Judge Andrews successfully held a jury trial in a criminal case this week, culminating in a "not guilty" verdict today. Everything seems to have gone off without a hitch, with jury selection, preliminary instructions, opening statements, and multiple witness examinations taking place in a single day.
There's a huge backlog of jury trials in D. Del., and the court is still only equipped to hold one jury trial at a time (with a separate courtroom serving as the public observation area). But this is a big step …
In anotherruling from the In Re ChanBond litigation as it approaches trial, Judge Andrews today issued an in-depth opinion granting a motion in limine to exclude reference to prior expert testimony from a related IPR proceeding, on the grounds that the testimony is hearsay.
Plaintiff sought to admit the material as former testimony under FRE 804(b)(1), because it is helpful to its infringement case. The rule requires, however, that the former testimony was offered against the parties' predecessor who had "an opportunity and similar motive to develop it."
Here, Judge Andrews found that an IPR petitioner's motive in developing expert testimony to show invalidity is different from a defendant's motive developing its non-infringement position:
Judge Andrew's In re Chanbond opinion an Friday focused primarily on reopening discovery, but it also addressed a second issue, which I thought merited a separate post.
Shortly before trial, in a reply brief, Defendants sought production of an "Advisory Services Agreement" between the plaintiff and third party IPNav. They had previously informally requested the document at a deposition, and renewed that request as part of their motion to reopen discovery after the document's importance became apparent in light of the standing dispute. Defendants request at the deposition was apparently on the record, and Plaintiff indicated it would look for the document, but Defendants did not follow up with a formal document request:
In In Re Chanbond, LLC Patent Litigation, Judge Andrews denied a request for post-pretrial-order discovery on Friday. The request came after Defendants received an e-mail from attorneys from third-party Deirdre Leane alleging that her consent was required for any settlement between the defendants and plaintiff ChanBond:
On September 2, 2020, Defendants received an email from Ms. Leane’s counsel, informing them of a dispute between Ms. Leane and ChanBond. . . . The email stated, “As we read Section 8.3 of the ISA, Ms. Leane’s written consent is required given that a license is a transfer of an interest in the patents-in-suit, which in turn are material assets of ChanBond.” . . . The email warned, “[P]lease take notice …
We've noted previously that it is tremendously difficult to win a motion for interlocutory appeal in Delaware (and pretty much everywhere else). So it comes as no surprise that litigants—innovators all—will occasionally come up with new ways to achieve the same result without all the difficulties attendant with actually moving. We now know that at least one of these methods does not work.
The parties in Malvern Panalytical, Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, C.A. No. 19-2157-RGA (D. Del.) filed a joint stipulation dismissing the 5-patent case following a claim construction opinion that apparently definitively absolved the defendant of infringing 2 of the patents. Id., D.I. 163. The stipulation, however, only dismissed the claims as to those 2 patents with prejudice while specifically reserving the plaintiff's right to "reassert the [remaining] [p]atents in the future, including in the event of a reversal and remand to this Court following the expected appeal from the final judgment entered pursuant to this Joint Stipulation of Non-Infringement." Id.
Despite that fact that this was a joint stipulation ...
Under Judge Andrews' form scheduling order, the parties are allotted a certain number of pages for both Daubert and summary judgment briefs. Given how difficult it is to win mostDaubert motions in the district, it might sometimes make sense to forego filing one in order to devote more pages to briefing a seemingly stronger SJ motion.
Yesterday, Judge Andrews gave the district a reason to rethink this strategy.
The defendants in M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless America, Inc., C.A. No 14-1102-RGA-CJB, moved for summary judgment of non-infringement, relying largely on their expert's opinion that the devices did not practice a particular limitation. D.I. 213 at 3 (D. Del. Mar 31, 2021). The plaintiff responded by pointing to various alleged errors in the defense expert's methodology, but failed to actually file a Daubert motion to strike the opinion. See id. Judge Andrews found this failure fatal to the plaintiff's case, stating:
M2M’s objections may be the appropriate subject of a Daubert motion, but M2M does not cite any authority for the proposition that critiquing an expert’s methodology in the absence of a motion to exclude the testimony is sufficient to create a material dispute of fact.
Id. at 4.
The bit of this opinion that I find interesting is ...
We keep writing about how hard it is to win a motion to strike in D. Del., which is generally true. That said, it's still possible to get late-disclosed theories and evidence excluded, especially when there's no good explanation for the delay.
Yesterday afternoon, one plaintiff learned that lesson the hard way. As often happens, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's expert raised new opinions on motivation-to-combine in his reply report.
But instead of moving to strike (or seeking leave to submit a sur-rebuttal report, or dealing with the issue during expert depositions...), the plaintiff simply waited until summary judgment briefing. There, it submitted a rebuttal declaration from its own expert in support of its answering brief on invalidity. …
Judge Andrews issued an interesting opinion on Wednesday discussing the level of control necessary for divided infringement -- an issue that has not come up much in the district.
As the Federal Circuit laid out in Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, (Fed. Cir. 2015), divided infringement requires the parties that collectively perform all of the method steps to be part of a joint enterprise, or for one of them to "direct or control the other's performance." Id. at 1022–23.
This "direct or control" requirement has historically been a pretty good grounds for motions to dismiss or summary judgment in the district. In the 5 years since Akamai …
Daubert motions are as tough as they are common. It seems every case spawns at least one on each side, and the vast majority are denied with the Court finding that any deficiencies in the expert's methodologies are merely grounds for exploration on cross-examination.
One type that consistently beats these odds (at least in Delaware) is directed to damages experts that attempt to use the damages figures from prior jury verdicts as starting points for a hypothetical negotiation.
Judge Andrews in particular has held a hard line on this issue as shown in his decision on Wednesday in Sprint Communications Company L.P. v. Charter Communications, Inc, C.A. No. 17-1734-RGA, D.I. 573 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2021). …
Objections to Reports and Recommendations are something like an appeal. The District Judge is tasked with addressing the alleged errors of the Magistrate Judge de novo only to the extent they are "properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Thus, it is the job of the parties to raise objections to an R&R in a procedurally proper way. If they fail to do so, the District Judge is hamstrung to an extent. This outcome was on display in a recent ruling by Judge Andrews, in which both sides failed to properly object to a portion of the Magistrate Judge's R&R, leaving a patent with "serious" validity problems alive (for now).
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