A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: Summary Judgment

Laura Ockel, Unsplash

The Doctrine of Equivalents can sometimes be an irritating aspect of patent law. Patent applicants tend to draft broad claims to begin with, and modern claim construction law likewise tends towards broad constructions. Once you add DOE on top, it can start to feel like the patent covers anything and everything.

But there is a boundary. Under the doctrine of "vitiation," courts have held that DOE can't be used to extend a claim to the oppose of what was claimed.

We got a good example of that this week from visiting judge Kennelly, who granted a motion for summary judgement of non-infringement after a seemingly fully-articulated DOE claim (DOE claims are often not-so-well articulated).

In …

Here is something you don't see everyday.

On Thursday, Judge Andrews granted a motion for summary judgment of invalidity for claims that failed to include a limitation from the spec.

In MHL Custom, Inc. v. Waydoo USA, Inc., C.A. No. 21-091-RGA (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2023), the patent at issue described a "passively stable hydrofoil." The hydrofoil is a board that a person can ride in the ocean, with a big fin under the water to keep it stable:

The hydrofoil at issue, from U.S. Pat. No. 9,586,659
The hydrofoil at issue, from U.S. Pat. No. 9,586,659 U.S. Pat. No. 9,586,659

As the Court describes, the whole patent is focused on the board's stability feature:

The specification of the '659 Patent only, and repeatedly, describes the …

We've talked quite a bit on the blog about navigating the concise statement of facts in summary judgment briefing. Judges Connolly, Noreika, Williams, Burke, and Hall all require one, and it's a common—yet severe!—stumbling block in the district which has hobbled many a fine brief.

Mehmet Turgut Kirkgoz, Unsplash

Indeed, we talk about it so much that you could (almost) be forgiven for thinking that all of our judges require such a statement with their summary judgment briefing.

Judge Andrews, however, has never adopted the practice and actually does not allow parties to submit separate statements of fact (or at least, not ones that otherwise expand the page limits). He made this point quite clearly in an order last week responding to a motion to strike such a statement:

Defendant requests that I strike Plaintiffs rogue statement of uncontested facts, which Plaintiff opposes. (D.I. 197 , 198 ). I expect counsel to know my practices, whether written or unwritten. My practice for summary judgment motions does not permit what Plaintiff did. There is nothing in the scheduling order of this case or the later form order on the Courts website that would serve as encouragement for Plaintiff to do what it did. Neither, however, is there anything expressly prohibiting what Plaintiff did. Plaintiffs statement of facts, which has 12 pages of text, is (by eyeball) about 8 pages of facts that are scattered throughout its opening brief with about 4 pages of citations in support, which are omitted from the opening brief. Thus, Plaintiff has gained a 4-page advantage by committing something more akin to a traffic violation than a felony. I think the proportionate response is ...

Chris Chow, Unsplash

The concise statement of facts is perhaps the trickiest part of SJ practice in Delaware. Given the limited space available in the briefs, it's often the only place where a party has room to lay out the story behind their motion and the case as a whole.

The danger, of course, is that you'll put in some unnecessary fact which the other party may dispute. While this might seem like a minor worry, Judge Connolly has denied many SJ motions on this basis alone.

Last week Judge Williams took the same tack in Victaulic Company v. ASC Engineered Solutions, LLC, C.A. No. 20-887-GBW (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2022) (Mem. Order), a case which he …

The Court has said in the past that "winning summary judgment in a patent case is like hitting a hole in one." Well, yesterday DePuy Synthes scored a hole in one, invalidating all asserted claims of one patent on SJ in RSB Spine, LLC v. DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1515-RGA (D. Del. Nov. 22, 2022).

How Did They Do It?

Basically, they won it at claim construction, but couldn't end the case until summary judgment.

The patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 6,984,234, covers a "base plate" that a surgeon can screw into two bones in a person's spinal cord to stabilize them.

The base plate screws into the bones (blue, below), and a …

Secret Plan
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

New Judge Williams is on a roll lately, releasing seven new opinions on Wednesday alone. Sadly we can't post about them all—I'd be doing nothing but writing blog posts. But I wanted to take the opportunity to point out an opinion from a rare (in D. Del., at least) trade secret action.

In Zoppas Industries de Mexico, S.A. v. Backer EHP Inc., C.A. No. 18-1693-GBW (D. Del.), the plaintiff accused the defendant of misappropriating its trade secret information about heating elements for appliances.

According to the complaint, plaintiff disclosed its literal secret plan—the "Zoppas Plan"—to appliance manufacturer Whirlpool. The complaint also alleges that the defendant here, Backer, then acquired that secret plan …

Here's an AI-generated patentee dealing with the burden of proof on marking.
Here's an AI-generated patentee dealing with the burden of proof on marking. AI-Generated, displayed with permission

My co-blogger Nate wrote yesterday about Magistrate Judge Hall's discussion of prior art estoppel in Innovative Memory Systems Inc. v. Micron Technology Inc., No. 14-1480-RGA (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2022). That was actually just one issue the Court dealt with in a lengthy R&R and Order on a summary judgment and Daubert. I wanted to post about one of the other issues Judge Hall addressed in that opinion: patent marking.

Marking is an important and sometimes underrated issue. It's not uncommon, in patent cases, for the bulk of the damages to have accrued in the years prior to the plaintiff filing suit. These "pre-suit" damages can be at risk, though, if the patentee sold products that practice the patent and failed to mark them under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). Here is how Judge Hall explained it in Innovative Memory:

[W]hen a plaintiff makes or sells a product practicing its patent, the plaintiff can only recover pre-suit damages from an infringer if (1) the patentee marked its product in the manner specified in § 287(a) or (2) the patentee notified the infringer of its infringement. Even if a plaintiff patentee doesn’t make or sell anything, it cannot recover pre-suit damages (absent providing notice) if a prior owner of the patent failed to mark its products covered by the patent.

One interesting thing about marking, ...

Schedule issues
Towfiqu barbhuiya

We've recently flagged Judge Noreika's evolving practice of sometimes requiring parties to seek leave before filing summary judgment or Daubert motions. It doesn't seem to happen in every case, and so far the Court has often granted leave for at least one summary judgment or Daubert motion in each case. But it's worth keeping in mind if you have a case before Judge Noreika.

Yesterday, we saw a new variation on Judge Noreika's previous orders on this issue. She specifically noted that the trial was a bench trial (it is an ANDA case):

ORAL ORDER re . . . Stipulation and Proposed Order - WHEREAS, the parties have submitted a proposed stipulation that includes, inter alia, new …

mario-la-pergola-hxCQXj5mB7Y-unsplash
Mario La Pergola, Unsplash

It's easy to fall into the trap of separating rules into "technical" and "substantive" and on that basis to choose which must be followed and which can be safely ignored. Judge Noreika neatly illustrated how foolhardy this practice can be last week, when she issued a brief, two-sentence order denying a summary judgment motion:

WHEREAS, pursuant to the 47 Scheduling Order, a separate concise statement of facts shall be filed with any summary judgment motion; and WHEREAS, Plaintiff did not file such statement with its 194 Motion for Summary Judgment. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED for failure to comply with this Court's procedures set forth in the Scheduling Order

Board …

This Photo Is Great
This Photo Is Great Artem Kniaz, Unsplash

Continuing our discussion of trends in summary judgment practice from last week, today we will be checking in on a practice Judge Noreika has been using recently to limit summary judgment motions in her cases.

All the way back in January, we noted that Judge Noreika had issued an opinion in Gentex Corp. v. Galvion Ltd., C.A. No. 19-921-MN, D.I. 163 (D. Del. Dec. 16, 2021), eliminating the standard summary judgment procedures in the scheduling order and instead requiring the parties to move for leave before filing any summary judgment or Daubert motion. In the intervening months, this practice has not yet been memorialized in a standing …