A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


LPS
The Honorable Leonard P. Stark

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Nathan Shively, Unsplash

We've written several times about the Pennypack factors—the Third Circuit standard for determining whether to exclude late-disclosed evidence. Although the standard itself is fairly lenient (focusing on prejudice and whether it can be cured), the D. Del. judges have shown an increasing willingness to exclude evidence under Pennypack in recent years.

Earlier today, for example, Judge Stark applied Pennypack to preclude four witnesses from testifying at an upcoming jury trial (two from each side). The witnesses were disclosed months after the close of fact discovery, and Judge Stark refused to force the parties to use their limited trial prep time for clean-up discovery: "there is not sufficient time in the 12 remaining days before trial …

"Oh god. What did our expert just say?" Jamie Haughton, Unsplash

More and more NPE cases have moved to Delaware over the last few years, following TC Heartland. Defendants often try to deal with NPE cases by threatening fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, with varying degrees of success.

A § 285 fees opinion today by Judge Stark offers an interesting data point as to what kind of conduct is not sufficient to render a case as a whole exceptional under § 285, as well as a lesson on how to best to pursue a fees motion.

In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Trend Micro Inc., C.A. No. 12-1581-LPS (D. Del.), the patentee's …

Sometimes Arguments Solve Nothing
Sometimes Arguments Solve Nothing Sarah Kilian, Unsplash

It's uncommon to see the Court dismiss an ANDA case before trial. The patents are usually grounded enough to avoid easy 101 issues, infringement is as likely to be conceded as disputed, and any other serious invalidity contentions are normally simply reserved for trial (none of our Delaware judges allow for SJ motions in ANDA cases without leave).

That being the case, Judge Stark's dismissal of the complaint in Almirall, LLC v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd., C.A No. 20-1373-LPS, D.I. 50 (D. Del. July 13, 2021) ("Almirall II"), via a 12(c) motion is worthy of comment merely because it dismissed an ANDA complaint on the pleadings before Markman. …

Judge Stark issued a claim construction ruling in a large multi-district ANDA case last week, touching on interesting questions regarding the nature of intrinsic evidence and the impact of disclaimers on child applications.

The parties to In re Entresto (SacubitriWalsartan) Patent Litigation, C.A. No. 20-2930-LPS presented the Court with just a few issues for resolution.

First, the Court considered whether independent claims of two of the patents-in-suit directed to administration of a "combination" of active ingredients should be limited to administering those ingredients as "two separate components“…

We've written several times about Judge Stark's practice of holding "101 days." For the uninitiated, these are day-long hearings in which the court hears argument on multiple 101 motions from unrelated cases in a single, combined hearing. He has continued this practice throughout the pandemic, holding telephonic 101 days roughly once a quarter since July 2020.

He held another one last Friday, and he issued his written rulings earlier today. This time, he addressed three 12(b)(6) motions covering a total of four patents.

F45 Training Pty Ltd. v. Body Fit Training USA Inc. (C.A. No. 20-1194-LPS)

The claims were "directed to the abstract idea of storing, sending, and retrieving information over a network." Judge Stark found that this …

Here's a new one: A defendant in Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc., C.A. No. 20-125-LPS (D. Del.) wanted to delay the trial to coordinate the schedule with another case involving an overlapping patent. So it filed a letter asking for leave to file a 3-page letter briefs, or to have a teleconference:

Given the parties have been unable to agree on an appropriate approach for coordination of both cases, we respectfully request leave to submit the competing views to Your Honor during a status conference or 3-page letter briefs.

Chief Judge Stark denied the request, directing the parties to file a motion instead:

ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed the parties' letters . . . relating to [the …

Yesterday, Chief Judge Stark addressed whether "judicial estoppel" prevents a defendant from taking one position in an uninstituted IPR petition and asserting a contradictory position during claim construction in the district court:

[Plaintiff] Sequoia contends that [defendant] Red Hat is judicially estopped from arguing for a narrower construction than it proposed during the IPR . . . . Judicial estoppel is only appropriate when: (1) the party to be estopped is asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with one she previously asserted; (2) the party changed her position in bad faith, i.e., with an intent to play fast and loose with the court, and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to address the affront to the …

In a recent order, Judge Stark ruled that evidence of willfulness would come in during the liability phase of a jury trial in which liability and damages are being tried separately. The ruling was one of several issued in the lead up to the June jury trial in Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P. v. Powder Springs Logistics, LLC, C.A. No. 17-1390-LPS.

In his ruling, Judge Stark noted that "[t]he Court's interest in conservation of resources disfavors Defendants' request,"...

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David Clode, Unsplash

In Reputation.com, Inc. v. Birdeye, Inc., C.A. No. 21-129-LPS (D. Del.), the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction.

Judge Stark referred the PI motion to Judge Burke, who held an initial status conference and set a truncated schedule for PI discovery. The scheduling order set deadlines for PI discovery and supplemental briefing to be completed within 4 months.

Shortly after the PI motion, defendant moved to dismiss on § 101 grounds; in response, the plaintiff amended the complaint.

After the amendment, the Court issued an oral order sua sponte denying the motion to dismiss as moot—a common practice among some D. Del. judges (these orders helpfully make explicit that the pending motion …

By and large, the view from the bench is that expert testimony provides little value in the claim construction process. It's litigation-driven extrinsic evidence, and it often plays no role in the court's final analysis. But if you choose to rely on an expert during claim construction, will you have to make them available for deposition?

Judge Stark answered this question on Friday with a resounding yes. After reiterating the general view that "[e]xpert opinions and declarations constitute extrinsic evidence . . . and are at times unhelpful," he confirmed that:

a party asking the Court to rely on such extrinsic evidence should expect to make its expert(s) available for deposition prior to a claim construction hearing, should …