The doctrine of equivalents is often treated as the legal equivalent of going "c'mon....c'mon! its all the same."
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It's not uncommon to see it included in infringement contentions in terms that just note that, to the extent the noodlewiggler (TM) does not literally infringe claim 38 of of the '123 patent, it's insubstantially different, and performs the same function in the same way to achieve the same result, and is lame."
Judge Andrews issued an opinion today that neatly illustrates the problem with that tactic. The defendant in Carrum Techs., LLC v. Ford Motor Comp. C.A. No. 18-1647-RGA (D. Del. Nov. 9, 2023) (Mem. Op.) moved for summary judgment on the basis of a …
"Yes, your honor, it literally meets the claim elements of an 'animal' in a 'structure' with a 'gable roof.' But under the reverse doctrine of equivalents . . ."Go to Tomas Tuma's profile Tomas Tuma, Unsplash
The reverse doctrine of equivalents and ensnarement are great for accused infringers, but for whatever reason they often seem to get set by the wayside.
Reverse doctrine of equivalents has a terrible name. It's really just the argument that even if the accused product meets the literal elements of the claim, it does not infringe because it is performs the claimed function in a substantially different way than the claimed invention.
The parties in Stragent, LLC v. Volvo Car USA, LLC, C.A. No. 22-293-JDW (D. Del.) filed a joint appendix of exhibits alongside some supplemental SJ briefing. The defendant filed a motion to seal its SJ brief, which apparently discussed internal software specifications.
The Court granted the motion to seal the SJ brief, but criticized the brief in strong terms:
Volvo seeks to file its supplemental summary judgment brief under seal, but it’s supporting brief doesn’t say much. For example, while Volvo makes generic references to “proprietary commercial, financial and business information” and …
In D. Del., stipulated extensions of the schedule are routine and are normally granted, with occasional exceptions. Usually, when the Court grants them, it results in an unremarkable order like this:
There's really nothing there. Occasionally, though, it results in an order like the below. Can you spot the difference?
Can you see it? It's tiny. The only difference is that the docket number ("52") is a link. I don't blame you if you missed it.
Usually, clicking on that link, you'll find a plain-Jane stamped or signed version of the stip as filed. Nothing remarkable or meaningful at all. It feels wrong to bill .1 hours to a client to click on the stip and look at …
When you think about it, pleading on the basis of "information and belief" is sort of funny. What else are you going to plead on? Hopes? Dreams? The lost souls of wayward lawyers past?
I just can't get the timing right on these Halloween posts . . .AI-Generated, displayed with permission
In any case, its something you see all the time, and it usually goes unchallenged. Today though, Judge Bryson issued an opinion explaining the situations where such pleading is appropriate, and those where doing so is grounds for dismissal.
The test boils down to, are the facts you plead "on information and belief" uniquely within the defendant's possession, or are supported by other factual allegations (plead not on information and belief, but on immutable and unchallengeable fact known amongst the plaintiff's brood for countless generations, all hail facts, all hail allegations)?
The use of “information and belief” pleading in the complaint is consistent with the purposes previously approved by the Third Circuit and other courts. The “information and belief” allegations relate to limitations that address the process for manufacturing the accused products, information to which DSM is not privy, or details regarding the composition of Honeywell’s products that may be difficult to ascertain by testing the finished products, but which would be readily known to the manufacturer. Those allegations are therefore made in circumstances in which the factual information in question is peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge or control. Moreover, the various other allegations that are not made on information and belief, such as the allegation that the SPECTRA Blue products exhibit characteristics substantially similar to the characteristics of the multi-filament yarns of the ’532 patent, constitute factual allegations that make DSM’s “theoretically viable claim plausible.”
DSM IP Assets, B.V. et al v. Honeywell International, Inc., C.A. No. 23-675-WCB, 10 (D. Del. Nov. 2, 2023) (Mem. Op.).
The Court also made a note that pleading willfulness on information and belief is ...
Ouch. This week in MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte Ges.m.b.H. v. Advanced Bionics LLC, C.A. No. 18-1530-JDW (D. Del. Oct. 30, 2023), Judge Wolson addressed a motion in limine to exclude testimony from both of the accused infringer's witnesses on their prior use defense.
The accused infringer didn't offer expert testimony at all on invalidity, according to the briefing. D.I. 399 at 3. Instead, it asserted a prior use defense in its contentions, presumably intending get it in through fact witness testimony.
The patentee first moved in limine to preclude the defense due to a lack of expert testimony. But the Court held that a party can present an invalidity defense without it—and compared the motion to an improper SJ motion:
The first part of AB’s Motion In Limine #1 is a summary judgment motion in disguise. MED-EL asserts invalidity in this case. If AB had a basis to argue that the absence of expert testimony dooms that claim, then it should have moved for summary judgment on the issue. It didn’t, and it can’t use an in limine motion to dispose of MED-EL’s claim. If AB believes that the lack of expert testimony means that MED-EL cannot meet its burden, then AB can seek relief under Rule 50 at the close of MED-EL’s case at trial.
(We've talked before about the risks of bringing what should be an SJ motion as a MIL.)
In other words, offering no expert testimony could be OK. The accused infringer, however, also failed to ...
I know the title is for the wrong holiday, but I can only work with what the Court provides. If you want something more appropriate, encourage your local judge to issue opinions on murders most foul and revenge from beyond the grave this time next year. There's still time for opinions on disastrous chimney collapses for the holiday season.
Somehow the reindeed ended up looking more evil than the witchAI-Generated, displayed with permission
Anyway.
Today's case, Midwest Energy Emisions Corp. and MES Inc. v Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., C.A. No. 19-1334-CJB (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2023) (Mem. OP.) has an interesting wrinkle on the distinction between the requirements for induced infringement under 271(b), and contributory infringement under 271(c). The defendants there were all somehow involved in the sales and hauling of coal to various power plants (hence the title). One particular group of defendants was allegedly involved only in the moving of the coal from place to place, but was not alleged to actually make any sales. Accordingly that defendant group (called the "Cert Operations" defendants), moved for summary judgment that they had not induced or contributed to any infringement, despite their logistical role in the process.
Judge Burke granted the motion as to the contributory infringement claims but denied it as to the induced infringement claims, stating:
Plaintiffs’ allegations are that the CERT Operations Companies are liable here because they took steps to “provide” refined coal to power plants . . . —and one can “provide” such coal not only by selling the coal to the plants, but also by playing a role in having the coal delivered to the plants. . . . On this ground then, the Motion is DENIED as to the CERT Operations Companies.
Id. at 4 (cleaned up).
But the Court does not see (and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated) how simply “participating in the operation, production and delivery” of refined coal to a power plant on behalf of a refined coal company, without more, could equate to engaging in the sale of coal from the refined coal company to the power plant. And Section 271(c) requires that these CERT Operations Companies had to have participated in some way in that sales process—a process that involves two parties agreeing to transfer property or title in return for the payment of or promise to pay an agreed-upon price. . . . [P]laintiffs have not demonstrated that any of the CERT Operations Companies advertised the coal for sale, negotiated the terms of sale, collected payment for any sale, received a portion of any sales revenue or in some other meaningful way participated in the actual negotiation and sales process. Thus, summary judgment is GRANTED as to the claims for contributory infringement against the CERT Operations Companies.
Id. at 5-6 (cleaned up).
Its a useful reminder that the language of these two closely related sections is not precisely parallel.
An order on Friday reminded me of a local counsel issue that comes up from time to time here in D. Del.
Whenever a party files a motion or a brief, the docket on PACER automatically includes a due date, like so:
312 OPENING BRIEF in Support re 311 MOTION to Amend Judgment, filed by ViaTech Technologies Inc..Answering Brief/Response due date per Local Rules is 11/8/2023. (Mayo, Andrew) . . . (Entered: 10/25/2023)
ViaTech Technologies, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., C.A. No. 20-358-RGA-JLH (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2023).
The docket text is not perfectly clear, but that due date is automatically generated based on a set of rules in PACER (that are …
Where IPRs are concerned, post-institution stays are fairly routine. But there are also instances where cases are not stayed, and it can lead to surprising results. For example, we talked last year about a case where where a defendant won on invalidity in an IPR, but had to proceed to trial anyway—and faced estoppel on their prior art.
We saw an order in a somewhat similar category this week, when Judge Williams denied a post-trial motion to stay following the invalidation of the asserted claims by the PTO in an ex parte reexamination:
ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed the Joint Status Report, D.I. 1856, filed by the parties on October 23, 2023, the Court …
By definition, you raise it after your would normally file a motion to dismiss, as the pleadings are closed. You can file one as late as you want, as long as it's "early enough not to delay trial." Honestly, I'd never seen a motion denied for being too late—until now!
He's a slow readerAI-Generated, displayed with permission
The defendant in Ecolab Inc. et al v. DuBois Chemicals, Inc., C.A. No. 21-567-RGA (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2023) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings at the same time as its SJ and Daubert motions, which was about 5 months before trial. Neither party devoted more than a few of their 40 allotted pages to the 12(c) motion—focusing instead on the SJ and Daubert issues.
(Note—the parties managed to fit the 12(c) motion briefing into their overall page limits for "dispositive motions" in the scheduling order. I think that's probably correct, but I've never seen an opinion actually addressing whether a later-filed 12(c) motion must adhere to those limits. It certainly looks like gamesmanship to give yourself an extra 20 page brief at summary judgment time, but what about a 12(c) motion filed 6 months earlier? Would those pages need to be deducted from a later SJ motion page count? I encourage someone braver than me to give it a try and see how it goes.)
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