extremity Medical, LLC v. Nextremity Solutions, LLC, C.A. No. 22-239-GBW (D. Del.). The Court listed three bases for its fee award. First, the patentee made zero showing of any pre-suit investigation of invalidity:

[T]here is no dispute that Defendants notified Plaintiff of [prior art references] Marcus and Chandran several years prior to the date …

"Yes, we need to know their financials for our permanent injunction. It totally won't help us in settlement negotiations or anything." AI-Generated, displayed with permission

This is another one where I saw a potentially useful order about an issue that comes up from time to time, and thought "I should write a blog post about that, so I can find it later." I hope this will be helpful for others as well.

Last week in Nexus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC, C.A. No. 22-1233-GBW (D. Del.), the Court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff in a "competitor-competitor" patent case could compel production of the defendant's corporate-level financials. It held that no, it could not, …