Apparenly this is a picture of a large magnet, rather than a particle accelerator. Either way, it looks like someone left their binder in it.Brandon Style, Unsplash
We've talked about this before, but it was so long ago that I think it's worth pointing out again. Typically, left to their own devices, parties in patent cases will schedule initial contentions, then claim construction and a Markman hearing, and then final contentions.
In theory, the final contentions can then reflect claim constructions. In practice, it doesn't always work out that way, given that a Markman opinion may come out after the hearing anyway. If you want to have constructions before final contentions, you need to leave a fair …
I don't think I'm speaking out of turn when I say that snap removal is a patently ridiculous concept. Whatever lawyer first decided to float this argument deserves all of the praise I can heap upon them, both for the inventiveness and sheer audacity. In fact, lets take a moment to snap for them now:
Some say he's still writing that brief. . .AI-Generated, displayed with permission
In any case, snap removal has been the law in the Third Circuit since Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152-53 (3d Cir. 2018), where the Court held that the plain language of the removal statute required snap removal even though the "result may be peculiar." Id. at 153-54.
But real snappies will be aware of the next big thing—"super snap" removals, which the Third Circuit has yet to address. A super (duper) snap removal (expialadocious) is where the plaintiff electronically submits the complaint, the defendant becomes aware of it through their docket-monitoring service of choice, and then removes the case before the filing has even been accepted by the clerk.
Snappy.
The Ninth Circuit—the first to address this growing class of removals—held that they "had a foundational defect—the absence of an existing civil action in state court—that rendered them not just defective but legally null and void." Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2024).
Judge Noreika had a decision yesterday on a middle-ground between regular and snap removal, which I have chosen to call semi-super snap removal (expialadocious). The plaintiff in Higgins v. Novartis Pharms. Corp, C.A. No. 25-245-MN (D. Del. May 14, 2025) filed ...
This is something we've talkedabout before, but the blog is always picking up new readers, so I figured it's worth revisiting for the newcomers.
Yesterday, Judge Noreika denied a stipulation to extend the page limits for the briefing on a motion to dismiss from the default 20/20/10 (opening/answering/reply) to 30/30/10:
ORAL ORDER re 16 Stipulation Regarding Motion to Dismiss - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stipulation is DENIED. The Court will not extend the page limits. ORDERED by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 11/12/2024. (dlw) (Entered: 11/12/2024)
Advanced Accelerator Applications USA, Inc. v. Curium US LLC, C.A. NO. 24-1161-MN, D.I. 17 (D. Del. Nov. 12, 2024).
"Your honor, we'd like to drop most of our claims." "Ok, but you're not picking them back up."AI-Generated, displayed with permission
True D. Del. patent litigators know that, no matter which side you're on, you're going to have to narrow your claims and defenses before trial. It's just unwise and unworkable to go into a five-day trial with 100 claims, or with 30 prior art references and hundreds (or millions) of potential obviousness combinations. There isn't time to cover it all.
That said, sometimes the parties in patent cases delay case narrowing for a long time. And while the Court will often narrowing, it doesn't do that in every case. Instead, judges sometimes take the approach that …
I know which one I'd prefer.AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Because cases tend to go away rapidly over time, either through settlement or on the merits, attorneys tend to be less experienced with motions that come up later in the case, particularly things that come up after the judgment (other than post-trial motions), or even after appeal.
One example is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under FRCP 59(e). You just don't see them that often. So I thought it was worth talking about a Rule 59(e) motion that the Court addressed last week.
In The United States of America v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., C.A. No. 19-2103 (D. Del.), the plaintiff argued that the …
Judge Noreika issued an interesting order yesterday denying a § 101 motion to dismiss. According to the docket, shortly after the defendant filed its motion to dismiss—and contrary to what we found when we last looked at this—the Court directed the parties to meet-and-confer on a proposed schedule.
While the motion to dismiss was pending, the Court held a scheduling conference and issued a scheduling order. In it, the parties agreed to a real case narrowing proposal (without court intervention!), with plaintiff to initially cut back to 20 asserted claims per patent and 50 total by initial contentions, and then further cut back to 25 total just before final contentions.
In AlterWAN, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1544-MN (D. Del.), the parties stipulated to a judgment of non-infringement after the Court construed certain terms of the patent, and then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit vacated the stipulated judgment because it found it was not specific enough, and remanded the case. See AlterWAN, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 63 F.4th 18, 23 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[W]e cannot ‘ascertain the basis for the judgment’ of non-infringement, . . . because the parties did not adequately explain how the claim construction rulings related to the accused systems.”).
Along the lines of on Friday's post, Judge Noreika issued an order in a different case this week denying a § 101 motion because it addressed only a subset of claims, and suggested that more claims may be asserted:
ORAL ORDER re (10 in 1:23-cv-00174-MN) (9 in 1:23-cv-00220-MN) MOTION to Dismiss - Defendants have filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that claim 1 in two of the four asserted patents is directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. . . . Defendants state in a footnote that they are not addressing other claims, but that very same footnote suggests that the Court may face additional § 101 arguments in the future should Plaintiff add further asserted claims from the two patents at issue in the motion and that the Court may also later have to address § 101 with respect to the remaining two patents not subject to the present motion. (C.A. No. 23-220, D.I. 10 at 2 n.2). Given that Defendants' § 101 motions suggest that the Court will be forced to address § 101 issues in this case seriatim and because doing so is not a good use of the Court's time, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motions to dismiss are DENIED without prejudice to renew as appropriate during summary judgment. ORDERED by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 10/23/2023.
AlmondNet, Inc. v. Freewheel Media, Inc., C.A. No. 23-220 (D. Del. Oct. 23, 2023).
What was in the footnote? An admission that the motion doesn't resolve all of the claims:
This motion is directed to only two claims—claim 1 of the ’307 patent and claim 1 of the ’249 patent—because they are the only claims of those patents that the Complaint alleges Defendants infringe. . . . While Plaintiffs could conceivably assert other claims of the ’307 and ’249 patents if the Court grants this motion, they would do so at their peril because those other claims add only incidental limitations to the two at issue here. Thus, resolution of this motion will likely dispose of two of the four asserted patents in this case. Moreover, because Plaintiffs’ patents are all similar—and all face similar obstacles under Section 101—Defendants believe that deciding this motion now will streamline and promote resolution of this entire case, and possibly of other AlmondNet cases as well, since they involve similar or overlapping patents. . . . Accordingly, Defendants believe that deciding this motion now, at the Rule 12 stage, will be an efficient use of the Court’s resources.
Id., D.I. 10 at 2 n.2.
This outcome is not unusual, but it's definitely something to keep in mind when evaluating ...
We noted last year how Judge Noreika has sometimes denied § 101 motions to dismiss that challenge large numbers of claims, holding that it is more efficient to deal with such motions at the SJ stage (where, presumably, the case would be narrowed).
This week, the Court addressed a § 101 motion in Global Tel*Link Corporation v. JACS Solutions, Inc., C.A. No. 23-500-MN (D. Del.). The motion seeks a § 101 ineligibility finding for 5 claims across 5 asserted patents—i.e., one claim per patent. That's all the plaintiff asserted in the complaint. Id., D.I. 20.
I wanted to call out the interesting quote in the title, which comes from an opinion Judge Noreika issued on Friday granting-in-part post-trial motions in a patent case.
The quote is in the context of a motion for JMOL of no post-suit indirect infringement because the accused infringer didn't encourage users to infringe. The Court was very disappointed in the parties' briefing:
[T]he Court must still address Defendants’ remaining complaint as to indirect infringement. Defendants argue that there was no evidence at trial to suggest that they encourage others to infringe the ’502 and ’386 Patents, which is required for a finding of inducement liability. On this point, …
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