We've talked a lot about how the Jumara factors, which govern how courts in the Third Circuit exercise their discretion on motions to transfer, are pretty tough on plaintiffs. Patent cases seems to stick more often than not, but plaintiffs with other claims, such as false advertising, may not be so lucky.
Judge Andrews granted a motion to transfer in a false advertising case on Friday. Here's how the factors broke down:
Plaintiff's Choice of Forum: This always favors plaintiff, and …
Last month, we wrote about the Mavexar-related witness who spent about $44,400 and counting just to avoid a trip to Delaware. Our post was prompted by the Federal Circuit affirming Judge Connolly's order imposing sanctions for her failure to appear in-person (even though, oddly, she agreed to appear remotely) for questioning by the Court related to potential misbehavior by her LLC, its attorneys, and Mavexar/IP Edge.
Well, yesterday the Court set a new hearing date, once again ordering the witness to appear for an in-person examination by the Court:
At Wilmington on this Twenty-third day of August in 2024, having received the Federal …
We're back! During our brief intermission, the Court issued an exceptional case finding in Wireless Discovery LLC v. eHarmony, Inc., C.A. No. 22-480-GBW (D. Del.), and awarded fees.
I always like reading these opinions both (1) as a guide on what not to do and (2) to figure out how to better threaten NPEs with the risk of fee awards. I'm not sure this one is going to be particularly helpful in those regards, because there were some exceptional facts.
First, the patentee filed a patent that asserted previously invalidated claims. Worse, after the accused infringer called them …
We'll be taking a brief blog intermission, until next week when I’m back from my current travel. See you then!
Patent lawyers often lament their clients' casual correspondence, which sometimes read like the villains monologue that might close the first act of an early 80's Disney Movie.
Today's case, Jackson v. NuVasive, Inc., C.A. No. 21-53-RGA, D.I. 309 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2024), is the rare case where those casual communications are helpful to the case.
You see, NuVasive had a prior agreement with Dr. Jackson that included a covenant not "assert . . . any claim that the development, manufacture . . . or exploitation of any NuVasive prodect . . . infringes and of the Jackson Group's rights" in a variety of defined IP categories. So, when Dr. Jackson sued for infringement of various patents not specifically listed in the agreement, the parties naturally disputed whether they fell within the terms of the covenant.
This leads us to an internal email from one of NuVasive's IP attorneys who worked on the agreement which helpfully stated, "I just want to ensure we’re as clear as possible that we’re FOREVER FREE FROM JACKSON (and any down-stream licensees/assignees) based on the rights we originally obtained and are now obtaining.”
Plaintiff moved in limine to exclude this email as hearsay, arguing that NuVasive would use it to prove the truth of the statement that they "were obtaining" rights that would leave them "FOREVER FREE" of Jackson.
Judge Andrews, however, found that the statement could be admitted subject to a limiting instruction:
Mr. Spangler's live testimony about what he wanted to achieve in the 2014 Agreement is not hearsay. The email clearly expresses Mr. Spangler's goal in the negotiations, which is evidence of his motive, intent, and plan. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). His motive, intent, and plan, in conjunction with other evidence, appear to be relevant to proving two of Defendant's counterclaims . . . I agree with Defendant that if Mr. Spangler's testimony were challenged, as it seems almost certainly likely to be, at least impliedly, the email would not be hearsay if offered in response to that challenge. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(B) . . . . Thus, I will admit the email. The motion (D.I. 293) is DENIED. There is a bit of hearsay within the email. If Plaintiff wants me to give a limiting instruction in connection with that bit, Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit any such proposal before the pretrial conference is held.
Id. at 3-4.
I for one find it amusing that this rare example of a communication helpful to a case was authored by an attorney. It's probably good advice to all you in-house folks out there—send the occasional email to your buds explaining that you're totally in the right. It might turn out to be important one day.
Judge Bryson unsealed a discovery dispute opinion last week in Impossible Foods Inc. v. Motif Foodworks, Inc., C.A. No. 22-311-WCB (D. Del.), addressing a motion to supplement infringement contentions after the deadline for final contentions. The patentee argued that it had good cause to supplement because it did so quickly after the accused infringer added a totally new prior art reference in their final invalidity contentions.
There are a couple of interesting things about the opinion, but I wanted to call out one in particular.
The case included a deadlines for final contentions, and then for case narrowing, with the defendant to drop to a list of 10 references. The defendant initially cut …
Chief Judge Connolly issued an opinion today addressing whether a claim to a COVID "vaccine" can extend to something that is not a "vaccine," and ultimately calling for the Federal Circuit to address its inconsistent precedent on construction of patent claim preambles.
The claims at issue claimed "[a] vaccine comprising . . ." a certain formulation. They agreed on what a vaccine is, but disagreed as to whether that term in the preamble to the claims should be limiting:
What the parties dispute is whether the term "vaccine" is "limiting" in claims 27 and 28. "Limiting" is patent-speak for "is an element of the claim." . . . Notwithstanding the fact that claim 27 …
I've noticed that, since November of last year, Judge Burke has been issuing claim construction opinions in some cases in the form of a series of oral orders on the docket, rather than a formal memorandum opinion or an order with footnotes. I thought I'd flag this so that people know what may happen if you have claim construction in a case before Judge Burke.
I first saw the Court construe terms via oral orders on the docket in November 2023, in The Nielsen Company (US), LLC v. TVision Insights, Inc., C.A. No. 22-057, D.I. 140-141 ( …
(Eds. Note - Andrew actually knows how the website works, so he could probably stop me)
Today's case is RyanAir DAC v. Booking Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 20-1191-WCB, D.I. 399 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2024). For those unfamiliar, RyanAir is sort of the Irish version of Spirit airlines, although I believe they represent a significantly less wintry ring of hell (I understand they do not charge extra for a seat that did not previously contain an incontinent cat). Booking is a third-party website for booking airfare and accommodations -- similar to Expedia for our American readers.
Apparently, it was undisputed that Booking paid contractors to scrub RyanAir's website via screengrabs to get prices to post on their site. RyanAir sued, alleging that this amounted to a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") because, in collecting the screencaps, Booking and its contractors "intentionally accessed a computer without authorization or exceeded authorized access, and thereby obtained information from any protected computer."
So I mean, its pretty close to IP.
The issue was that RyanAir's website was, unsurprisingly, open to the flying public. They ran various anti-spyware measures to prevent bots from scrubbing their website for prices and blacklisted known bots, but any normal person was free to peruse at their leisure. The dispute thus centered on whether running bots to grab the prices, in contravention of terms of service and in an active attempt to circumvent the security measures, constituted access to the website "without authorization." Judge Bryson found that ...
It can be risky to stipulate to change the deadline for dispositive motions, particularly for the reply brief, because it cuts short the Court's time to resolve those motions.
We've talked about this before, including in our guide to stipulations. But I think it's worth noting again, given that it popped up twice within the past week.
In both instances, the parties stipulated to move the reply dispositive motion deadline, while keeping the pretrial conference deadline—thus shortening the Court's time to resolve case dispositive and Daubert motions.
Likewise in both instances, the Court said no, but gave the parties some options.
As to the first stip, Magistrate Judge Burke actually suggested an abbreviated summary …
