A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: Stipulation

People think they just have to run out that clock...
Akram Huseyn, Unsplash

It's not uncommon for parties to find themselves in a position where, while discussing settlement, they end up filing a series of short (or not so short) extensions over a potentially lengthy period in order to give themselves time to negotiate.

Why not just stipulate to a full-on stay? The problem with a complete stay is that it removes all pressure to actually get the settlement done. I've seen cases where one side wanted to push the settlement forward, but would have had to essentially move to lift a stay to apply any kind of pressure. That's not where you want to be.

Sometimes, implementing the process as a series of stipulated extensions of a deadline, such as an answer deadline, can help maintain some pressure for each side to continue to negotiate while not actually requiring the parties to litigate. There is always the implicit threat that, if the parties can't agree on a further extension, the case will start right back up again.

As we've noted before, though, eventually the Court may want an update. The exact number of repeated extensions that a particular judge will tolerate likely depends on the circumstances, but it's not infinite.

We got another data point on this last week after the parties in a patent action before Judge Bryson filed 7 stipulations to stay an answer deadline. The Court granted the newest stip, but asked in the accompanying oral order for a status update within 4 days:

ORDER: This stipulation to extend time (D.I. 249 ) is granted. However, this is the seventh stipulation to extend time for defendants to file their answers and counterclaims with nearly identical language. Accordingly, parties are directed to file a joint status report with the court no later than December 12, 2025, at 5 p.m. Eastern Time setting forth what progress has been made toward settlement of this matter, what remains to be done, and when the parties expect this matter to be resolved. Signed by Judge William C. Bryson on 12/08/2025. (mpb) (Entered: 12/08/2025)

Colt International Clothing, Inc. v. Quasar Science LLC, C.A. No. 22-213-WCB, D.I. 250 (D. Del.).

On the fourth day, the parties filed a notice of settlement and promised to dismiss the case.

Many (2) years ago, we (Andrew) wrote a (comparatively) riveting post about the Court denying a stipulation to extend redaction deadlines (insert witty parenthetical). In that post we speculated that the denial may have been due to either the number of documents affected (10) or the long length of the extension (6 weeks). No firm conclusion could be reached without greater powers of divination.

Hulki Okan, Unsplash

Yesterday we had another denial of a stip to extend redaction times in Qualcomm Inc. v. ARM Holdings PLC, C.A. No. 24-490-MN. D.I. 494 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2025), that I think was a bit less mysterious.

The stipulation related to redacted SJ filings—openings, oppositions, and replies with all the accompanying papers.

The parties had already extended the deadlines for everything by several weeks when they filed a new stipulation seeking to move back the redaction deadlines for just the exhibits by a few more weeks.

I am no augur (that's Andrew's beat), and my powers to pierce the veil of the Court's reasoning are only of for mundane sort. But for my money, the key reason this stip was denied can be found in the following passage—I dare you to read it without your eyes glazing over:

the deadline for the parties to file redacted versions of their respective declarations and exhibits associated with opening (D.I. 410-413, 416-418, 422-424, 427-429, 432, 435-436, 439-440, 444-445), opposition (D.I. 448-450, 452, 454-455, 457, 459, 465-470), and reply (D.I. 479-480, 483, 485, 487, 491-492) summary judgment and Daubert papers is here by extended to December 1, 2025.

I tried to count how many docket items this is like 3 times before giving up. I can tell you it's on the order of 50, shoot me an email if you've got what you think is the real number (I promise I won't even try to check your math!).

[Edited by Andrew: It's 41. I think.]

Apparenly this is a picture of a large magnet, rather than a particle accelerator. Either way, it looks like someone left their binder in it.
Apparenly this is a picture of a large magnet, rather than a particle accelerator. Either way, it looks like someone left their binder in it. Brandon Style, Unsplash

We've talked about this before, but it was so long ago that I think it's worth pointing out again. Typically, left to their own devices, parties in patent cases will schedule initial contentions, then claim construction and a Markman hearing, and then final contentions.

In theory, the final contentions can then reflect claim constructions. In practice, it doesn't always work out that way, given that a Markman opinion may come out after the hearing anyway. If you want to have constructions before final contentions, you need to leave a fair …

Entering into a stipulation is easy. You say we both agree to move this date or not assert that patent, and normally the court signs it and everyone goes about their business.

Getting out of a stipulation is harder.

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

If you're wondering just how hard, I present to you Judge Bataillon's opinion this week in Astellas Pharma Inc. v. Zydus, Inc., C.A. No. 20-1589-WCB (D. Del. May 30, 2025).

In that case Judge Bataillon resolved the rare "motion for relief from stipulation." The parties had long ago entered into a case narrowing stipulation in which the defendants dropped their obviousness and anticipation defenses.

Following a trial, then an appeal and a remand, the case was back in Judge Bataillon's hands, and was a bit more complicated. In the interim, it had been consolidated with related cases against other defendants and new claims from a related patent.

Because those other claims and other defendants were not bound by the prior stipulation, Lupin and Zydus argued that ...

(Eds. note—my therapist (an avid reader of the blog) tells me that the title of this post is inaccurate and indicative of an "unhelpful" worldview.)

(Second Eds. Note—My therapist has asked that I not quote her in the blog. Apparently it "demeans us both.")

Amie Roussel, Unsplash

What can you do.

Today's tale is of a stipulation, born of hope and an honest desire to streamline a case, that ended in acrimony and pain.

The parties in Roger P. Jackson, M.D. v. NuVasive, Inc., C.A. No. 21-53-RGA, D.I. 431 (D. Del. Feb 21, 2025), had long ago stipulated to several representative products for the purposes of infringement and invalidity across an otherwise vast swath of accused …

I am from Minnesota. Home of the noble loon, and dainty ladyslipper. It is a harsh place. I have read in books of lands where a person's word is all they have -- a sacred thing that must be protected at all costs. To barter it away is to invite the most dire peril.

I wasn't really using it much anyway...
I wasn't really using it much anyway... AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Minnesota is not such a place. The winds are fickle there, and everyone understands that most commitments are contingent upon a (sometimes unlikely) confluence of fortuitous occurrences. If you way, I'll visit Gramma this weekend, there's an implied "if it's not too cold." If you say "I'll bring the cheeseburger soup" it's understood that you …

We lawyers move things around all the time. Some due date or another falls on a vacation, an expert gets sick, a bunch of files won't load -- a thousand different minor catastrophes can occur. In Delaware, the result is almost invariably a stipulation to move the relevant dates.

WHEREAS, on the first day the waters turned to blood;
WHEREAS, on the first day the waters turned to blood; AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Typically for little interim deadlines, the Court will grant the stipulation as a matter of course. Deadlines a little closer to trial are a bit trickier. Judge Connolly, for instance, notes in his form scheduling order that "Should the parties later stipulate or otherwise request to have the [SJ and Daubert] reply brief deadline extended, the parties …

As we've covered in the past, stipulations are hard.

Their very simplicity can lull you into a false sense of security. Their ubiquity obscures their finer details.

(Eds. Note -- this was meant to be a haiku, but I couldn't make it work. Please prepare your own legal haiku for submission to our annual contest.)

Wei Feng, Unsplash

Judge Burke's decision in CosmoKey Solutions GmbH & Co. KG v. Duo Security, Inc., C.A. No. 18-1477-JLH-CJB (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2024) (Oral Order), deals with a stipulation that encompassed more than intended.

The case began life under the watchful gaze of Chief Judge Connolly. Like all patent cases assigned to him at the time, the scheduling order …

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AI-Generated, displayed with permission

As we've noted in the past, it's fairly routine to stay cases once an IPR is instituted. But the Court has at least once denied a stipulated stay where the IPRs were not yet instituted.

Last week the visiting Judge Choe-Groves denied a stipulated stay where the PTAB had instituted an IPR for two out of three patents-in-suit—leaving one patent not subject to an IPR, as the parties explained in the stip:

WHEREAS, Teladoc filed three petitions for inter partes review (“IPR”) (Nos. IPR2024-00618, IPR2024-00616; and IPR2024-00617) of the Asserted Patents;
WHEREAS, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) instituted IPRs on the ’554 and ’142 Patents on September 16, 2024 and September 17, 2024; …

Deadline extensions are perhaps the most common of all requests to the Court. I have seen requests granted for medical reasons, conflicts with deadlines in other cases, prescheduled vacations, and the need to enact a dark ritual which can only take place when the moon fears to rise (we'll have a post about that one on the future, assuming the ritual is unsuccessful and does not result in all things returning to dust beneath the sacred ash and the profane oak).

Paul Robert, Unsplash

Today's post, however, is a tale of an extension denied. The defendant in Purdue Pharma LP v. Accord Healthcare Inc., C.A. No. 22-913-WCB, D.I. 111 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2024) had prevailed on its obviousness defense following a bench trial and filed a timely motion for fees 14 days after the Court entered final judgment.

The plaintiff, however, apparently intended to appeal the invalidity determination and thus requested that the defendant stipulated to defer briefing on fees until after the resolution of that appeal. When the defendant refused to stipulation, plaintiff moved to defer briefing until after the appeal and requesting expedited consideration of the motion (as the clock was already ticking on its 2-weeks to file a responsive fees brief).

Unlike in the true to life examples listed at the start of the blog, the plaintiffs motion was not based in any particular conflict with client or counsel. Instead, the deferment was based on the general proposition that "the appeal may impact or otherwise refute the bases for Accord’s motion." Id., D.I. 108 at 2. The defendant filed a short opposition to the motion, noting that this logic would apply to essentially any motion for fees.

Judge Bryson denied the motion to defer the briefing in a short order:

The motion to defer briefing on Accord's motion for attorneys fees 108 is denied. The court will determine when to rule on Accord's motion for attorneys fees after the briefing is complete.

We'll keep a watch out for that fees opinion and let you know if it comes before or after the appeal.