A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: Indirect Infringement

"[T]he briefing is so lacking that it borders on comical . . . The Court is truly dumbfounded at Plaintiffs’ failure to cite any portion of the trial record . . . ."

Andrew E. Russell, Oct. 2, 2023
Contributory Infringement Judgment as a Matter of Law

Artist's illustration of one of the parties' briefs.
Artist's illustration of one of the parties' briefs. Carl Tronders, Unsplash

I wanted to call out the interesting quote in the title, which comes from an opinion Judge Noreika issued on Friday granting-in-part post-trial motions in a patent case.

The quote is in the context of a motion for JMOL of no post-suit indirect infringement because the accused infringer didn't encourage users to infringe. The Court was very disappointed in the parties' briefing:

[T]he Court must still address Defendants’ remaining complaint as to indirect infringement. Defendants argue that there was no evidence at trial to suggest that they encourage others to infringe the ’502 and ’386 Patents, which is required for a finding of inducement liability. On this point, …
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A Simple Sale

Nathan R. Hoeschen, Jan. 12, 2023
Inducement Indirect Infringement

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Interesting opinion from Judge Burke today on indirect infringement allegations, and what constitutes an "active step" to encourage the direct infringement.

The defendants in Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., C.A. No. 19-1334-CJB (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2023) (Mem. Order) sold a sort of refined coal that was a necessary agreement in an allegedly infringing process performed by power plants. They moved to dismiss the complaint for indirect infringement, arguing that, while they knew it was likely to be used in an infringing manner, they did not communicate with the end users in any way that actively induced infringement. I.e., they did not take any active steps.

Judge Burke …

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Original Complaint Supports Post-Suit Inducement and Willful Infringement, Finds Judge Burke

Jeff Castellano, Feb. 9, 2022
Willfulness MTD

It is a live question in this District whether the filing of a complaint for infringement can support a claim - asserted in a later, amended complaint - for post-suit indirect infringement or post-suit willful infringement. Judge Burke recently offered some helpful comments on his views regarding this question, and at the same time, provided some guidance about how to allege pre-suit indirect infringement.

In an R&R issued February 7 in Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Tonal Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 21-652-LPS-CJB, Judge Burke addressed two separate questions. First, whether the amended complaint adequately pleaded pre-suit indirect and willful infringement, and second, whether it adequately pleaded post-suit indirect and willful infringement...

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Judge Hall Chooses a Side in the Split Over Whether the Complaint Itself Can Establish "Knowledge" of a Patent

Andrew E. Russell, Oct. 4, 2021
Willfulness R&R

Divide
Crack on white concrete surface, Brina Blum, Unsplash

We've been following the district court cases holding that a complaint itself cannot establish knowledge of patent infringement sufficient to support a claim of indirect infringement or willfulness.

On Friday, Judge Hall jumped in, noting that judges in this district have taken views on this issue:

As many have acknowledged, courts—including courts within this district—disagree as to whether a pleading alleging post-suit inducement must allege that the defendant had the requisite knowledge prior to the filing of that particular pleading (or the lawsuit itself). I am also aware that there are courts—including in this district—that appear to hold that in the absence of pre-suit knowledge, a post-suit indirect infringement claim …
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Judge Connolly Rejects Effort to Assert Indirect Infringement Based on Post-Complaint Knowledge

David M. Fry, June 9, 2021
Willfulness R&R

Stop Sign
Luke van Zyl, Unsplash

Back in March, we noted Judge Connolly's adoption of a bright-line rule regarding reliance on post-complaint knowledge for indirect and willful infringement allegations:

[I]n the absence of binding authority to the contrary from the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, I will adopt the rule that the operative complaint in a lawsuit fails to state a claim for indirect patent infringement where the defendant's alleged knowledge of the asserted patents is based solely on the content of that complaint or a prior version of the complaint filed in the same lawsuit. And I conclude that the operative complaint in a lawsuit fails to state a claim for willfulness-based enhanced damages under § 284 where the …
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Judge Burke Criticizes "Lazy" Pleading of Indirect Infringement Allegations

David M. Fry, May 5, 2021
R&R MTD

Hammock
Mohamed Ajufaan, Unsplash

The most interesting part of a judicial decision is often found in the footnotes.

Case in point: yesterday, Magistrate Judge Burke issued an R&R on a motion to dismiss, recommending dismissal with prejudice of the patentee's contributory infringement claims (but otherwise recommending that the motion be denied).

For the most part, the R&R presents a fairly standard analysis of induced, contributory, and willful infringement claims. But it also contains several interesting footnotes, including a stern word of caution on sloppy pleadings:

As Tonal notes, . . . ICON gets off to a poor start here, since in its counterclaims, ICON did not even bother to state whether it is alleging induced infringement, contributory infringement, or both. …
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Judge Connolly Takes a Stand on Post-Complaint Knowledge

David M. Fry, March 24, 2021
Willfulness Indirect Infringement

As we pointed out last July, Judge Connolly has publicly questioned (several times) whether post-complaint knowledge is enough to state a claim for willfulness or indirect infringement. Today, he answered that question with a resounding no.

In nearly two full pages of footnotes, Judge Connolly collected the conflicting authority across the nation—and within the district—on whether an infringement complaint, by itself, is enough to support the knowledge element of willful and indirect infringement claims.

He went on to explain his own views:

ZapFraud has identified, and I know of, no area of tort law other than patent infringement where courts have allowed a plaintiff to prove an element of a legal claim with evidence that the plaintiff filed …
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Don’t Waive Your R&R Objections!

David M. Fry, Feb. 17, 2021
R&R Indirect Infringement

Judge Andrews just issued some tough guidance for parties thinking about filing R&R objections in D. Del.

The entire order is worth a read, but the most interesting tidbit is in the first footnote. Magistrate Judge Burke issued an R&R on a motion to dismiss, where he recommended dismissing the plaintiff's indirect infringement claims (without prejudice) and denying the defendant's § 101 motion.

Judge Andrews wasted no time overruling the plaintiff's objection to the dismissal of its indirect infringement claims, noting that:

Plaintiff’s argument has no impact on this case; Defendant wisely did not waste paper filing a response.

Although Judge Andrews spent more time discussing the defendant's objections, he quickly dispatched several arguments that were raised only …

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"Failure of the Defendant to Concede [Does Not] Automatically Convert . . . a Non-Willfulness Case into a Willfulness Case"

Andrew E. Russell, Dec. 9, 2020
Willfulness Indirect Infringement

Illustration of plaintiff's willfulness allegations
Illustration of plaintiff's willfulness allegations Head Of A Skeleton With A Burning Cigarette, Vincent van Gogh

Judge Andrews, in granting a motion to dismiss a patentee's willfulness allegations:

The allegations could charitably be described as bare-bones. There is nothing to suggest any pre-suit knowledge of the two asserted patents. Thus, Plaintiff’s position is that failure of the Defendant to concede after a suit is filed automatically converts a non-willfulness case into a willfulness case. I disagree. Thus, I will grant the motion as to willfulness.

In the same short order, he set out his view on the difference in pleading standards between willfulness and indirect infringement:

As to indirect infringement, I think the allegations make out a case for post-December 2014 indirect infringement. (I do not think Plaintiff is arguing that there was any pre-December 2014 indirect infringement, and, in any event, there are no allegations that would provide any basis for such a theory.). I do not think the requirements in regard to state of mind for indirect infringement are as great as they are for willfulness. Thus, I will deny the motion as to indirect infringement.
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