A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


RGA
The Honorable Richard G. Andrews

I like to think we are getting in to spring. That new life is on the verge of breaking free of the currently cold and fetid ground. That Persephone is not held up on some unusually difficult underworld errand. That we may again be renewed.

My furnace died during the last snowstorm, which has made me weirdly more poetic and prone to flights of drama
My furnace died during the last snowstorm, which has made me weirdly more poetic and prone to flights of drama AI-Generated, displayed with permission

In that spirit of renewal, I bring you the opinion in Ferrer Int'l S.A. v. Verge Analytics Inc., C.A. No. 24-694-RGA (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2026). That case dealt with a surprisingly novel set of facts.

The plaintiff filed a complaint and the defendant filed counterclaims, which the plaintiff answered. Then, there was an amended complaint, followed by amended counterclaims that were identical to the original counterclaims. The answer to those counterclaims, however, was different from the previous answer, with some allegations that were previously admitted now denied.

The defendant moved to strike these changed responses to the counterclaims, "premised on the theory that Plaintiff could not substantively change its responses to the unchanged allegations of the counterclaims."

In the spirit of the season, Judge Andrews denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff was free to start anew, unfettered by its old responses:

In this case, Plaintiff was required to respond to Defendant’s amended pleading. Plaintiff was not limited to copying its previous response to the counterclaims. It could treat them as new counterclaims.

Id. at 2.

And so let us all bask in the coming light of a new and stronger sun. Free to reconsider old bargains and break new ground.

I am so cold.

Danger
Micaela Parente, Unsplash

In Pierce v. Delaware River and Bay Authority, C.A. No. 24-679-RGA (D. Del.), an employment case, the defendant filed a pretty typical 20-page motion for summary judgment that sought summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims.

In response, the plaintiff filed a motion for 10 additional pages for its answering summary judgment brief, in order to address all of his claims, including "retaliation under the First Amendment, and Defamation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law." Id., D.I. 54 at 2. The defendants opposed.

Or, at least, they did in theory. The Court granted the motion before the defendants filed their responsive brief, and the plaintiff received 50% more pages than …

As we've mentioned previously, the 12(b)(6) motion based on a lack of details, is a dying beast. Only coaxed from its cave by the juiciest of prizes.

I wanted nuggets!
I wanted nuggets! mana5280, Unsplash

It's a simple fact, and it's the work of a blogger to cozy it up in a middling metaphor and accompanying stock photo.

[Eds. Note - I've been bugging Andrew to add functionality for Gifs, which I think will really elevate the blog. Consider this my formal request for the Court to implement the same feature on Pacer].

But one can trust Judge Andrews to put it in plain, quotable, terms.

[Eds. Note -- please let me know if you've ever quoted the blog …

"You should grant our stay because it will increase the chances of institution which will increase the chances of you granting our stay" Ihcoyc

This week in MYW Semitech, LLC v. Apple Inc., C.A. No. 25-504-RGA-EGT (D. Del.), the Court rejected a pre-institution IPR stay argument that I haven't seen before.

The accused infringer pointed out that the PTAB now considers whether any pending District Court action is stayed. It argued that, because institution would simplify the case (one of the traditional stay factors), the Court should stay pre-institution to maximize the chances of institution and, thus, simplification:

Under the new bifurcated process, granting a stay increases the likelihood of simplification of the issues. The factors considered by the Director as part of the discretionary denial process include “whether the court granted a stay” in this case. . . . This “evolving circumstance[]” means that granting a stay at this point directly increases the likelihood that [the accused infringer]’s IPRs will be considered on the merits and instituted—which in turns increases the likelihood that these IPRs will simplify the issues for the Court. . . . Thus, a stay promotes the simplification of the issues by encouraging the Director to allow consideration of the IPR on the merits for purposes of institution. The new discretionary denial procedure thus presents a new reality that uniquely warrants a stay while IPRs are at the discretionary considerations stage.

D.I. 65 at 2-3. Judge Andrews denied the pre-institution stay in a three-sentence oral order, and dedicated one of those three sentences to specifically rejecting this new argument:

ORAL ORDER: The motion for a stay pending IPR (D.I. 59) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal should an IPR actually be instituted. There is no reason to interrupt the schedule based on speculation about what might happen in April or June 2026. (D.I. 60 at 2). I note that I do not think that I should grant a stay in order to increase [the defendant]'s chances of getting an IPR instituted.

MYW Semitech, LLC v. Apple Inc., C.A. No. 25-504-RGA-EGT, D.I. 68 (D. Del. Jan. 21, 2026). Good to know!

Nightmare Birds
Alessandro Benassi, Unsplash

Missing a notice of appeal deadline is a nightmare scenario for an attorney. It's easy to imagine how it could happen: Final judgments can come at somewhat random times, and it's not a deadline that PACER flags for counsel. And, depending on how things go, it may be difficult or impossible to get the deadline extended. If that happens, that's it: your case may be over.

It looks like this nightmare almost played out in a recent District of Delaware case.

In Belden Canada ULC v. CommScope, Inc., C.A. No. 22-782-RGA (D. Del.), the Court entered a final judgment on October 14, 2025. The notice of appeal was due Thursday, November 13, 2025 …

Secrets Barrel
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

The blog was on hiatus for a few weeks back in early September while I was out for a brief baby break, a period which included an important opinion from Judge Andrews. He granted a motion to dismiss a DTSA claim that relied on inevitable disclosure, holding that inevitable disclosure is not a cognizable harm under the DTSA:

I find that, to the extent FICO relies on the inevitable disclosure doctrine to plead threatened misappropriation, FICO has failed to state a claim under the DTSA. Dr. Bastert is bound by multiple agreements that bar him from disclosing FICO's trade secrets to his new employer. (D.I. 1 131). That Dr. Bastert only provided FICO with a …

I have no idea what image would go with this, so here is a mildly interested chipmunk.
I have no idea what image would go with this, so here is a mildly interested chipmunk. Andrew E. Russell, displayed with permission

Yesterday, Judge Andrews granted two motions to dismiss willfulness allegations for a failure to allege knowledge. The orders are short and sweet, and provide some examples of the kinds of allegations that are not sufficient to allege knowledge of the asserted patent in support of a willfulness claim.

First, in New Directions Technology Consulting, LLC v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., C.A. No. 25-506-RGA (D. Del.), the Court granted the willfulness portion of a motion to dismiss in just three sentences:

The motion to dismiss the willfulness allegations is GRANTED. Alleging that employees of Defendants attended a 2016 presentation on the topic of "Benefits of IP Partnering for Drug Delivery Telemanagement" provides no factual basis for an allegation of willfulness. Nor does the allegation that in 2021 an online article "Patents are Important for Smart Healthcare Products"-- described the patents and that Defendants subscribe to the online publication.

New Directions Technology Consulting, LLC v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., C.A. No. 25-506-RGA, D.I. 18 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2025).

This decision was quick, issuing less than two motions after the motion to dismiss, although it only addressed the motion in part. The Court referred the motion's remaining allegation re: § 101 to Magistrate Judge Tennyson.

The Court also issued an uncommonly ...

As a man of letters, I am often astounded by the power of certain small and simple expressions to remain in the general consciousness for decades.

Why does taco Tuesday still ring so true? Any number of callow admen must have attempted to start Fish Friday (a natural choice for many reasons), macaroni Monday, or Waldorf Salad Wednesday, yet all of these efforts are long forgotten.

Will any of us recognize the next great cultural alliteration when it arrives, or will it be known only in history's telling?

saracohenn, Unsplash

All of this is only in reference to the title, so if you've read it so far please see me for a coupon redeemable for a discount at any …

Judge Andrews had an interesting decision yesterday on the hypothetical negotiation date in an ANDA case.

Sebastian Herrmann, Unsplash

Obviously, damages issues like a hypothetical negotiation date don't come up very often in an ANDA case. Mallinckrodt PLC v. Airgast Therapeutics LLC, C.A. No. 22-1648-RGA, D.I. 461 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2025), was a little different, however. In that case, the Defendant Airgas had actually filed its ANDA 12 years before the case was filed, and before any of the asserted patents were added to the Orange Book. Accordingly, there was no 30-month stay.

By the time summary judgment came around, Airgas had launched its product and damages were thus in play. The parties disputed whether …

I know that I promised a hard-hitting post on infringement stats in ANDA cases, and I was really going to post the update this time—really! But then the very first case I read had a neat issue that deserved a post on its own. We can only hope I remember to get to it next week.

My blog calendar
My blog calendar Claudio Schwartz, Unsplash

In the meantime, today I have the rare case where the Court actually granted an adverse inference as a discovery sanction.

Central to infringement in Novartis Pharms. Corp v. MSN Pharms Inc., C.A. No. 22-1395-RGA, D.I. 523 (D. Del. July 11, 2025), was a factual issue that is only of interest to analytical chemistry …